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Abstract 
This thesis is about Aceh, Indonesia, the Northernmost province in Indonesia with 
special autonomous rights to implement Islamic law, better known as shari’a. It 
examines the discursive practice of the implementation of shari’a in Aceh, regarding 
how men and women should behave.  
 
This research is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted from August 2016 to 
February 2017 in Aceh, Indonesia. In analysing the data, this thesis is informed by 
constructivist grounded theory and critical discourse analysis. This research found that 
local shari’a codification regulates people in various aspects, from public appearance, 
religiosity, morality and behaviour, as well as mobility and sexuality. It argues that the 
law is constructed within a patriarchal interpretation and it regulates women more 
than men. 
 
The finding also highlights the local shari’a regulations are aimed at creating what 
Foucault referred to as the “docile body”, in which the government, through the law 
and its various shari’a institutions, has set certain norms to regulate and control 
people as well as monitor the practice of shari’a to ensure their obedience. Aceh’s 
shari’a also regulates various forms of penalties, including public caning. This 
research illuminates how this punishment reproduces and sustains the concept of 
masculinity and gender hierarchy.  
 
The discourse of shari’a application in Aceh constitutes expressions of masculinity 
and femininity and sexuality. This thesis argues this local codified version of shari’a 
promotes the idea of a unified standard model of femininity, in particular how women 
should be dressed in public. 
 
This thesis also provides alternative views of women’s agency. Agency here is not 
only seen as a form of resistance, it also considers how women negotiate all the 
regulations and patriarchal values, but at the same time they create space to 
destabilise, construct and re construct these norms. 
 
Keywords: shari’a, Islamic law; gender discourse; femininity; masculinity  
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Introduction 
The state plays important roles in constructing gender relations and gender 
parity. It constructs gender ideology within the society through the law, policies and 
even public institutions. This thesis explores how gender ideology is constructed and 
how women and men should behave under local shari’a law in Aceh, Indonesia. 
In this regard, I borrow the definition of ideology provided by van Dijk (2009) 
who said, “Ideologies are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its members”. 
According to Van Dijk (2006, p. 116), there are four fundamental characteristics of 
ideology: (i) a belief system that is (ii) socially shared by members of a collective or 
group of people (iii) which control and manage other socially shared beliefs (iv) and is 
gradually obtained or changes over a certain period of time. He argued that, in a 
socially shared belief system, ideology constitutes social representations that define 
the group’s social identities and could possibly be developed or changed by members 
of the group. Thus, the term gender ideology here is referring to gender construction 
within Aceh shari’a law and how it controls people’s appearance and behaviour in 
public. According to Van Dijk (2006) ideology also determines a set of common 
cultural values relevant for the society. Hence, this research attempts to examine the 
general cultural values believed to concern gender in Aceh’s shari’a law. 
My research is conducted in Aceh province, which lies at the northwestern tip 
of Sumatera Island, Indonesia. The province was guaranteed status as a special 
autonomous region following the signing of the peace agreement known as the 
Helsinki Agreement, in 2005, between the government of Indonesia and the 
secessionist movement in the province of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), literally 
translated as the Free Aceh Movement. The deal not only ended the conflict that 
began in 1976 in the westernmost province of Indonesia, it also opened the door for 
the reconstruction of Aceh’s constitutions and rule of law. It ratified Aceh’s rights of 
special autonomy to self-govern the province and to re-establish the implementation 
of shari’a law in the region, through the local constitution, Qanun, that was enacted in 
2002 as part of previous efforts to create peace. The Helsinki Agreement was 
followed by the Law on Governing Aceh (No. 11/ 2006), which reaffirmed the 
province’s rights to re-establish the Qanun. 
In the same year Aceh issued Qanun No. 11 (2002), in which some of its 
points regulated women’s clothing as having to be loose-fitting and not showing the 
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shape of their bodies. In addition, some regions even banned women from wearing 
jeans as part of the implementation of shari’a law (Affiat, 2011). Given that Aceh 
gained special status and privileges, including the implementation of shari’a law, it is 
interesting to investigate how this has affected gender ideology within the society. 
Before explaining details about the structure of the thesis, I would like to 
explain the context of shari’a in this thesis. In the case of Aceh and Indonesia in 
general, shari’a often refers to Islamic law, and the local codification is often called 
‘shari’a law’. As this term is used in everyday conversation as well, in this thesis 
shari’a refers to local codification of Islamic law. However, here I also would like to 
emphasise the real meaning of shari’a, from a language perspective. Shari’a literally 
means ‘the way’ and it does not refer to a codified law.1 However, the term shari’a is 
often overused and misunderstood as Islamic law. Wael Hallaq, Professor of Islamic 
law and Islamic Intellectual History described that much recent literature and reading 
have distorted shari’a, puzzling its principals and its application in the modern day 
that is highly politicised.2 According to Asma Asfarudddin, Professor of Islamic 
Studies at Indiana University, shari’a is best understood as extensive moral and 
ethical principles based on the two primary sources of Islam that is the Quran and 
Hadith (saying and practice of the Prophet Muhammad). 
Neither the Quran, nor the Hadith are books of law, however both sources 
provided the main principles for Muslim followers all over the globe. If Islamic 
knowledge is sourced from these two texts, then why does the practice vary across the 
Muslim world and society? In order to answer this question, we need to understand 
how the two sources have been preserved and interpreted until today. The Quran has 
been preserved in its entirety from the original version, which was originally 
preserved through memorisation by the prophet and his companions. After the Prophet 
Muhammad died, his companions compiled the Quran to preserve it and in the present 
day the Quran, in its entire originality is available anywhere either in the form of a 
hard copy book or electronic version. Thus, there is no debate regarding the Quran’s 
content, differences only appeared regarding the Quran interpretation (tafsir) due to 
various methods used in interpreting the text (see. Shihab, 1996) The Hadith which is 
often defined as the prophet’s saying and practice, has played a crucial role in 
                                                1	See	Asma	Afsaruddin:	https://theconversation.com/what-shari’a-law-means-five-questions-answered-79325	2	See	Wael	B.	Hallaq:	An	Introduction	to	Islamic	law,	p.1	
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interpreting the Quran as scholars often refer to it even though it was not compiled 
until decades or even centuries after the prophet died. The civil wars and sectarian 
schisms in the Muslim community after his death caused some groups to try to forge 
the Hadith for their benefit (Brown, 2009, p.3-4). Thus, unlike the Quran, its 
authenticity has been one major concern for Muslim scholars until the present day 
(Brown, 2009). Authenticity has become one of the main reasons that influence 
various interpretations regarding religious text, as some Islamic scholars or jurists 
doubted the accuracy of some hadith. As a result, diversity has become the very core 
values of religious text interpretation, thus codification of shari’a which has 
homogenised and standardised religious text interpretation into a fixed law would 
omit this heterogeneity. 
The codification of shari’a or the “Islamization of Politics” (see Buehler, 
2016) has transformed authority regarding religious text interpretation which was in 
the hands of Islamic scholars or jurists, to the state. As this thesis argues (see chapter 
4), the state has become a single authority that monopolises religious text 
interpretation and has transformed it into the so called shari’a regulations. In the hand 
of the state, these have also become political products, especially in a Muslim 
majority country like Indonesia. It is used by politicians to directly appeal to the 
constituents and some influencers or groups which have large followers, to gain 
political support (Pisani and Buehler, 2016).  
Previous scholarship about shari’a in Aceh mostly focuses on the shari’a 
regulation in general and how the system works, without analysing the text 
thoroughly. Feener (2014) wrote about how the shari’a in Aceh has been formulated 
as a social engineering project by its architect or agents. His works focus on 
individuals and institutions involved in creating and designing the regulations as well 
as their implementation. He discussed some features in Qanun 11 (2002) that shape 
shari’a in Aceh, such as the concept of syiar (activities regarding glorification and 
promotion of Islamic teaching), ʿaqīda (belief), ʿibādāt (worship) and the institutions 
responsible for the reinforcement of shari’a, the shari’a police or Wilayatul Hisbah 
(WH). Feener (2014) also discussed the early draft of Qanun Jinayat, where Irwandi, 
the Governor at that time, refused to sign the bill. It later went through some revision 
and became Qanun No. 6 (2014) about Jinayat Law which was passed by the new 
Governor at that time, Zaini Abdullah. This law is one out of few legal documents 
analysed in this thesis. Buehler and Muhtada (2016) studied the diffusion of shari’a 
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regulations all over Indonesia from 1998 to 2013 and found it was clustered in six 
provinces: West Java, West Sumatra, South Kalimantan, East Java, South Sulawesi 
and Aceh. Regarding the contents, their analysis found that the law regulates 
collection of religious alms (zakat), Islamic micro-finance, fostering ‘proper faith’ and 
banning sects or groups considered deviant (i.e. Ahmadiyah group), dress codes, 
alcohol consumption, gambling and prostitution. 
Another important aspect of this thesis is about agency. Studies of how women 
perform their agency within a patriarchal culture and the application of shari’a are 
still very limited. In 2013, Jacqueline Siapno published her work which discussed 
women’s agency in Aceh. She highlighted women greater roles in society in relation 
to the local tradition of matrifocality (see chapter 3). However, Siapno also 
emphasised that her work was conducted between 1992 and 1996, before the 
application of shari’a and when the province was still under violent conflict between 
GAM and Indonesian Government (Siapno, 2013). In time of war or violent conflict, 
the volatility of gender roles is a common phenomenon (Pirmasari, 2016), thus under 
this kind of situation, women often have more space to perform or play more roles on 
various occasions. A more recent account coming from Afrianty (2015) who wrote 
about shari’a and women in Aceh, particularly local women’s NGOs, agreed with 
Siapno (2013) that women in Aceh are not passive and silent. Afrianty’s work focuses 
on local women’s NGOs and local movement and how they used these organisations 
to fight for equality, civil and political rights, as well as economic and socio-cultural 
rights. Neither Siapno, nor Afrianty studied the local shari’a regulations in detail. 
During Siapno’s study, shari’a had not been implemented officially in Aceh, while 
Afrianty conducted her fieldwork between 2007 and 2008, not long after the tsunami 
in 2004 and peace agreement in 2005. It was the time when many international 
organisations entered the province which had been isolated due to the prolonged war 
(see also chapter 3). Thus, the codification of shari’a was not as extensive as today, 
because the province was still recovering and started to re-build. This thesis fills the 
gap by providing a more recent account exploring how women perform their agency 
in the post-war society Aceh, under the implementation of shari’a. This thesis adds to 
the very limited accounts regarding women’s agency and Islamic law, particularly in 
Aceh, Indonesia. 
This thesis is based on six months’ ethnography fieldwork conducted between 
2016 and 2017 in Aceh, Indonesia. Thus, it provided a real account of the application 
	 13	
of shari’a in the modern day and how its codification affected the society. I analyse 
the local qanun (local shari’a codification) as well as its practice in everyday life.  
This research highlights how local shari’a codification regulates people in 
various aspects, from public appearance, religiosity, morality and behaviour as well as 
mobility and sexuality. The findings also highlight how local shari’a regulations aim 
to create what Foucault refers to as the “docile body”, in which the government 
through the law and its various shari’a institutions has set certain norms to regulate 
and control people as well as monitoring the practice to ensure people’s obedience 
towards the law. This thesis also highlights how women negotiate their identity to 
perform agency, which helps them to the construct and reconstruct the norms. 
Overall, this thesis highlights the practice of shari’a in modern day, 
particularly in Aceh in Indonesia. The codification of shari’a has become the main 
character of the contemporary practice, in which the state or government plays the 
most significant roles to interpret and codify religious text and monitor people’s 
behaviour. 
Structure of the thesis and Intended Reader 
In brief, this thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 explores background of the 
research, by highlighting the history of conflict in Aceh that lasted for almost 30 
years, and efforts made to solve it, including giving the province an autonomous right 
to implement shari’a. I also elaborate on gender discourse in Aceh particularly related 
to the concept of national identity and post-conflict negotiations. In this chapter I also 
highlight how this thesis was informed by feminist post-colonial theory and I use the 
term ‘Indonesian feminist’ to describe my position. Chapter 2 explores the research 
methodology used in this thesis. It highlights the ethnography approach I used, type of 
data collected, and analysis utilising computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
(CAQDAS) NVivo; and describes details of how the thesis is informed by 
constructivist grounded theory (CGT) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). In 
chapter 3, I analyse women’s position in Aceh society within traditional matrifocal 
culture and the historical context from the sultanate era, the colonial period, through to 
the present day, which was also affected by the prolonged conflict and tsunami 
disaster in 2004. Thus, this chapter provides the historical background that influenced 
gender construction in Aceh. Chapter 4 explores gender construction in local qanun 
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and its practice in everyday life. In this chapter, I highlight gendered regulations 
within some local laws analysed in this thesis and how they are practiced in the 
society. Thus, this chapter provides details of gender ideology of how men and 
women are expected to behave in Aceh under local shari’a regulations and it’s 
discursive practice. The public caning ceremony as a form of punishment regulated in 
local qanun will be discussed in chapter 5. In this chapter, I argue that the ceremony 
maintains and disseminates control over women’s bodies and at the same time 
contributes towards the production and re-production of the concept of masculinity 
and gender hierarchy. This chapter also highlights the legacy of colonialism within the 
application of Islamic law, particularly regarding the practice of corporal punishment. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates the concept of agency in subaltern studies and how women in 
Aceh perform their agency. Thus, this thesis also aims to provide an alternative 
account regarding women’s agency, how it is performed and could be understood 
within different frameworks and cultural backgrounds. Finally, chapter 7 provides the 
conclusion of the thesis. 
This thesis is intended for those who are interested in the study of gender and 
Islam, and the practice of shari’a outside the Middle Eastern context, which in this 
thesis is Aceh, Indonesia. In the last decades, the implementation of shari’a has 
emerged in many countries across the globe, especially in the Southeast Asia. Aceh 
first introduced shari’a in 2002, some regions like Kelantan in Malaysia also 
introduced shari’a, and in May 2019, Brunei Darussalam announced a strict shari’a 
penal code with some harsh punishment, such as stoning to death for adultery and 
homosexuality, and amputation for theft. Thus, this thesis provides an ethnography 
based research regarding the implementation of shari’a in Aceh, Indonesia. My work 
highlights gender constructions within the law, how shari’a is practiced in the society 
and how women manage to perform their agency within the society and Islamic 
tradition that is often seen as patriarchal and denying women’s agency. This thesis 
could also be read by those interested in post-colonial theory and the legacy of 
colonialism with regard to the implementation of Islamic law, particularly in the case 
of Indonesia.  
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Chapter 1. Gender, Conflict and National Identity in Aceh: 
Background and Research Questions 
In 2002, the northernmost province of Indonesia, Aceh officially declared the 
application of Islamic law in the region. This declaration did not come without any 
trigger, Aceh had experienced prolonged violent conflict between GAM and the 
Government of Indonesia for almost three decades. In order to end the war, the 
Indonesian Government granted Aceh special autonomy status in 1999, which was 
later followed by the declaration of shari’a law by Aceh’s Governor, Abdullah Puteh. 
This announcement was followed by the codification of shari’a in which Qanun No. 
11 (2002) about religious affairs, worship and religious symbols became the very first 
bill passed. This first law mentioned various aspects, including regulation of people’s 
religiosity, public appearance and establishment of the Shari’a Police, known as WH, 
as the institution responsible to reinforce the implementation of Islamic law in the 
society. Since then, the application of Islamic law in Aceh has often been in the 
spotlight due to the increasing of vigilante acts in the name of reinforcing shari’a, and 
the brutality of public caning as punishment and discriminatory towards women. 
In fact, Islamic law is often portrayed as a law that controls people’s bodies 
and morality, and implements harsh corporal punishment to those who breach it, by 
caning, amputation and death by stoning. Islamic law is also often described as 
oppressive towards women, and controlling their bodies so they have no autonomy. It 
is even called misogynist and hostile to women.3 Thus, saving Muslim women from 
their oppressive men, culture and religion has been the narrative since the colonial era. 
The veil, for instance, is described as oppressive and this has brought about the 
narrative of unveiling as a means to liberate them (Ahmed, 2011, Rich, 2014, Fanon, 
1965). 
This chapter provides a brief historical background of violent conflict in Aceh 
and how it has sparked a stronger sense of Islamic identity. In brief, this chapter will 
be divided into four main sections. Section one provides a brief historical background 
of the Aceh conflict and its landscape, and how Islam and the religious leaders 
(ulama) played significant roles within the society. The next section will discuss 
gender discourse in Aceh. There are two fundamental fields upon which this thesis 
draws: gender and national identity (section 1.2.1) and gender and post conflict 
                                                3	See:	https://womenintheworld.com/2016/04/07/passionate-debate-erupts-over-the-future-for-women-in-islam/	
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(section 1.2.2). These were chosen following many previous studies about nationalist 
movements in war and the aftermath, particularly in Aceh. This helps me in exploring 
current literature in this study, and to locate this research within the existing 
scholarship in this field. It also helps to see how this research will be different from 
other work, in order to fill the gap in these particular studies. The fourth section will 
focus on the use of postcolonial feminist theory and the concept of the third world 
feminist, which will lead to a discussion as to why I use the term ‘Indonesian 
Feminist’ in this research. The last section will end this chapter by highlighting the 
research questions. 
1.1 From a Conflict Zone to Special Autonomy 
To begin with, in this section, I will provide some basic historical information about 
Aceh and the landscape of conflict in the region, as well as the connection between 
politics and religion within it. As previously mentioned, Aceh is the westernmost 
province of Indonesia, situated in the Northwest of Sumatera Island, with an area of 
approximately 56,770 square kilometres. 
The conflict dates to 1976 when Hasan Tiro established the Free Aceh 
Movement, a secessionist organisation aimed to fight for independence in Aceh and 
build a separate state from Indonesia. However, in Aceh history, GAM was not the 
first separatist movement in the province, as, in 1953, Daud Beureu’eh, the chairman 
of Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh, or All-Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA), formed 
Darul Islam to seek autonomy and the implementation of shari’a (Aspinall, 2006, 
Bertrand, 2004). Ulama is the word used for an Islamic religious leader, who is 
generally respected by Muslims, particularly in Aceh. According to Fauziyah (2014), 
ulama comes from ‘alima-ya’lamu-‘ilman, in Arabic which means a recognised 
scholar who has deep and wide knowledge of Islamic religious texts.  
The Darul Islam movement, which literally means Abode of Islam, was 
created as a reaction against the Indonesian government, which did not implement 
Islamic rules as the nation’s legal constitution, as was believed by the Acehnese to be 
their common goals during the war against Dutch colonialism (Aspinall, 2006). 
Before establishing Darul Islam, in the late 1940s, Daud Beureu’eh, together with the 
urban youth movement, which shared the same idea of creating an Islamic state, took 
control of the Acehnese to join the struggle against Dutch colonialism in Indonesia 
	 17	
(Bertrand, 2004, Kell, 1995). However, after Indonesia gained independence in 1945, 
the country rejected the implementation of Islamic law. Instead, Soekarno, Indonesia’s 
first president, chose to adopt Pancasila which promoted pluralism as the national 
ideology as the basis of the state, which made the Acehnese feel their struggle had 
been betrayed (Aspinall, 2006, Bertrand, 2004, Malley, 2001). 
Given that some movements in Aceh were led by religious leaders, it is 
important to recognise their power in gaining public support and mobilising the 
masses. The role of ulama was not only respected, but had also played an important 
role within society and in Aceh politics since the nineteenth century (Milallos, 2007). 
According to Fauziyah (2014), although ulama is a neutral word which could be 
associated with either a male or female religious expert, in fact narratives about ulama 
are predominantly male. She argued male domination in this context affected the 
interpretation of religious text, which could lead to a gender bias understanding that 
accommodated patriarchal interpretation and the marginalisation of women. 
In the Aceh context, ulama (predominantly male) led some guerrilla 
movements to fight against Dutch colonialism, as well as the Japanese and Indonesian 
government, from 1940 onwards (Milallos, 2007). According to Shaw (2008), the fact 
that the ulama managed to gain public support and lead the struggle to fight against 
the foreign power, reflects the significance of religion to the movement’s ideology. 
Islam was the point of commonality and used as an identity. 
During the war, some efforts made by the Government of Indonesia to bring 
an end to the conflict in Aceh continued, by giving the region special autonomy status 
and renaming the province Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, which literally means Aceh 
land of peace. Huber (2008) argued that the special autonomy given at that time was 
not fully implemented; however, it gave the province rights to implement shari’a law. 
On 15th March, 2002, coinciding with the first day of the Islamic year of 1423, the 
Governor of Aceh province, Abdullah Puteh, officially declared the beginning of 
implementation of shari’a law. 
As a matter of fact, formalisation of shari’a was not one of the goals of GAM 
when it was first founded by Hasan Tiro, as he sought Aceh’s independence from 
Indonesia (Aspinall, 2007). In one of his speeches Hasan Tiro highlighted how 
“colonialism, either by white, Dutch, Europeans, or by brown, Javanese Asians is not 
acceptable to the people of Aceh Sumatra” (di Tiro, 1984; p.16). However, it cannot 
be denied many of the military leaders in GAM were Darul Islam veterans and 
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members of its first cabinet had family ties with Darul Islam supporters (Aspinall, 
2007). Furthermore, in some of their propagandist narrative, GAM did not only 
emphasise Aceh’s past glory and Javanese tyranny over them, but also called their 
struggle against the Government of Indonesia a “religious duty” (Aspinall, 2007; 
p.253). 
A few years after GAM was established, in 1979, many GAM leaders were 
forced into exile, thus gaining International support, particularly from the United 
States, Europe and Australia, a key strategy in order to support their movement  
(Schulze, 2006). Although the group often claimed its goal is Aceh’s independence 
and often distanced itself from being seen as an Islamic group, as they do not want to 
be affiliated with radical islamic groups or terrorism (See Aspinall, 2007; Kingsbury, 
2007; Schulze, 2006), after the Iranian revolution in the 1980s GAM tried to gain 
support from some Muslim countries. In 1985, the group got support from Muammar 
Ghaddafi, who provided GAM fighters military training in Libya from 1986 until 
1989 (Schulze, 2006). However this support did not last long and was no longer 
maintained in 1990s  (Chalk, 2001). From 1990s onwards, realising western countries 
crucial roles in the success of the secession in Eastern Europe and the referendum in 
East Timor in 1999 which give them independence from Indonesia, GAM focused on 
lobbying western support (Aspinall, 2007). The group tried to bring their case for 
Independence for Aceh to the United Nation, attracting foreign media and building 
relationships with International human rights organisations. GAM also intensified its 
military approach to provoke Indonesian military violent reactions and get 
International attention towards Aceh conflict (Schulze, 2006).  
At the same time, the Indonesian government also tried a different approach in 
dealing with the conflict in Aceh. Having realised the strong Islamic influence 
towards Aceh society, in 1999, the Indonesian government granted Aceh special 
autonomy status, which later on allowed the province to implement shari’a law. In 
response to this, GAM officials and the Prime Minister of the State Aceh Malik 
Mahmud stated their disagreement towards the imposition of shari’a law in Aceh by 
Indonesian government: “GAM’s struggle is motivated by and based on independence 
and not on religious issues. Jakarta is merely using syariah laws as a propaganda ploy 
to deviate public opinion from the real issue of the conflict.” (Kingsbury, 2007; p. 
166). 
Indonesian government strategy could also be seen as an effort to build 
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Acehnese support towards central government and distance the people from the 
rebellious group. As said by Malik Mahmud, “The gift [of sharia] was placed at our 
parliament’s door. Should we accept it or not? If not, we could be seen Anti-Islam, but 
accepting it means a problem” (BBC, 2015). GAM claimed this unwanted gift of 
shari’a is part of Indonesian government effort to portray them as a radical Islamic 
group in front of international community (Miller and Feener, 2010), particularly after 
September 11 incident. 
 At the same time, since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, 
religious activism in Indonesia increased and the government’s new decentralisation 
policy brought about a politics of Islamic identity which was used by some elites to 
gain support from the people to win the elections (Buehler, 2013). Shari’a regulations 
become a commodity to win people’s support, particularly in areas with strong Islamic 
roots. Thus in 2002, Aceh’s Governor Abdullah Puteh, who was seen as a lackey of 
Jakarta by GAM (See Schulze, 2006), declared the beginning of the implementation 
of Islamic law. 
The introduction of shari’a did not bring an end to the Aceh conflict and only 
in 2005 GAM finally agreed to end the war by signing the Helsinki Agreement with 
the Indonesian government. The success of the peace talks was inseparable from the 
critical situation faced by the province following the tsunami disaster of December 
2004, which made peace both possible and critical in order to re-build Aceh. The deal 
was regarded as one of the most successful peace agreements in the modern age 
(Pearlman, 2014), as it finally brought peace to Aceh after several unsuccessful 
negotiations between the government and the rebel group. 
Even though GAM initially rejected the shari’a law as their goal and claimed it 
as Indonesian government effort to deviate public from the real problem of the 
conflict, when GAM members took control of power and local government in Aceh, 
they also utilised shari’a to gain people support. As mentioned by Buehler (2013), 
since 1998 shari’a regulations were often used by political elites to gain support from 
the people. Thus since then, in Aceh and other regions in Indonesia with strong 
Islamic roots as well as at the national level, political elites often used religion to lure 
their constituents in order to win elections. 
In Aceh history, the region began to socialise Islamic values and Arab culture 
in the 8th century (Hurgronje, 1906a). However, the idea to implement Islamic Law in 
the region only arose in 1939 when PUSA was established by Teungku Daud 
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Bereu’eh (Noerdin, 2005, p.1-2). Ulama, or religious leaders, used Islam as the 
rhetoric to unite and mobilise Acehnese at that time to fight against the foreign power 
that was Dutch Colonialism (Reid, 2006). However, according to Siapno (2013), 
women were never forced to wear the veil until 1999, when ‘razia jilbab’ or ‘veil 
raids’ were conducted by several groups. Human Rights Watch (2010c) stated that this 
operation subjected women who did not wear a veil in public to violent acts, such as 
verbal abuse or having their hair and clothes cut by the groups of male vigilantes who 
conducted the raids. In 2002, it became a legitimate order, endorsed by the state 
through local government, following the implementation of Qanun No. 11 (2002). 
Since then, more laws and government orders have been passed to control the female 
body and women’s mobility in public.  
Following the introduction of Islamic law in Aceh, local elites also conducted 
various ways to promote and develop shari’a regulation, such as learning from 
neighbouring countries like Kelantan in Malaysia and inviting religious scholars from 
other Muslim countries like Egypt. In 2018, the city mayor of Banda Aceh Aminullah 
Usman said that, together with local religious leaders, they agreed to conduct a study 
visit to Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries such as Brunei Darussalam 
regarding the idea to open cinemas and permit music festivals/concerts (Detiknews, 
2018; Indozone, 2019). At the same time, some other Muslim countries including 
Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia also conducted study visit to Aceh to learn various 
aspect or local regulations and institutions regarding the implementation of Islamic 
law in Aceh. Thus, there has been a continuous transfer of knowledge regarding the 
application of Islamic law, particularly between Aceh and two neighbouring Southeast 
Asian countries, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. 
A growing body of reports and research has been conducted related to the 
implementation of shari’a law and women’s subordination in Aceh. The next section 
will discuss previous research and review the literature regarding gender and shari’a 
law in Aceh. In this research, I follow Fatima Mernissi’s standpoint about the context 
of Islam, in which she says: 
Every time I speak of Islam without any other qualification, I am referring to 
political Islam, to Islam as the practice of power, to the acts of people 
animated by passions and motivated by interest, which is different from 
Islam Risala, the divine message, the ideal recorded in the Koran, the holy 
book. (Mernissi, 2006, p.5) 
 
I believe that, in the context of Aceh and many other religion-associated 
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conflicts, the religion itself is politicised, and used to justify the acts of certain groups 
and to gain public support for their actions. The fact that Aceh is a Muslim majority 
province and known as one of the centres of Islamic civilisation in Indonesia, where 
Islam has also historically played a key role in society, demonstrates the strong 
influence of religion in Aceh. However, as argued by Roald (2001, p. 119), “texts are 
present in their entirety in the body of religious literature, but one tends to choose and 
interpret texts, intentionally or unintentionally, according to what is compatible with 
one’s own attitude”. This is the case with Islamic text that is rooted in the holy book, 
whereby the interpretation of the text tends to be politicised by a certain kind of group 
to preserve its hegemony. Therefore, this thesis aims to investigate the implementation 
of Islamic law in Aceh, especially in relation to gender construction. 
 
1.2 Gender Discourse in Aceh: An Overview 
Despite all the efforts that have been made to eliminate the gender gap and promote 
female empowerment around the globe, equality remains, as yet, an unfulfilled goal. 
In many cultures, the terms ‘female empowerment’ and ‘gender equality’ often 
conflict with local norms, making them difficult to be accepted. Gender equality is 
usually linked to the feminist movement, often seen as ‘western ideology’, and 
perceived as the legacy of colonialism, particularly for many Islamic organisations in 
Indonesia, as well as the state gender ideology during the 32 years of the New Order 
era (Blackburn, 2004). It creates an additional barrier, since the term ‘western 
ideology’ often builds resistance from a society which believes that any kind of 
colonial legacy, which will be discussed later, must be fought. Strong resistance 
movements against ‘foreign power’ are usually followed by the re-construction of 
local identities. 
Aceh’s identity, and the source of political trouble in the region for almost 30 
years, has been discussed in the works of various scholars, such as Reid (2004), 
Aspinall (2007), Crow (2010), Thalang (2009), Reid (2004). Others, like McCall 
(2000), Santoso and Yuniver (2009) studied female GAM combatants, known as 
Inong Balee, (female widows) (see chapter 2), and their lack of involvement in the 
peace process. Another scholar, Noerdin (2005), focused on the implementation of 
shari’a law as part of the special autonomy granted to the region in 2002, while 
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Siapno (2013) discussed female agency in Aceh society within the complex interplay 
between Islamic belief and practices, indigenous matrifocality and state violence. 
Siapno’s work provides an important account regarding Islamic belief and female 
agency in Aceh. However, as previously mentioned, her research was conducted 
before the codification of shari’a or before Aceh officially declared the 
implementation of Islamic law and passed any local shari’a regulations. Siapno 
conducted ethnography fieldwork between 1992–1996, or when Aceh still 
experiencing violent conflict between GAM and the Government of Indonesia, and 
the special autonomous rights has not been granted to the province. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, Aceh officially declared the application of shari’a in the region 
after being granted special autonomous rights by Central Government of Indonesia 
which also gave them rights to pass their own local law in some aspects. Thus, this 
thesis aims to fill the gap within research about Islamic law in Aceh, in which I will 
look at some laws, passed after Aceh adopted Islamic law. Like Siapno, this research 
also employed an ethnography approach, which will be explained in chapter 2. 
The next section will review previous research regarding the Aceh conflict, 
and, as explained earlier in this chapter, the discussion will focus on three 
fundamental fields, which represent many previous studies on the Aceh conflict. The 
three categories that will be draws upon are: gender and national identity and gender 
and post-conflict.  
1.2.1 Gender and National Identity 
 
This subsection will seek to explore previous research and literature regarding gender 
and the notion of national identity, especially in Aceh. It will begin by highlighting 
the role of religion as a common identity that is used to mobilise and unite people to 
fight against a foreign power. The discussion is followed by an exploration of 
previous studies in this field in order to identify the significance of the research I am 
conducting. It also aims to determine how my thesis differs from previous studies in 
order to fill the gap in this particular field. 
To begin with, the Aceh conflict is often seen as a form of resistance to fight 
against a foreign power in which Islam played a significant role to mobilise people. 
Historically, Aceh had internalised Islamic values into its culture since the 8th century, 
which was subsequently used by religious leaders to mobilise the society to fight 
(Hurgronje, 1906a). During the war against the Dutch, religious leaders called upon 
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the Acehnese to fight in order to defend the nation and religion from the Dutch 
colonials, referred to as infidels. Islam was used as an identity that united the 
Acehnese to take up arms and go to war. 
In fact, Aceh started to use Islamic values, including restricting women’s 
public appearance or to make the Acehnese identity more visible, after foreign powers 
began to invade the region. Even though Islamic values have been part of Aceh’s 
national identity for centuries, women were never forced to wear the veil until mid-
1999, when it was imposed in response to the presence of the Indonesian military in 
the region, which used sexual violence to humiliate the local people (Siapno, 2013). In 
other words, restrictions regarding women’s bodies in the name of the enforcement of 
shari’a law aimed to show how Aceh’s national identity differentiates it from the rest 
of Indonesia. Islam was used as a form of resistance and tool to unite the Acehnese to 
fight against the foreign threat that was Dutch colonialism at the beginning, and the 
Indonesian government later on.  
Noerdin (2005) discussed the political identity of women in Aceh in which she 
highlighted women’s participation in the nationalist movement and in the political 
stages in Aceh’s history. She attempted to understand the struggle of power relations 
in the construction and deconstruction of nationalism in Aceh, based on Islam, 
through discourse analysis at three levels: language, institutions and social process, 
and subjectivity. To analyse discourse in language, she studied a historical Aceh text, 
Hikayat Perang Sabil, written in the 17th century, and another recent publication, 
written in the 19th century, in order to show women’s inclusion in the decision-making 
process and their involvement in war within the older text and their exclusion in the 
more recent one. She also examined female domestication as represented in national 
government policy and local shari’a law, which showed how gender discourse was 
constructed through institutions and the social process. In addition, interviews with 
women activists aimed to examine how discourse worked at the level of subjectivity. 
Noerdin (2005) argued that Acehnese women were victims of three main powers: 
GAM, the Indonesian military forces, and religious leaders or ulama. 
However, as argued by Lee-Koo (2012), this kind of one-dimensional 
representation of women as victims reduces their aptitude to perform political agency 
in the aftermath, by ignoring their various skills developed during insurgency. She 
also emphasised that seeing women as victims during war means denying their 
involvement or active participation on the public or political stage. Although, in one 
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way, I agree that women are often victimised in time of war, particularly in Aceh, it 
cannot be denied that they also play active roles, either in guerrilla movements or in 
advocating peace and calling for reconciliation between the warring parties. 
In addition, I would argue that Noerdin’s work only represents one single 
perspective, as all the women interviewed in her work were female activists or those 
who were active in organisations or activities to empower women and support gender 
equality. According to Shadia Marhaban, the co-founder of Liga Inong Acheh, an 
organisation aimed to empower women’s participation in public, the tsunami disaster 
of 2004 brought many international aid agencies and NGOs to Aceh to work on short-
term based programmes (Marhaban, 2011). Marhaban, who was also the only woman 
involved in the peace negotiations between GAM and the Government of Indonesia, 
argued that the situation made women’s groups and activists divided as they competed 
for donors’ funding, particularly in economic empowerment projects. It also created 
disparity between women’s groups and activists with the civilians (Marhaban, 2011). 
Hence, I would argue that women’s experiences are diverse, not only during the war, 
but also in the aftermath, which could possibly make them have different perspectives 
on the situation in Aceh and the implementation of shari’a law. Regardless of their 
situation as Acehnese women, I believe it is also important to listen to the voice of 
women from a different variety of backgrounds, not only women activists. Having 
diverse voices could help to avoid the simplification of all women’s experiences the 
homogenisation of their situation. 
Furthermore, Noerdin’s work also focuses on women’s situation in relation to 
political circumstances, whereby she did not really put local culture into context. For 
example, when explaining about a situation after the tsunami disaster in 2004, 
whereby a group of young men stopped a journalist’s car when entering a village in 
Aceh. The men told the passengers that ‘Inong-inong’, which literally means 
‘women’, wanted to talk to them. When they did so, all the men there remained quiet 
and let the women speak. Noerdin (2005) described this as social awareness, wherein 
the society trusted women to play an important political role as spokespersons. She 
also argued that it indicates Acehnese women are ready to get involved in political 
roles when needed. However, I would argue it is more about Aceh’s traditional 
culture, in which women are highly respected in society. As noted by Hurgronje 
(1906a), in Aceh culture, in the past, women had high freedom of action and were 
very knowledgeable about what happened around them. Furthermore, he said: 
	 25	
The women are also the hereditary guardians of old-fashioned words and 
expressions, the meanings of proverbial sayings and so forth. When enquiring 
into such matters I have been often told by Acehnese that they must refer to 
their wives or mothers, and I can say that the latter seldom failed to supply the 
desired information. (Hurgronje, 1906a, p.371)  
  
It indicates how women were highly respected in Aceh’s traditional culture. Hence, I 
would say that, despite all the new politicised policy enacted in the province, 
customary values still remain, at least within some communities in society. 
Violent conflict in Aceh has affected many aspects of people’s lives, including 
their culture, traditional values and other form of identities. Jacqueline Aquino 
Siapno, who conducted ethnographic research in Aceh from 1992 to 1996, found 
varied experiences between women who lived in the cities and those who lived in the 
villages. There were differences in how Islam was practised by people from villages 
and those who lived in the city, which affected the re-creation of Acehnese identity 
and nationalism in relation to state violence; urban women tended to be more 
conscious of defending their Islamic identity than those who lived in the villages, 
which resulted in more veiled women in the cities rather than in the rural areas 
(Siapno, 2013). 
According to Siapno (2013), as urban societies face more interaction with 
foreign people from many different backgrounds, they tend to build stronger 
resistance and Islamic identity in response to foreign cultures that are perceived as 
threats. In the case of Aceh, urban women experienced more interaction with the 
Indonesian government and the economy and met many people of different ethnicities 
or nationalities who worked at the multinational companies in Aceh, and also the 
Indonesian military troops. Siapno also emphasised the fact that urban women have 
more access to information through mass media, whereby so-called ‘Westernisation’, 
is spread in society. In addition, according to Siapno, feminism is also seen as the 
most obvious symbol of ‘Westernisation’. She believed all these situations lead to 
more restrictions regarding urban women’s bodies and emphasis on their roles in the 
domestic space. 
Siapno also mentioned that, together with western values, Aceh also showed 
negative sentiments towards the Indonesian government, which was perceived as 
‘Java Centris’, or prioritising Javanese culture as the nation’s identity. Specifically, 
she mentioned Javanese traditional costume, the sarung and kebaya, the ‘national 
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dress’ for women, which is usually required to be worn at official events, such as 
university graduation ceremonies. On the other hand, men are not required to wear 
‘national dress’ and usually wear western clothing, such as a shirt and tie. As Siapno 
mentioned, the female body has become a contested arena to represent one’s identity. 
The Indonesian government made the ‘national dress’ for women as a national 
identity, while some groups in Aceh also enforce their women to wear the veil to 
signify their Islamic Identity and as a form of resistance against Indonesian secular 
culture. Women’s bodies often symbolise the identity of a nation, metaphorically 
termed the motherland, a country where one belongs and which should be defended. 
Women represent the society’s honour as they are seen as the symbol of 
collective identities (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Thus, the society often feels responsible to 
protect and control women as they are seen as representatives of their communal 
identities. According to Yuval-Davis (1997) women are associated with the creation 
of the nation for two reasons: first, regarding their biological nature as the ones who 
can give birth to the next generation, and second, regarding the society’s construction 
of nationhood. In a similar manner to Yuval-Davis, Mostov (2000) argued in addition 
to being the “reproducer of the nation”, women are also often defined as the territorial 
markers and property of the nation. For example, the term motherland or mother earth 
not only associates women with the spirit of collectivity, but also collective territory 
and collective identity (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Thus, women’s bodies are seen as the 
‘entry’ point of invasion, they are targets of enemy attacks, through rape in order to 
humiliate the society and destroy the nation if they give birth to their enemy’s children 
(Mostov, 2000, Galtung, 1996). In terms of the society’s honour, an attack on 
women’s bodies by the enemy means the society has failed to uphold its 
responsibilities of protecting its own honour, which makes women at risk in times of 
violent conflict. In the case of Aceh, women’s bodies were contested between two 
powers, the Indonesian government through the enforcement of wearing national 
dress, kebaya, and the local authority which forced them to veil in public. 
In addition, according to Siapno (2013), the Indonesian military’s approach to 
the rebel movement in Aceh perpetuated more patriarchal lines within the politics of 
Islamic resistance in the region. She emphasised that Islam in Aceh would have been 
less likely to turn militant and more patriarchal if there had been no armed rebellion 
against the Indonesian state. She explained the co-existent practice of indigenous 
matrifocal beliefs and Islamic values in Aceh that has lasted for centuries, where 
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women are equally powerful as men. However, the war between the rebel movements 
against the Indonesian state reconstructed Acehnese identity into becoming more 
restrictive, not only towards women’s bodies, but also their roles and mobility. 
In her work, Siapno underscored how the war reconstructed gender, whereby 
women’s bodies and sexuality were contested sites for both the Acehnese rebels and 
the Indonesian government. Conflict in Aceh brought about a militant Acehnese 
rebellion which prided itself upon a strong Islamic identity in resistance to the 
Indonesian state that was perceived as neo-colonial and a threat to their culture. 
Islam and Islamic culture achieved hegemonic status in Aceh, but within 
this hegemony, there are opposing forms of Islam: on the one hand is the 
traditionalist Islam practiced syncretically with matrifocal (mother-centred 
and woman-centred) adat or culture. On the other hand, is modernist Islam 
with strong attempts at purification – the removal of practices such as 
matrifocal adat (e.g. women as head of the family) which supposedly 
conflict with ‘pure’ Islam. (Siapno, 2013, p.36-37) 
 
According to the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas 
Perempuan), rape was used to subjugate women, particularly those who were involved 
in the rebellion movement (Komnas Perempuan, 2009). In response to this state 
violence and the existence of military troops in Aceh, many other groups raised and 
re-constructed Aceh’s identity by veiling women and telling them how they should be 
dressed in public. This was done not only to distinguish them from the state culture 
that was considered as secular, but also to protect their women from outside threats, 
including Indonesian military troops. 
Although Islamic values have been practised and a part of Aceh culture for 
centuries, never in Aceh history had women been forced, either by the militants or 
government, to wear the veil in a public space (Siapno, 2013, p.37). Hurgronje’s work 
described how women in Aceh society at that time did not wear a veil, although there 
were some who wore a scarf, which was usually used to cover their shoulders 
(Hurgronje, 1906a). Siapno’s ethnographical works were conducted when the 
province was sometimes under operational military status, in an effort by the 
government to tackle the resurgence of separatist activity. However, in recent years, 
for example in mid-1999, as previously mentioned, razia jilbab or ‘veil raids’ 
occurred in Aceh in order to force women to wear the veil in public and when Aceh 
passed Qanun no. 11 (2002), Muslim women were obliged to wear the veil and 
banned from wearing tight clothes that could show the shape of their bodies. I would 
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argue that 2002 marked a significant change in the re-construction of gender ideology 
in Aceh and, therefore, it is necessary to undertake further study to give a more up-to-
date picture than does Siapno. 
The implementation of shari’a and the qanun as rule of law in Aceh, which 
was subsequently strengthened after the signing of the peace agreement, established a 
new chapter within the discourse of gender construction in the province. Since then, 
the control of women’s appearance in public has been endorsed by the state, 
particularly local government. Siapno (2013) acknowledged she was not writing about 
current political events in Aceh, which meant there was a lack of analysis of recent 
government policies regarding women. Therefore, this research will try to fill the gap 
by focusing on the current situation, particularly after the implementation of shari’a 
law in 2002. 
1.2.2 Gender and Post-Conflict Negotiations 
 
A second aspect of how gender and power have developed since the 2000s is in 
relation to post-conflict political negotiations and the near-total absence of women in 
these. Despite their effort to transform the violent conflict into peace in Aceh, women 
were still poorly represented in the formal peace negotiations between the 
Government of Indonesia and the secessionist group, GAM. This exclusion led to 
failure to address women’s interests and their rights in the aftermath. 
As a matter of fact, during the insurgency in Aceh, women were actively 
involved as combatants, as part of GAM’s women’s military wing, Inong Balee. The 
rebel group claimed to have around 8,000 women combatants out of a total 26,000 
soldiers (McCall, 2000), although the Indonesian Military Forces said that GAM only 
had around 200 to 300 female soldiers (Santoso and Yuniver, 2009). Despite the 
different numbers claimed by both sides, it cannot be denied that women were part of 
the ‘nationalist movement’ and joined the military struggle with the rebel group. 
In 2000, women in Aceh also made their own alternative axes of power by 
establishing women’s movements such as Duek Pakat Inong Aceh (DPIA), or the All 
Acehnese Women Congress (Siapno, 2013). The first DPIA meeting resulted in a 
recommendation calling for peace and women’s involvement throughout the process. 
However, their active involvement in military struggle and the peace movement did 
not guarantee them to be invited for strategic decision-making processes such as the 
peace talks. 
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During the Aceh peace process, which was followed by the signing of the 
peace agreement in 2005, there was only one woman involved at the negotiation table, 
Shadia Marhaban. She was one out of a nine-member negotiating team from the rebel 
group, GAM (Herbolzheimer, 2011), who also joined late in the talks (Lee-Koo, 
2012). According to Martti Ahtisaari, who acted as head of the mediation team during 
the peace talks between the Government of Indonesia and GAM, women were barely 
involved at the negotiation table and their involvement in the process was very limited 
(Ahtisaari, 2007, Crisis Management Initiative, 2006, Kamaruzzaman, 2008). 
Ahtisaari (2007) also admitted that women did not have visible roles at that 
time, but refused to discuss the reason. Based on my personal interview with the Vice 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, Jusuf Kalla, who played a key role in 
negotiating peace in Aceh, at that time there were two elements needing to be at 
peace, politics and combatants, and, as men were the actors in those two elements, 
therefore, they were involved in the negotiation process (Personal Communication, 21 
Aug 2015). Even though GAM had a women’s military wing, the Inong Balee, men 
still dominated the leadership and strategic positions in the movement, as happened at 
the negotiation table. 
Women’s exclusion from the peace process meant them also being left out of 
many strategic activities in the aftermath, such as the Aceh Transition Committee 
(Komite Peralihan Aceh/KPA), an organisation for former GAM combatants to help 
their reintegration into civilian life (Kamaruzzaman, 2008). In addition, 
Kamaruzzaman (2008) also highlighted that in the Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA), 
an organisation formed as part of the reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation 
process, there were only three women involved out of 43 members. She also 
mentioned that not one woman was included among the 3,000 former GAM fighters 
who got government compensation for ex-combatants in the first stage. 
Although GAM once claimed that women constituted about one third of their 
guerrilla fighters (McCall, 2000), their large number was not represented in the peace 
talks and the aftermath. According to the Crisis Management Initiative (2006), women 
are usually sent back to the domestic space when the war is over. Enloe (2004, p.206) 
argued that, in the post-war era, where male veterans have returned, they are expected 
to take the paid jobs, while women are returned to their domestic roles at home or 
provide support to their husbands. In her work, where she highlighted the case of the 
post-Vietnam war, “a time fraught with gendered decision” (p. 215). It demonstrates 
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that the aftermath of war and conflict usually pose massive challenges for women to 
transform the situation. 
Katrina Lee-Koo, in her work Gender at the Crossroad of Conflict: Tsunami 
and Peace in Post-2005 Aceh, investigated the gendered politics of war and peace 
after the tsunami disaster. She criticised the dominant narrative brought about by 
many of the foreign NGOs and international news media that emphasised women’s 
vulnerability in conflict-affected communities and represented them as victims. With 
the exception of Siapno’s work (2013), many news stories, NGO reports and studies 
focused on female victimhood. Nurjannah (2015) studied women’s experiences as 
victims of violence during the implementation of the Military Operations Area 
(Daerah Operasi Militer/DOM) in East Aceh from 1989 to 1999. An essay by Kay 
(n.d) also emphasised women’s victimhood, albeit acknowledging males as victims or 
casualties in the Aceh conflict. Kay highlighted the experiences of women who were 
tortured, raped and silenced during the war. Although it cannot be denied that women 
are victims of war, particularly in the context of Aceh, we also need to give space and 
acknowledge women’s agency and contribution to the society during the insurgency. 
The dominant narrative has made the diversity of women’s skills and experiences in 
calling for peace remained unacknowledged (Lee-Koo, 2012). 
According to Lee-Koo (2012), the tsunami disaster of December 2004 
provided the catalyst to the peace process, but the post-tsunami recovery processes 
sidelined the post-conflict rehabilitation, which made women’s roles during the war 
further silenced. She claimed the situation also created disparities of assistance for 
post-tsunami and post-conflict victims, in which most of the international aid was 
focused on the catastrophe caused by the seismic sea wave. 
In addition, regarding the peace process, Lee-Koo (2012) referred to it as being 
dominated by a masculine agenda that left women’s voices and experiences behind, 
since the negotiation mainly focused on a truce to halt military activities between 
GAM and the Indonesian army, the creation of special-autonomy status and political 
power sharing. She also criticised the international community and the European 
Council, who sponsored the peace talks, as they did not encourage the implementation 
of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, which calls for 
women's participation in the peace process and decision-making. Women’s absence in 
this particular situation led to a lack of representation of women-related issues or 
awareness of the diversity of experiences they had.  
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1.3 Feminist Postcolonial Theory 
This thesis is influenced by feminist postcolonial theory. According to Gandhi 
(Gandhi, 1998, p.4), 
post-colonialism can be seen as a theoretical resistance to the 
mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath. It is a disciplinary 
project devoted to the academic task of revisiting, remembering and, 
crucially, interrogating the colonial past. 
 
 Gandhi argued postcolonial studies attempt to criticise the cultural hegemony 
of European knowledge in order to bring non-European knowledge to the forefront. 
Meanwhile, in terms of feminist theory, Mohanty (2003) discussed how colonialist 
movements can be seen from Western discursive representation of women in third 
world countries and the homogenisation of their experiences. She explained that third 
world women are seen as an “oppressed group”, poor, uneducated, not progressive, 
tradition-bound, backward, family-oriented and victimised. The universalisation of 
third world women’s representation and experiences has colonialised and set aside 
their diversities, which has eventually robbed them of their historical and political 
agency (Mohanty, 2003, p. 39).  
Western discursive representation also has been criticised by Pratt (2013) who 
discussed the case of women in the Post Arab Spring. She argued there are two 
intersecting discourses that construct women’s representation seen as greatly 
participating during the uprising but then marginalised in the aftermath. This 
dominant narrative was built by two discourses: the Euro-centric feminist framework 
based on the development of the European women’s movement and the neo-orientalist 
framework where Arab women are seen as victims of eternal Arab Islamic patriarchy 
(Pratt, 2013). She further argued that, as a result, this framework could lead to the 
homogenisation of women’s experiences from the region, victimising women and 
demonising Arab men which later on would open the way for the West to be seen as 
the rescuer who brings civilisation to the Arab world. It could also lead to Spivak 
(1988a) view that “white men are saving brown women from brown men”. 
By emphasising feminist postcolonial theory, I would like to explain my 
position as an Indonesian, a country that was colonised by the Dutch for more than 
three and a half centuries. It means that I am one of the so-called ‘third world’ 
women, although I reject the term (see discussion later in this chapter), or part of the 
‘oppressed group’. However, as a scholar who has studied in a western institution, in 
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the UK in particular, reading literature and theories mainly written by western 
scholars or feminists, I am exposed to the European hegemony of knowledge that also 
influences the construction of my knowledge. I am aware of the possibility that I 
might be perpetuating this by imposing its values on the interpretation of the situation 
in my country, particularly Aceh province. Harding (1991, p. 247) refers to this as 
“the second attempted colonisation of Third World science and technology by one 
part –the feminist part - of North Atlantic culture”. However, by adding my voice to 
the various bodies of literature in this field, I could also potentially narrow the unequal 
power relations between Western and Third World feminist scholars.  
1.3.1 Third World Feminist Concepts 
 
In this research, I would like to take Uma Narayan’s third world feminist approach. 
Even though I disagree with the term, I agree with her approach, which became an 
important framework in this thesis. In her work, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, 
Traditions, and Third World Feminism, Narayan (1997) used the term ‘Third World 
Feminism’ to refer to feminists from many different cultural backgrounds or identities 
who address third world issues. Narayan aimed to criticise western understanding of 
third world cultures, traditions and women’s experiences. 
Narayan discussed Mary Daly’s argument of sati culture, or widow 
immolation, in India, in which she referred to Daly’s standpoint as “colonialist 
representation [… of third-world traditions]” (1997, p.46). She criticised Daly for her 
failure to contextualise and locate sati culture, which made it appear common practice 
among all groups in the country and which still afflict Indian women today. Narayan 
argued that Daly’s work failed to mention that sati was never a widespread practice 
among all groups or castes in India, and is no longer common nowadays. According to 
Narayan (1997), these problematic representations are caused by lack of 
understanding of historical, social, cultural and political contexts of third world 
culture. She also criticised third world men or women who follow colonialist 
representation of third world contexts. Similar to Narayan, Lazreg (1988) argued that 
many eastern feminists used western feminist values to judge women’s experiences in 
their home countries. She criticised the western perspective about Middle Eastern and 
North African women that tends to make a generalisation and evaluates women’s 
experiences in this region according to western standards. Lazreg argued that scholars 
need to understand that the lives of women in third world nations, like those in the 
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Western hemisphere, are influenced by political, economic and cultural dynamics 
(1988, p. 98). She called on scholars to learn and understand the set of knowledge 
produced by indigenous people in order to avoid universalisation of women’s 
experiences, as has been the case of western hegemony, which was also criticised by 
Mohanty (2003). 
Narayan (1997) categorised three different roles encountered by women from a 
third world background, like me, when assigned within a western context. The first 
one, the Emissary position or “Cultural Riches” approach is problematic as it seeks to 
rescue westerners from their hegemonic knowledge of third world culture, which 
makes it less critical about its own. The second one, is the “Mirror, or Looking Glass 
to the West”, in which third world scholars in a Western context study a culture 
without having to engage with the indigenous institutions. In this case, third world 
individuals become a reflection of the West, which ultimately will perpetuate western 
hegemony and its agenda. The last one is “Authentic Insiders” in which third world 
scholars also “speak for their culture” (Narayan, 1997 p.142), but are also critical of it. 
It differs from the mirror role as it allows continuous attention to the third world 
context and values without reflecting a Western agenda. An insider critic could also 
avoid misrepresentation and misleading when discussing indigenous cultures. Thus, in 
this research, I am expecting to adopt this role, especially as I employ ethnography, 
which will allow me to combine my emissary position as an Indonesian who speaks 
for our own culture, while also maintaining my critical stance as an academic scholar 
who is studying and learning about one specific culture. 
Like Narayan and Lazreg, I appreciate and respect multiculturalism and I do 
not want to generalise or universalise the experiences of women in Asia and Africa 
with those in the US or other European countries. However, I reject use of the term 
‘Third-World feminist’, which Narayan was also concerned about but still adopted to 
describe herself, a woman who engages with and is concerned about feminist issues in 
third world countries. My rejection is more about the use of the term ‘third world’, 
which I find problematic. According to Wolf-Phillips (1987) and Tomlinson (2003) it 
was initially used to refer to non-aligned countries during the Cold War, those who 
were not part of the West or Communist groups, and it also refers to a group of poor 
countries. Tomlinson (2003) also highlighted how a report by the Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues, widely referred to as the Brandt 
Report, published in 1977, used the terms ‘Third-World’, ‘South’ and ‘Developing 
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Countries’ to refer to poorer countries where people were “pre-occupied solely with 
survival and elementary needs [… and faced] total deprivation” (Tomlinson, 2003, 
p:313-314). I would argue the term is not only problematic, but also no longer 
relevant to use now, particularly to refer to Indonesia. 
My rejection of this term is related to various aspects. First, I regard it as an 
acknowledgement of the global hierarchy of power, as the First World is generally 
associated with more developed and wealthy countries, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom and other European countries, while the Second World refers to 
former Communist countries such as Russia and China. Secondly, I do not want to 
follow the western belief that African or Asian countries, like Indonesia, are 
underdeveloped and poor. As a matter of fact, Indonesia is part of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20) countries, an international forum of 20 major economies in the world. 
According to The Times of India (2015), together the G-20 member states account for 
about 85% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, the World Bank 
also classified Indonesia in the top ten of the world’s largest economies in terms of 
purchasing parity power, and economic growth remains promising following 
government focus on building more infrastructure facilities and providing more social 
assistance programmes in education and healthcare (The World Bank, 2015). In this 
regard, I would also like to highlight that I use the term G-20 only to emphasise 
Indonesia’s economic power in the world. Lastly, instead of using the term ‘Third 
World’ feminist as my identity, I prefer to see myself specifically as an Indonesian 
feminist, as I also believe that Asian countries are diverse and women’s experiences in 
this region cannot be generalised or homogenised. 
 
1.3.2 The Indonesian Feminist 
 
Indonesia is known for its diversity, stretching from Sabang to Merauke with more 
than 17,000 islands, the country is also renowned as the largest archipelagic state in 
the world. Hence, the country consists of diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious and belief 
customs. According to the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics, based on the 
population census in 2010, there are 237 million people, which makes it the fourth 
largest population in the world (BPS, 2010).  
Indonesia has the biggest Muslim population in the world with more than 207 
million followers, which makes it slightly different from other countries in Asia and 
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the Pacific region. According to Wanandi (2002), religion plays an important role 
within Indonesian society. Although Indonesia is, on the whole, a moderate Muslim 
country, after the downfall of Soeharto, some radical groups emerged, such as Laskar 
Jihad (the Jihad Brigade) and Front Pembela Islam/FPI (the Islamic Defence Front); 
and in some cases or provinces like Aceh, the implementation of Islamic values 
appears to be rather strict. Although the formalisation of shari’a law as the dominant 
law at the national level has always been rejected, at the regional level the number of 
local regulations associated with religion has increased (Bush, 2008). Bush (2008) 
found there to be 78 regional regulations influenced by religion, with 35 ordinances 
associated with ‘morality’ issues, including prostitution and gambling. Meanwhile, the 
other 43 regulations, or about 55%, are associated with Islamic values or shari’a law. 
A more recent number coming from Buehler (2016) who claimed between 1998 and 
2013 only there were 443 shari’a regulations adopted in Indonesia. The shari’a-
related regulations range from requiring people to wear Muslim clothing, managing 
zakat, to Islamic knowledge and skills such as the ability to read the holy book, the 
Quran (Bush, 2008).  
According to the Indonesia National Commission on Violence Against 
Women (Komnas Perempuan, 2009), between 1999 and 2009 only, there were 63 
local bylaws in Indonesia discriminating against women, 21 of which are specifically 
regulating how they should appear in public or are regarding their dress-code 
(Komnas Perempuan, 2010). 
Throughout history, Indonesia has long been known as a moderate Muslim 
country, wherein the nation’s Islamic followers are known as the most tolerant 
Muslims. People from different religions and beliefs can live side by side in harmony, 
representing the national motto, Bhineka Tungga Ika, which means Unity in Diversity. 
Furthermore, Indonesia’s diverse culture can also be seen from the kinship system in 
some ethnicities. Despite the patriarchal culture, some regions also uphold a 
matrifocal tradition as will be discussed in chapter 3. The matrifocal culture 
demonstrates diversity of women’s position and experiences within Indonesian 
society, and needs to be taken into account when talking about gender discourse. It 
also signifies the difference between women’s experiences in Indonesia and other 
countries. 
By highlighting Indonesia’s unique background, I would like to emphasise its 
distinction from other countries, particularly those so-called ‘third world’ countries. 
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Being born in a Muslim-dominated country and raised in a moderate Islamic society 
has affected my standpoint on Islam, which I would say is further being politicised to 
preserve some hegemonic power. In addition, Indonesia’s multiculturalism and ethnic 
diversities also influence my acceptance of different perspectives, even within the 
nation itself.  
1.4 Research Questions 
Current existing scholarship about Aceh has mainly focused on the source of conflict 
in the region, the concept of national identity, and gender and the aftermath, as 
previously discussed. Meanwhile, regarding Islamic law in Aceh many scholars focus 
on how the system works (see Feener, 2014) or women activists’ response (see 
Noerdin, 2005, Afrianty, 2015). There are still very limited accounts studying the 
legal text thoroughly, and to my knowledge there is no study yet that combines 
analysing the text and its discursive practice in everyday life, which is the core of this 
research. Therefore, this research would like to answer the following questions: 
 
1. How is gender ideology constructed within local shari’a law in Aceh? 
 a) How should men and women behave under local shari’a;  
b) How is shari’a practiced within the society? 
2. How is punishment conducted on those who do not follow the local 
codification of shari’a? 
3. How do women respond to shari’a regulations and how do they perform their 
agency within the society? 
  
Hence, this research investigates the law and how it constructs gender ideology 
within the society. A close reading of the text helps to understand how the Aceh 
government’s expectation about how people are expected to behave in everyday life. 
Thus, the next question relates to how this law is practiced in everyday life. Analysing 
the text and its practice provides a foundation to understand the unequal power 
relations within the discursive practice of shari’a, which has often been criticised for 
marginalising some groups, especially women. The next question aims to investigate 
punishment for those who breach the law. I wanted to explore if this process goes 
beyond punishing the body. In saying this, I examine how the punishment shapes and 
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reshapes gender expectations as well as gender bias, which perpetuate and maintain 
domination within the system. The last research question aims to explore how women 
perform their agency. I want to go beyond previous research which has focused on the 
marginalisation of women within the discourse of Islamic law or in war-torn societies. 
Instead I want to find out about women’s response toward the shari’a regulations and 
how they find space to perform agency. 
As mentioned earlier, this research is informed by post-colonial theory which 
also helped me to develop the research questions above. This research is both critical 
of Western hegemony of knowledge which often portrays Muslim women as 
oppressed and subjugated and policies which use religion to maintain control and 
domination over the people. The two discourses are often seen as having two different 
strands, however this research suggests that the codification of shari’a in modern day 
Aceh is perpetuating the Western colonial legacy.  
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Chapter 2. Research Methodology 
 This chapter discusses the methodological approach in conducting this 
research, from data collection to analysis. It demonstrates the process of how data for 
this thesis was gathered and analysed, some negotiations I went through during my 
fieldwork in response to the dynamic in the field, as well as some challenges I had 
particularly due to my concern of being a perpetrator of the legacy of colonialism. It is 
structured in three main sections. The first section provides details about the research 
approach and types of data, which consist of official government documents, news 
publications, interviews with local people and field notes, as well as photography and 
audio recording of events. It also highlights some stages of data gathering and how I 
gained consent from participants. The second section briefly outlines the use of CGT 
and CDA within the study. The last section elaborates the researcher’s reflexivity, 
including my understanding about subjectivity vs. objectivity, and the interplay of 
gender and colonial history in Indonesia. As there is no specific term for gender in the 
Indonesian language (Bahasa) the English term is used. As this term is often related to 
Western values it created some barriers during my fieldwork. The last section also 
elaborates my personal background which shaped my knowledge, framework and 
some of the negotiations I undertook during fieldwork. 
 
2.1 Research Approach and Types of Data 
2.1.1 Ethnography 
 
This research employed an ethnographic approach. Davies (2008, p:4-5) defined 
ethnography as a research practice that involves fieldwork and contact with those 
being studied for certain period of times and gathering data using mainly qualitative 
research techniques. Ethnography combines a variety of ways to collect data and 
information, which involves the researcher’s involvement, gathering information 
through formal and informal interviews, while also observing and investigating 
documents related to the research topic (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.3). 
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The research was conducted in Aceh where I lived for about six months in 
order to understand the ‘native’4 point of view, while also doing observation and a 
thorough investigation on the rule of law. I stayed there between August 2016 and 
February 2017, with a three-week fieldwork break from the end of October to mid-
November. According to Bernard (2006; p. 382) a break in the middle of fieldwork is 
an important stage for researchers who are conducting long-term participant 
observation. He suggested that a break be taken after the researcher has spent three to 
four months in the field, in order to obtain some distance from the research site and 
also to reflect on what has been gathered in the first few months and what else needs 
to be done. 
I spent most of my time in Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh province, with 
some short visits to other districts and towns, including Aceh Besar, Lhokseumawe, 
Takengon and Weh Island. During my fieldwork, I developed relationships with local 
people from many different backgrounds, including those who had been members of 
the secessionist group, the Free Aceh Movement. 
 
2.1.2 Types of Data 
 
Data were collected from various sources, including document analysis, interviews 
with local people, field notes, photography and audio recordings from some events 
during the fieldwork. All data were analysed in the original language, Indonesian, 
except for my own field notes which were written in English from the beginning. 
Some data and text in my mother tongue, are translated into English for the purpose of 
including examples to inform the reader. 
I decided to analyse data in the original language, due to my understanding 
about the process of translation which might change the meaning of words spoken. 
Not all words can be translated equally or exactly, for example, the Indonesian 
language does not recognise gender in the third person, it only uses the words ‘dia’ to 
refer to he or she.5 Spivak argued that “translation [is] catachresis, the making of the 
                                                4	Conducted	through	an	ethnographic	approach	and	interviews	with	local	people,	which	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	following	sections	in	this	chapter.	5	Most	 phrases	 in	 the	 Indonesian	 language	 are	 gender	 neutral,	 including	 third	 person	pronouns	and	kinship	terms,	so	must	include	an	explanation	as	to	whether	it	is	male	or	female	Quinn,	George	&	Kozok,	Uli.	2011.	 Is	Indonesian	a	non-sexist	language?	[Online].	Bahas	 Kita:	 Indonesian	 Language	 Online	 Resource.	 Available:	
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subject in reparation” (2000; p.20). Her arguments, with which I agree, are based on 
the fact that some words being translated might not convey exactly the same idea as 
the original words. Some phrase or specific jargon sometimes cannot be translated 
literally to another language or may contain cultural meaning or connections (Guo, 
2012). Thus, in line with the concept of ethnography, which is to understand the 
native point of view, I believe that analysing data in the original language helps me to 
keep connected with the local context, which will be useful in order to understand 
local values. 
However, as Spivak said, “translation is necessary and unavoidable” (Spivak, 
2000; p.21), which is also the case in my research because some of the texts and 
interview data I analysed are in the local Aceh language. Translation is a necessity in 
order to communicate and share one culture to another, therefore, it is unavoidable. In 
this research, some texts that were originally in Acehnese were translated to 
Indonesian by my local contact, when I was in Aceh. Indonesia is a country 
constituted of many different ethnic groups who all have their own local languages. 
There is no exact figure of the total number of local languages in Indonesia but, 
according to Ross (2005), Indonesia is one of the most multi-ethnic countries in the 
world with more than 300 distinct local languages. Krauss (1992) claims it has 670 
languages; and research conducted by the Indonesia Language Agency in 2011 
identified 514 distinct languages, though the exact number is estimated as higher, as 
some regions has not been studied yet (Budiwiyanto, n.d). Indonesian is a national 
language as well as the official language that must be taught as a compulsory module 
at school; however, many ethnic groups commonly preserve their local language in 
                                                                                                                                       http://www.bahasakita.com/is-indonesian-a-non-sexist-language/	 [Accessed	 22	March	2017]..	However,	according	to	Jupriono,	D	2010.	Selayang	Pandang	Ketimpangan	Gender	dalam	 Bahasa	 Indonesia.	 Parafrase,	 10,	 33-39.,	 there	 are	 a	 few	words	 and	 phrases	 in	Indonesian	which	are	gender	biased	and	put	men	as	superior	 to	women,	or	women	as	passive	 actors.	 For	 example,	 the	 term	 ‘wanita	 simpanan’	 which	 literally	 means	 ‘kept	woman’	but	 the	man	himself	 is	never	referred	to	as	 ‘lelaki	penyimpan’	or	 ‘the	one	who	keeps	the	woman’	ibid.	In	addition,	some	words	can	be	used	to	refer	to	male	and	female,	but	the	female	version	of	these	words	are	only	applicable	to	females	Yulaelawati,	Ella	&	Somantri,	 Cecep	 2013.	Bahasa	 dan	Responsif	 Gender,	 Jakarta,	 Kementerian	 Pendidikan	dan	 Kebudayaan.	 For	 instance,	 ‘mahasiswa',	 which	 means	 university	 student,	 usually	refers	to	all	males	and	females,	and	it	could	also	mean	only	male	students;	however,	the	female	version,	‘mahasiswi’,	is	only	applicable	for	women.	In	addition,	according	to	ibid.	local	 values,	 social	 interaction	 and	 culture	 could	 also	 determine	 gender	 bias	 in	 the	language.	
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their daily activities. Acehnese is one out of the aforementioned hundreds of local 
languages spoken in the archipelagic country. 
In this study, there are eight photographs of signboards I took in Banda Aceh, 
as well as some remarks people made during a caning ceremony I witnessed, written 
in Acehnese. I asked my local friends to explain the meaning of the texts on the 
signboards, while some remarks during the caning ceremony were translated for me 
during the event. Hence, in this research, all data are analysed in their original 
language, except those in Acehnese, which were translated to Indonesian to help me 
better understand the text. The analysis and findings will be written in English. 
 
Documents  
I will analyse some official documents, including local shari’a law or qanun and 
government orders, Governor Instructions (GI), which regulate women regarding their 
bodies, appearance and mobility. The analysis also includes the instructions of the 
City Mayor of Banda Aceh, as the capital is the main site of the fieldwork in this 
research. Those laws are as follows: 
 
1. Qanun no.11 (2002) on religious affairs, worship and religious symbols, which 
was the very first shari’a regulation passed by the government.  
2. Governor Regulation (GR) no. 10 (2005) on technical guidelines for 
implementation of uqubat (punishment) by caning; 
3. Qanun no. 6/2014 about jinayat law, which regulates some acts considered as 
crimes, including khalwat (affectionate contact between an unmarried couple), 
Ikhtilath (free relations between men and women), zina (adultery/sexual 
relations outside marriage), liwath (gay relationships between men) and 
musahaqah (lesbianism). 
4. GI no. 02/INSTR/2014 about policing cafe and Internet services in Aceh 
5. City Mayor Instructions (CMI) nos.1/2015 and 2/2015 about supervision and 
policing tourist services/recreation/entertainment and internet services, 
cafés/other similar services and sports facilities in Banda Aceh city. 
 
Documents are gathered from the official government website, except for three 
Instructions (GI no. 02/INSTR/2014, CMI nos.1/2015 and 2/2015), which are not 
published on the government website. However, I managed to get an e-copy of the 
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instructions from the National Commission on Violence Against Women. The three 
instructions created considerable controversy when released in 2015 and have been 
generally criticised for discriminating against women as they restrict them from being 
out at night. The Commission stated that the three regulations are discriminatory and 
detrimental to women, and could trigger more restrictions to their rights to works and 
their mobility in public (Komnas Perempuan, 2015). It also claimed that this kind of 
regulation might spark stigma towards women where those who are still around at 
night would be seen as having low morality or violating the law. Criticism also came 
from Indonesia’s Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, who admitted Aceh had the right to deal 
with its domestic affairs, as mandated by its Special Autonomy status, but also 
questioned the need to impose a curfew for women (Kompas, 08.06.2015; The Jakarta 
Post, 9.06.2015). Meanwhile, the City Mayor of Banda Aceh, Illiza Sa’aduddin 
Djamal, who passed the regulation, said that her instructions were just a follow up of 
the Governor’s Instructions, thus, she invited those who did not agree with the 
regulations to discuss the issue with him (Humas Banda Aceh, 06.06.2015). 
Furthermore, she claimed the instructions were aimed to protect women, because she 
believed working in the entertainment industry until midnight is a form of exploitation 
and makes women vulnerable to harassment. Her arguments were also supported by 
the Minister of Internal Affairs and religious scholars or ulama who saw the 
regulations as an effort to protect women (Humas Banda Aceh, 06.06.2015; 
Kemendagri, 09.06.2015). 
 Previously, in October 2014, Aceh issued Qanun no. 6/2014 about jinayat law, 
which regulates some acts that are considered as crimes, including drinking khamar 
(liquor), as well as the aforementioned crimes about acts between two people, which  
carry a possible penalty of 100 strokes in public (Qanun Aceh no.6 of 2014, 2014). 
According to Qanun Article 5, the law is applicable to all Muslims who commit the 
crimes in Aceh, all non-Muslims who commit crimes with Muslims in Aceh and 
choose to obey the Qanun Jinayat (criminal law) and all non-Muslims who commit 
crimes that are not regulated in the Penal Code of Indonesia (KUHP) and other 





Interviews with Local People 
 
The ethnographic tradition usually employs unstructured interviews, in which the 
researcher collects the data through participant observation while also making notes 
and engaging with the society being studied (DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). 
Fontana and Frey (1994) described differences between structured and unstructured 
interviews based on Malinowski’s ethnographic works. They argued that a structured 
interview  
aims at capturing precise data of a codable nature in order to explain 
behaviour within pre-established categories, whereas the latter is used 
in an attempt to understand the complex behaviour of members of 
society without imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the 
field of inquiry. (Fontana and Frey, 1994; p.366) 
  
Thus, they praised Malinowski for immersing himself within the native culture and for 
his “being there” with them to understand their values (Fontana and Frey, 1994, 
p:366). In this research, the interview aimed to gain more information about local 
people’s points of view regarding the implementation of Islamic law. The interview 
method allowed me to be able to listen to different voices that would help to see how 
agency is being practised by women. 
 There were two types of interview conducted in this research. The first types 
were unstructured interviews from the daily activities and conversations I had with 
local people without making a prior appointment. This kind of interview formed my 
field notes. The second type of interview was a semi-structured one, for which I made 
appointments with local people, asking them several questions I had prepared, 
although the interview sometimes diverged when they also asked me questions. This 
kind of interview was audio recorded, and I always asked participants to read the 
participant information form and sign a consent form before the interview. I gave each 
participant a hard copy of the first and an e-copy of the latter, which I usually sent to 
their mobile. There were only two participants I did not ask to sign a consent form, as 
I had met them without making a previous appointment. However, I asked for their 
consent verbally, informed them about my research and that the interview would be 
recorded, just as I always did before interviewing all the other participants. In order to 
protect the participants’ interest, safety and confidentiality, I use pseudonyms. 
 In total, I have conducted 32 recorded interviews, of which 30 participants 
are Muslim and two are non-Muslim. According to data published by Statistics of 
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Aceh Province in 2016, there are over 4.8 million Muslims in Aceh, about 99.2 per 
cent of the population, while the non-Muslim population, which includes Christians, 
Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists and Confucianists is about 38,000 people in total, or less 
than one per cent of the total population (BPS Provinsi Aceh, 2016). Thus, I think the 
two non-Muslim voices are important to see their experiences under a law that is not 
based on their religious belief and how they negotiate with the regulations and 
customs in the place where they live.  
 All recorded interviews were conducted in Banda Aceh, although some of the 
participants lived in other towns in Aceh, such as Lhokseumawe, Aceh Besar and 
Takengon. However, they frequently visited Banda Aceh, the main research site of my 
fieldwork, either for work, business or other activities. The interviews covered a broad 
range of topics, including their perspective on the implementation of shari’a in Aceh, 
regulations regarding the veil and the partial curfew for women, local shari’a based 
punishment, as well as how the regulations had affected their life. All the interviews 
were then transcribed in full which allowed me to listen to them in detail. The 
transcripts were then transferred to NVIVO for coding purposes. 
Field Notes 
 
During my fieldwork, I made notes in order to keep records about my experiences and 
activities. I wrote up my daily interactions with local people, observations and 
personal experiences during the fieldwork. A researcher’s direct participation in a 
relatively new site or social world and production of written records about her/his 
experiences and observation are the “core of ethnographic research” (Emerson et al., 
2011; p.1). In this research, I followed Adriany (2013; p.72) to write my field notes in 
English instead of Indonesian, my mother tongue, so I did not need to translate them 
for the analysis stage. 
 According to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007; p.142) it is impossible to 
write down everything about our observational and interview data, hence, it must be 
selective, dependent on the researcher’s main focus. During my fieldwork, I usually 
wrote down my field notes in my book when I was at home. I avoided making notes 
directly when interacting with people, to avoid unnatural responses and other 
disruptions. However, sometimes I typed memos on my phone to write important 
notes or comments. Holding a mobile phone while talking is common practice in 
Indonesia, which made it easier for me to sometimes jot down my notes on my 
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mobile. In writing field notes, according Emerson et al. (2011), there is no single 
definitive way of doing it, everyone might write about one situation from different 
points of view, but it is all valuable.  
Photographs and Audio Recording of Events 
 
Photography has been used in anthropology for many years, but has recently attracted 
more researcher attention (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Davies (2008) describes 
some doubts about the use of visual media as ethnographic data. Visual media is 
argued as not showing the whole event or situation witnessed by the ethnographer, as 
it is limited in time and space (Davies, 2008). A photo can only capture one moment 
at a certain time and one picture cannot show the whole view as its frame is limited. 
Thus, Davies argued, the ethnographer is responsible to contextualise the picture 
taken. In order to do so, I would argue it is important that, when analysing 
photographic data, I need to refer back to the actual setting when and where the 
photos were taken, what kind of event they related to and who the people in the 
pictures are. 
 In this research, photographs aimed to record reality in the field, a natural 
visual setting, especially as regards events or other phenomena displayed in a public 
space, in order to analyse how gender discourse is highlighted in public. All the 
photos used were taken by me during my fieldwork. A total 45 photographs and three 
series of public event photos will be analysed. All photos were taken from public 
displays or ads, signboards in public areas, notes in entertainment venues, and  daily 
events and activities. Meanwhile, the three series of public event photos were taken 
during the Eid Carnival, the National Congress of Mothers organised by Hizbuth 
Tahrir Indonesia, and a public caning ceremony. This research also utilised audio 
recording to record the latter two events as well as public seminars of Aceh Women in 
History and Engaging Men in Women’s Empowerment. Each event’s audio recording 
duration ranges from one hour to three hours. The audio recordings were transcribed 
in full and transferred to NVIVO for coding. 
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2.2 Approaches to Data Analysis 
This thesis is informed by a mixed methods approach to analyse data, from CGT to 
CDA. I was informed by Charmaz’s (2006) concept of CGT, which “consists of 
systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analysing qualitative data to 
construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves” (2006; p.2). In addition, I was 
also informed by previous work such as that by Johnson (2011) and Adriany (2013), 
whose research gave me some insight about collecting and analysing data. Adriany 
(2013) employed CGT in her ethnographic work, Gendered Power Relations within 
Child-Centred Discourse: An Ethnographic Study in a Kindergarten in Bandung, 
Indonesia. Meanwhile, Johnson (2011) combined the analytic techniques of CGT and 
discourse analysis in her work, When system demands meet site realities in high-
stakes literacy testing: A Tasmanian education case study. 
 
2.2.1 Constructivist Grounded Theory 
 
Charmaz (2006) emphasised that, in constructivist grounded theory (CGT), the 
researcher must be open to any possibilities in order to be able to learn about the lives 
of the research participants. She argued that openness is necessary, especially during 
initial coding, to provide possibilities of new ideas emerging from the data. The first 
step in employing CGT is coding or naming segments of data, to define what happens 
in the data (Charmaz, 2006). By saying this, Charmaz highlighted how crucial coding 
is in CGT to bridge the data and provide an analytic interpretation of the research. 
 This research employed two main stages of coding, initial coding followed by 
focused coding. At the first stage, I did a close reading of the data and labelled it to 
give me an initial lead for its analysis.  
 
Table 2. 1: Initial Codes 
No. Code 
1.  Describing Society’s Attitudes 
2.  Refers to Socio-economic Gap in Indonesia 
3.  Describing Lack of Entertainment Places 
4.  Refers to Religious Identity 
5.  Mentioning Traditional Cultural Institutions 
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6.  Mentioning Authorities 
7.  Defining Shari’a 
8.  Disciplining Society 
9.  Involving People’s Participation 
10.  Men’s Role and Responsibilities 
11.  Women’s Role and Responsibilities 
12.  Discourse of Past History 
13.  Discourse of Female Hero 
14.  Discourse of Religious Associated Activities 
15.  Arab Values 
16.  Different Sentiments regarding ‘Gender’ 
17.  Western Values 
18.  Gendered Territory 
19.  Supporting and Policing Qanun by Members of the Public 
20.  Punishment by Members of the Public 
21.  Moral Values 
22.  Negotiating Identities 
23.  Negotiating Appearance 
24.  Negotiating Roles 
25.  Performing Resistance 
26.  Women’s Organisation 
27.  Diversities 
28.  Exclusion 
29.  Mentioning Intimidation 
30.  Homogenising Society 
31.  Unpleasant Experiences 
32.  Politics of Fear (Selling Fear) 
33.  Promoting the Idea of the Caliphate 
34.  Protecting Women 
35.  Public Raid 
36.  Mentioning Corporal Punishment 
37.  Other Punishment 
38.  Empathy towards those Punished 
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39.  Rape and Sexual Violence Case 
40.  Regulating People 
41.  Veil as Fashion Trend 
42.  Veil as Identity 
43.  Veil as Religious Obligation 
44.  Women and Public Space 
 
After I finished the initial coding stage, I continued with focused coding, 
which is more “directed, selective, and conceptual” than the first stage of coding, by 
“using the most significant and/or frequent earlier codes to shift through large 
amounts of data” (Charmaz, 2006; p.57). At this stage, similar codes were merged, for 
example, Corporal Punishment, Other Punishment and Empathy towards those 
punished were merged into Punishment; and Veil as fashion Trend, Veil as Identity, 
Veil as Religious Obligation were merged into Veiling. I also followed Adriany 
(2013) in which at the focused coding stage, some codes were dropped due to 
insufficient data. In this research, these codes were: Describing Society’s Attitude, 
Refers to Socio-economic Gap in Indonesia, Describing Lack of Entertainment Places, 
Promoting the Caliphate Idea, and Describing Public Facilities. The coding process 
helped to identify the dynamic within the application of shari’a in Aceh society.  
In addition to coding, memo writing is also an important stage in CGT. It is a 
space for the researcher to always stay connected with their data, and fosters ideas 
(Charmaz, 2006), thus it bridges the analysis process, from coding to writing, to help 
the researcher record their thoughts at any stage during the whole research process. 
According to Corbin and Strauss (1990), doing research analysis from coding straight 
to writing and neglecting the process of writing memos will leave some theoretical 
details unexplored. They argue that omitting the memo writing stage will result in “a 
less elaborated and satisfying integration of the analysis” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; 
p.10). I started writing memos following data collection and continued until 
completion of this research, as did Johnson (2011) and Adriany (2013). 
 
2.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
According to Fairclough (2012, p.6), “discourse is language viewed in a certain way, 
as a part of the social process (part of social life) which is related to other parts”. It is 
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often defined as language viewed in relation to social power relations. Discourse is 
further defined as a form of social practice shaped by situations, institutions and social 
structures, but which also shapes all these elements, or, in other words, discourse and 
social life are mutually constitutive, so that discourse can help to produce and 
reproduce unequal power relations between groups (Fairclough et al., 2011). 
In this research, I was informed by Fairclough’s approach to CDA. According 
to Fairclough (2001) social issues and problems are the starting points of CDA. 














Figure 2.1: Fairclough's dimension of  discourse and discourse analysis. 
 
The three dimensions, as can be seen in figure 2.1, are important keys in doing 
CDA: analysing the linguistic descriptions of the text, which could be written and 
oral; the discourse of practice involving the text production and reception or the 
process of interpretation; and explanation regarding the sociocultural practice 
(Fairclough, 2013). The position of the boxes nesting one inside the other highlights 
the interdependence of the dimensions, and the continual movement back and forth 
between different kinds of analysis (Janks, 1997). In Fairclough’s dimension of 
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discourse and discourse analysis above, the discourse practice mediates the text and 
social practice.  
 
The connection between text and social practice is seen as being mediated 
by discourse practice: on the one hand, processes of text production and 
interpretation are shaped by (and help shape) the nature of the social 
practice, and on the other hand, the production process shapes (and leaves 
‘traces’ in) the text, and the interpretative process operates upon ‘cues’ in 
the text. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 94) 
 
Fairclough emphasises the mutually constitutive relations between text, 
discourse practice and sociocultural practice. In the context of Aceh, for instance, 
(local) government regulations regarding people’s public appearance are often 
justified in the name of Islam which is at the heart of Aceh’s identity. So, the 
regulation is shaped by the socio-cultural practice and also shapes the social practice 
today. 
According to Van Dijk (2001) the primary goals of CDA is to understand the 
unequal power relations, of how social power abuse, domination and inequality is 
performed, produced and resisted in society. CDA is not only interested in the 
linguistic perspective, but also social phenomena (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). 
Therefore, in CDA it is important to see connections between text, context and the 
sociocultural practice in the society. Following Fairclough (2001) definition regarding 
text, in which he includes many types of semiotic material, from written text, 
conversations as well as advertisements on billboards, this thesis examines the various 
texts I gathered during ethnographic fieldwork in Aceh.  
I would argue the process of doing CDA is in line with CGT which requires 
the researcher to always refer back to the data and memo writing process. This 
practice was also a space for me to analyse the text and see connections between it 
and the social practice mediated by the discourse practice. CGT requires a close 
reading of the data which is also in line with CDA, to see the link between text, 
context and the social practice. 
2.3 Reflexivity: Subjectivity vs. Objectivity 
My awareness on reflexivity is based on the view that knowledge is situated, socially 
constructed, shaped and influenced by many elements, such as experiences and 
personal background (see Davies 2008 cited in Pillow, 2003; Fook and Gardner, 2007; 
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Jørgensen, 2003). According to Harding (1991), our background influences our beliefs 
and thoughts, and this would be likely to affect the research. Some backgrounds could 
also result in more knowledge of certain situations than others (Harding, 1991), which 
means that our cultural background and previous experiences can yield different 
perspectives. Fook and Gardner (2007, p.29) argued that “knowledge is also mediated 
by our own subjectivity”, which means that the researcher’s personal experiences 
influences the research in many ways, including how it is chosen and interpreted. 
Although, many arguments have been built surrounding the discussion of 
value neutral research, according to Berg (2001), research is seldom value neutral as it 
is commonly motivated by a personal interest or experience. In a similar manner, 
Harding (1991: p.159) stated that “research is socially situated, and it can be more 
objectively conducted without aiming for or claiming to be value-free”. Hence, she 
proposed the notion of “strong objectivity” which requires the researcher’s reflexivity 
or self-awareness of her/his situated knowledge. Disclosing the researcher’s 
motivational factors and background will help readers “to better understand why a 
research area has been selected, how it was studied and by whom” (Berg, 2001: 
p.141). According to Davies (2008: p.4) reflexivity 
refers to the ways in which the products of research are affected by the 
personnel and process of doing research. […] issues of reflexivity are 
particularly salient for ethnographic research in which the involvement of the 
researcher in the society and culture of those being studied is particularly 
close. 
 
Davies explained that, in ethnography, the researcher is part of the research 
conducted, as, during fieldwork, he/she establishes interaction with people and 
becomes immersed with the society. Likewise in ethnography, CGT also advocates 
researcher reflexivity as the researcher’s background and knowledge influences the 
research (Charmaz, 2006). In brief, this argument has built my awareness that my 
personal background, knowledge and experience influenced my decision to choose the 
topic of research and my point of view about the situation. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, I am adopting Narayan’s concept of the ‘authentic 
insider’, as an Indonesian scholar who speak for our own culture whilst maintaining 
my critical stance. In saying this, I am aware of diversity within various cultures in 
Indonesia, thus I believe there is a spectrum of ‘authentic insiders’. However, in this 
context I would like to emphasise my position as an Indonesian Muslim woman. 
During my fieldwork, I was both seen an insider and outsider. When I met people, 
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sometimes they asked where I am from? The fact that I am from Borneo Island (more 
known as Kalimantan in Indonesia) instead of Java brought some proximity with local 
people as I was seen as the same as them as ‘victims of colonisation’ by Java. At the 
same time, I was also seen as an outsider due to my research about gender, which is 
often affiliated with western values, and my educational background as student at a 
UK university. However, my background as someone who grew up in Banjarmasin, 
South Kalimantan, also known for its strong Islamic identity and prominent Islamic 
scholars such as Syaikh Arsyad Al-Banjari, often brought me back as an insider. 
My identity and knowledge as an Indonesian Muslim who was born and grew 
up in a Muslim family and learnt Islam throughout my life, brought my understanding 
of multiculturalism in Indonesia as well as the importance of religion for people. This 
position enabled me to understand people’s choices regarding religious devotion, for 
example, as I discussed in chapter 6 on the veil and hidayah. At the same time, my 
educational background as someone studying gender in a UK institution, allowed me 
to be critical as well. Here I wanted to emphasise that I do not say it is only in the 
Global North or western institutions, in this case UK, that people can gain critical 
knowledge. However, in my case, it is in the UK institution that I actually learnt about 
gender and postcolonial theory which allowed me to discuss gender issues and be 
critical regarding the legacy of colonialism. As said by Adriany et al., (2017), it was 
their engagement with theories in the Global North, including postcolonial and 
decolonial theory, that enabled them to understand the importance of acknowledging 
various voices of women. Thus, my authentic insider position created a hybrid space 
where I could speak for my own culture without being judgemental or generalising 
women’s experiences in the Global South or in a Muslim country as one single 
category that is victimised and has no autonomy to perform agency. At the same time, 
I am also critical in seeing the discursive practice of shari’a in Aceh today. 
In addition, by employing an ethnographic approach for this research, I am 
aware of several challenges in regard to my own personal background that construct 
my point of view and also my identity, such as ethnicity and gender. Huggins and 
Glebbeek (2009) highlighted the importance of identity negotiation in conducting 
ethnographic research as a way to negotiate with the dynamic situation and setting in 
the field. In some cases, as mentioned by Huggins and Glebbeek (2009), a woman 
researcher is seen as a “woman [… rather than a fully] professional researcher”, which 
I believed would be another challenge that must be faced, particularly in a society 
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with a strong patriarchal culture. Demovic (2009) explained her experience of 
negotiating her identity as a modern American feminist conducting research in a 
Muslim society in Zanzibar. During her fieldwork, she adapted her appearance and 
dress, such as wearing head covering, in order to respect and engage with local 
culture. 
A similar approach was also implemented by Sehgal (2009) during her field 
research on a women’s organisation within the Hindu Nationalist Movement in North 
India. Although Sehgal was born as an Indian from a Punjabi Hindu family, her 
background as a scholar studying in a Western institution meant she was seen as an 
outsider, or someone with Western feminist thought who could possibly be a threat. 
During her fieldwork, Sehgal not only modified her dress a by wearing a sari, she also 
decided to employ “partial secrecy” and “partial disclosure” of her identity, in which 
she exposed her Hindu and Indian background while also hiding her “ideological 
alignments” and “political standpoint” (Sehgal, 2009, p.336). 
Like Demovic and Sehgal, I also adapted my public appearance following 
local regulations, which require Muslim women to cover their head and wear a loose 
fitting outfit. Most of the time, I went out wearing a scarf to cover my head, although 
there were a few times I did not wear any head cover, like one of my local contacts in 
Aceh. During my six months’ stay there, she only wore head cover a few times for 
various different reasons, such as attending her friend’s wedding and when she was ill, 
and she told me she needed to cover her mouth so people would not be infected. She 
had been caught twice by the WH for not wearing a headscarf, which she told me did 
not stop her, even though she admitted sometimes she feels uncomfortable when some 
people look at her head to toe due to her appearance. She also told me it was fine for 
me not to wear a headscarf if I just walked around the area where I was staying. So, I 
decided not to wear a veil when I went jogging around the residential area where I 
was staying, and, indeed, for most of the time I met women in the neighbourhood 
chatting with each other on the roadside not wearing any head cover. There were a 
few times when I went out with my local contact when we both did not wear, as I was 
also curious about people’s response. Indeed, I did not feel comfortable as some 
people were actually staring at me because of my appearance, which was exactly the 
same as my local contact experiences sometimes. 
During my stay in Aceh, I only twice wore a veil, which fully covered my 
head, this is known as a jilbab in Indonesia; once was when I saw a public caning 
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ceremony and the other was when I went to a local event organised by Hizbuth Tahrir 
Indonesia. I was told by my local contact to wear a full veil if I wanted to attend the 
public caning ceremony, she warned me that I might not be allowed to enter the area if 
I did not do so. Although, later on, I found that some women were not veiled; 
however, I did not know whether this was because they were non-Muslim or because 
they lived in the neighbourhood where the ceremony was being held. Meanwhile, 
regarding the Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia event, I decided to wear the veil, as I generally 
knew the type of dress people wear to attend these events. Therefore, I adjusted my 
outfit to conform to the occasion, although still I did not look like a member of the 
organisation as they always wear long, loose-fitting dresses. 
Wearing the veil is not something new for me, as an Indonesian woman who 
was born into a Muslim family. When I was in high school, I joined an Islamic study 
group which was part of a prominent hard-line group in Indonesia and at an 
international level. In this group, male and females were segregated, we called each 
other using Arabic terms, akhi for male, which means brother, and ukhti for women, 
which means sister. One or two ukhti always came on Friday after school to preach to 
us and, sometimes, we also arranged other discussions outside the school area. During 
that time, I was always being told that a Muslim woman’s dress had to be long and 
loose fitting so it did not show the shape of my body; this became my dress code at 
that time. 
When I was part of this group, I was indoctrinated that being in a relationship 
was haram, or forbidden, as was to be a nationalist, because the state had adopted 
democracy, which is a Western value; and that we had to revive the caliphate and 
uphold shari’a. During that time, I called my non-Muslim friends kafir or infidel. 
However, I decided to quit the group after joining some traditional Islamic lectures 
held in a mosque and a traditional Islamic school, known as a pesantren. After 
comparing one to the other, I started to confront the ukhti in the Islamic study group 
by asking more specific questions about praying, about which she could not give me 
an answer, and avoided it by saying those topics I asked had often been discussed by 
other Islamic teaching groups. After that, I was once sat next to her and heard her 
reciting the Quran, but not that fluently, which raised my scepticism about her 
knowledge of Islam. I then decided to leave and learn about Islam through traditional 
religious preaching and from books.  
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I was studying at one of the biggest Islamic universities in the country and, 
during my study, there was no obligation for me to practise Islam, although I had to 
undertake several compulsory modules on Islamic studies. Although I was never 
compelled to practise Islam, sometimes I was advised either to pray or to wear a 
‘morally proper’ outfit. I wore a headscarf for several years, during high school and at 
university, of my own free will. I subsequently decided to remove my veil because I 
see it as an identity that is associated with Islam, and I do not want people to see or 
judge Islam based on what they see from me. However, I greatly respect people who 
wear the veil and I do not see it as a symbol of oppression.  
In addition, I worked as a journalist for more than eight years. I was often sent 
to cover conflict and war zones around the world, including Libya, Egypt and Tunisia 
during the Arab Spring, Mindanao in the Philippines, conflict in Southern Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, the Basque country in Spain and North Korea. In some of those 
assignments, I wrote stories about women in that kind of situation and how they 
performed their agency. In southern Thailand, for example, I filmed a female human 
rights defender who was fighting for justice regarding the Tak Bai incident in 
Narathiwat province, in 2004, in which more than 80 Muslim civilians were killed. In 
Libya, fighting against my own prejudice at that time of Arab women as oppressed 
victims of a patriarchal culture, I covered women’s active involvement in the uprising 
(Pirmasari, 2016). I met a woman and her daughter who were involved in many public 
rallies demanding democracy and international intervention to help them in fighting 
against the authoritarian regime; her husband fully supported their activities. Those 
experiences helped me to see that women were not merely victims during 
insurgencies, but they also played many other important roles to change the situation, 
and this needs to be acknowledged, appreciated and recognised as varied, which will 
also help me to avoid what Mohanty (2003) described as the universalisation of 
women’s experiences in the Global South. These experiences have built my awareness 
about different types of Islamic groups and how religious texts are interpreted 
differently. It also constructed my belief that religion is a personal matter and no one 
should be forced to practise it. 
2.3.1 Gender and the Colonial Legacy 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, this thesis is informed by postcolonial theory, which built 
my understanding of how studies from the Global North or the Global South could 
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indeed perpetuate Western hegemonic knowledge and the legacy of colonialism . For 
example, the term ‘gender’ is associated with Western values has been adopted into 
the Indonesian language because there is no Indonesian translation for it.  
This section will explore how colonialism still affects certain aspects of 
current life, particularly gender equality and female empowerment within the different 
societies. Although some other colonial powers, such as the Portuguese, British and 
Japanese also ruled the country, at various times, Indonesia was colonised by the 
Dutch for more than three and a half centuries, before declaring its independence as a 
nation in 1945. According to Vickers (2005), Dutch power in each region was varied, 
some regions, like Java, were under Dutch colonialism longer than other provinces. 
According to Locher-Scholten (2000, p: 16), Java was the centre of political life in 
Indonesia during colonial times, and Indonesian feminism was born and developed 
there. Even though women in pre-colonial Southeast Asia were already known for 
having greater autonomy, important roles in business or the political sphere (Reid, 
1988a). On the other hand, Aceh was one of the regions that resisted the most against 
foreign and colonial power. It took about thirty years for the Dutch to defeat Aceh, 
and the colonists also admitted that the conquering of Aceh was the most costly war in 
their history (Brown, 2003, Vickers, 2005).  
As Java experienced the longest occupation of all Indonesia, the island was 
subjected to the greatest colonialist influence in many aspects, including infrastructure 
development and women’s education. According to Brown (2003), in 1901, the Dutch 
began promoting education for women in the Indies as part of the so-called Ethical 
Policy programme. He argued this programme aimed to increase people’s welfare, but 
also to make them closer to Dutch culture which was expected to make them loyal to 
the colonists. Before the colonial era, girls were educated informally by their parents 
and were prepared to participate in the workforce or married life (Brown, 2003). Thus, 
the colonialists brought modernisation to girls’ education in what was then, the Dutch 
East Indies. However, education and change were mainly only open to women from 
the elite group, particularly in Java, while ordinary people and the majorities did not 
get access to it and were left in their own cultural environment (Locher-Scholten, 
2000). Indeed, according to Blackburn (2004), those who benefited most from the 
educational expansion were Europeans who lived in the East Indies.  
In addition, the Dutch administration in the region also implemented a 
segregation policy, where people were separated based on their race and social class. 
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There were three distinct legal groups recognised within the legal system, civil service 
and education sector: European, Foreign Orientals, which included Chinese and 
Arabs, and the Native Indonesian group (Locher-Scholten, 2000, p:18). This created 
stronger sentiments for local people towards foreigners and their legacy and cemented 
the gap between native Indonesians and those from the elite group, aristocrats, and 
foreigners. 
Native Indonesians who received education during that time mostly came from 
Javanese aristocratic families, like Kartini, an Indonesian national heroine. Kartini 
was a Javanese princess, who was born to a nobleman working for the Dutch colonial 
government. Coming from an aristocratic family gave Kartini the privilege of being 
able to study at a Dutch primary school, which exposed her to Western culture and 
values. She was befriended by J.H. Abendanon, the Minister of Education and 
Industry for the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), and his wife. Kartini sent them 
many letters in the Dutch language, which were later compiled by Abendanon into a 
book titled Letters of a Javanese Princess. In her letters, Kartini expressed her 
admiration of Dutch culture, Western education and women’s struggle in the West 
(see Brown, 2003, Kartini, 1921). Her thoughts also focused on education for women, 
promoting monogamous marriage as opposed to polygamy, which was a common 
practice during her time, and also a re-evaluation of Javanese culture (Locher-
Scholten, 2000), including the use of opium that was legitimised by the government at 
that time (Kartini, 1921). Kartini later became known as a symbol of women’s 
emancipation in Indonesia and her birthday is celebrated as a national holiday to 
commemorate her struggle for girls’ education and women’s rights. However, this has 
raised some other implications. Arguably, it widened the gap between Java and the 
rest of Indonesia as ‘Kartini Day’ is the only one celebrated nationally. Many other 
women had fought against the colonialists or were involved in promoting women’s 
education, but their birthdays are not celebrated as a national day. Aceh, for example, 
has Keumalahayati, who was the world’s first female navy admiral (Wijaya, 2012), 
and led a female military division, the Inong Balee, as well as a male division, to fight 
against the Portuguese and the Dutch in the late 16th to early 17th century (Husin, 
2016). Other national heroines from Aceh who also helped to fight against the Dutch 
are Cut Nyak Dhien and Cut Nyak Meuthia, while, from other islands, Martha 
Christina Tiahahu (Maluku, Ambon) and Maria Walanda Maramis (Minahasa, 
Sulawesi) were actively involved in supporting the advancement of women in 
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Indonesia. 
Kartini Day is celebrated by encouraging women all over the country to wear 
kebaya, a traditional Javanese costume. Here, as mentioned previously, women’s 
bodies again become a contested arena to impose one culture’s value on another. I 
would argue that many provinces experienced ‘structured cultural colonisation’, in 
which the Indonesian government enforced Javanese values on other cultures in the 
country, especially during the New Order era under the Soeharto regime (1966-1998). 
Details about how Soeharto’s policies affected gender construction will be discussed 
further in chapter 3, Thus, for provinces like Aceh, after Indonesia declared 
independence from the Dutch in 1945, the colonial era was not over. Hasan Tiro, the 
founder of the Free Aceh Movement, for example, referred to the Indonesian 
Government based in Jakarta (Java) as new colonials who took their resources and 
oppressed the people (Kell, 1995, di Tiro, 1984). 
Thus, despite the fact that Kartini also criticised some colonialist values, she is 
still associated with them. This brought about stronger sentiment, not only regarding 
foreign powers and the Indonesian Government, but also Kartini’s concept of 
women’s emancipation. 
Sentiment toward the colonial legacy was also influenced by the colonialist 
attitude towards local values, termed “anti-Indonesian” by Locher-Scholten (2000), as 
they refused to acknowledge the social setting and values where they were situated. 
During colonialism, European women in the Dutch East Indies, the name for 
Indonesia at that time, distinguished themselves from the natives, through their 
clothes, behaviour towards servants, and political views, particularly related to female 
suffrage (Locher-Scholten, 2000, p:31). The rise of the feminist movement in the 
Netherlands during that period influenced the thoughts of those who lived in the 
colony, and, subsequently, the notion of emancipation and women’s rights was always 
associated with colonial values.  
Kartini’s struggle to promote women’s rights and education can also be seen 
as a success story of the Dutch Ethical Policy goals, namely, promoting women’s 
education but also bringing the locale closer to Dutch culture, which could lead to 
their loyalty and a perpetuation of colonial power. Thus, women’s emancipation in 
Indonesia is often seen as a foreign value with some legacy of colonialism.  
I emphasise this story to explain my concern about being a perpetrator of the 
legacy of colonialism, as this research might also promote Western values. As 
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someone who learned and studied in a Western institution, in the UK, reading sources 
and theories mainly written by Western scholars has influenced my knowledge 
construction in analysing every situation around me. It has raised my concern of being 
trapped in a situation where I might judge my own culture based on those 
understandings. This situation also built a barrier between me and the locale during 
the fieldwork, as my educational background meant I was associated with the West, 
not only in relation to the educational institution to which I belonged, but also as the 
field that I am currently studying is about gender and women’s rights. However, as 
mentioned in chapter 1, in this research I adopted Narayan’s (1997) authentic insider 
role where third world scholars “speak for their culture” and at the same time are also 
critical of it (Narayan, 1997, p:142). Additionally, as previously mentioned, I was 
informed by postcolonial theory and read many works about Western hegemony of 
knowledge, Orientalist and Western scholars’ writings about people in the Global 
South and its culture which built my critical stance towards the legacy of colonialism. 
Thus, this research is expected to build a perspective of the insider, an Indonesian 
Muslim woman, that could challenge Western hegemony of knowledge and add 
diversity to the body of literature in the study of gender and Islam, in particular. 
Only recently the word ‘gender’ has been added to the Indonesian dictionary 
and is described similarly to the word ‘sex’, the state of being male or female.6 In 
Aceh, this term became more familiar after the tsunami disaster, where many 
international NGOs promoted gender equality programmes (see chapter 3). During my 
fieldwork, when I mentioned ‘gender’ to people and asked their opinion about it, I got 
a diverse response. I would argue women in Aceh are not one single category and 
their experiences are different to one another. Some women told me that the concept 
of gender equality is not something new for them, as their parents always taught them 
those values at home. Others disagreed because, in their opinion, ‘gender’ is about 
equality, which means women could be free like men, for example, to go to a coffee 
shop. Others said women should be at home and responsible for any housework, while 
men should work outside house. 
In one interview, a woman told me that in Islam, women should be at home 
and should not be working in public. When, I asked her about Khadija, the first wife 
of the Prophet Muhammad, who was also a successful businesswoman, she responded 
                                                6	See:	http://kateglo.com/?mod=dictionary&action=view&phrase=gender	
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by telling me not to pick some verses for my own benefit. As a Muslim myself, and 
someone who had learnt about Islam since my childhood, either at home or in an 
Islamic School, I know that Khadija supported the Prophet Muhammad’s missionary 
endeavour, but this did not discount the fact that she worked. She was also the one 
who proposed marriage to the Prophet Muhammad. 
However, during my interviews with people, usually I wanted to hear more 
about their perspective. In addition, during my fieldwork, I always told people that, 
even though I was studying in a Western institution and the word ‘gender’ is usually 
always associated with Western values that are incompatible with our Eastern values, 
I had come to Aceh to hear their point of view and experiences. When I was there, one 
woman I met told me some people were sensitive or a bit reluctant to talk about 
gender because, in the past, especially after the tsunami, many foreign NGOs had 
come to Aceh and campaigned about gender equality. Some of the staff wore 
‘inappropriate’ outfits or accessories, like a sleeveless dress and long earrings. I use 
the term ‘inappropriate’ here to also mean uncommon in our society. Traditionally, in 
many communities in Indonesia, people are expected to wear formal outfits in public 
gatherings or when working and meeting people. 
I do not agree with any idea to control or regulate how we, especially women, 
should appear in public, but, at the same time, I believe we should respect the local 
culture. Therefore, as in Aceh for example, I still tried to respect local values by 
always wearing a long sleeved top, long jeans or trousers and, most of the time, a scarf 
to cover my head. People generally knew that I was not local, because most Acehnese 
women wear a veil. They appreciated how I tried to respect their values and I also 
kept telling them that I had come to Aceh to hear their perspective. On one occasion, I 
was invited to stay for few days at a local person’s house. In the early days, I always 
wore long trousers at home, and the host told me I did not have to do so in the house, 
but, if I went out of the house, then I must cover myself.  
Additionally, the fact that I am a Muslim and originally from Borneo, brought 
proximities between me and the local people and helped me to be more accepted. As 
mentioned before, there has been tension between Java and the rest of Indonesia, and 
Aceh is no exception. Once, I was talking to a local man who told me that, in Java, 
you can get access to many things, including scholarships, schools and other facilities 
easier. As someone who was born and grew up in Borneo, then later lived in Java for 
the last decade, I fully understand what he meant. It cannot be denied that regional 
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inequality in Indonesia is still high, thus, sometimes it creates resentment. Java is still 
the most developed island and has the most advanced infrastructure in Indonesia 
(Panggabean, 2016). All the similarities not only bring proximities between me and 
the people I met here, but also made me accepted and welcomed.  
On the other hand, although I am studying in a Western institution and reading 
sources written by Western scholars, as mentioned in chapter 1, this research took 
Uma Narayan’s aforementioned Third World Feminist approach. Therefore, I hope 
this research could provide an in-depth and thorough picture of gender construction in 
Aceh, Indonesia, without neglecting local values and women’s agency. By 
acknowledging different forms of women’s agency, I believe it will give a space for 
people, including those who have been voiceless, to be heard.  
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Chapter 3. Women in Historical Discourse and Contemporary 
Reality in Aceh 
This chapter provides debates about women’s position in Aceh society from 
the historical context to the present time. The discussion covers a narrative of 
women’s leadership in public space and how it is affected by religious discourse. This 
chapter uses various sources from historical texts, previous research, and fieldwork 
data I gathered in 2016-2017. This historical chapter of women in Aceh is 
fundamental to understanding how the contemporary gender discourse there is 
affected by the complex history of this region. 
A narrative of women’s struggle, leadership and heroism has been part of 
Aceh history, in which women played fundamental roles. The current situation in 
Aceh is unseparated from the dynamics in the society within its historical context. In 
this chapter, I present how history and religion are intertwined and being used for 
political purposes. The discussion presented here will help to make sense of the role of 
religious discourse in the society, which is fundamental to understanding current 
gender ideology. The implementation of shari’a is core to the construction of current 
gender ideology in Aceh, and this is inseparable from Aceh’s strong Islamic identity.  
 This chapter begins with a discussion about indigenous matrifocal practice in 
Aceh throughout history until today. I draw upon the concept of matrifocality, from 
Raymond Smith who studied kinship in Guiana, and Nancy Tanner, who studied 
matrifocality in Java, Minangkabau and Aceh, Indonesia. In this section, I highlight 
the historical dynamics that have influenced the practice of matrifocality in Aceh, 
from the past to the present day. The second section elaborates the female queens’ era 
and roles of religious leaders in the Islamic kingdoms in Aceh. Here, I present a 
history of Islam in Aceh, the gate of Islam in Indonesia. In this section, I also consider 
the history of female queens in other Muslim societies, drawing upon the work of 
Fatima Mernissi. Her works present some similarities to the case of Aceh, in which 
religious discourse played fundamental roles in perpetuating or eliminating women’s 
leadership in public. The third section discusses women’s leadership during the 
colonial era and the discourse of the female hero in Aceh today. In this section, I draw 
upon the works of post-colonial scholars, such as Edward Said and post-colonialist 
feminists, such as Lila Abu-Lughod and Leila Ahmed. Their works are consistent with 
my standpoint as an Indonesian feminist, as I have discussed in chapter 1. In addition, 
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the works of the aforementioned women on Egypt, a predominantly Islamic society, 
helped me to compare the situation with Aceh. In this section I also highlight the 
connection between religious discourse and the politics of identity. The last section 
highlights the prolonged conflict in Aceh and the tsunami disaster, which affected 
many aspects of people’s lives. These two major events led towards a stronger Islamic 
identity and sentiment against the West. Overall, all discussions provide a 
fundamental background of how the practice of indigenous culture has shifted over 
time. 
3.1 Gender Narrative within Aceh’s culture of indigenous matrifocality 
Some scholars have highlighted the study of the matrifocal family. Raymond Smith 
(1956) for instance, studied kinship systems in Guiana. Smith used the term in 
explaining male marginal power in the husband-father role in domestic relations. Male 
marginality is reflected in men’s frequent absence and spatial separation in the 
domestic space (Smith, 1973, p:139-140). According to Smith (2001, p.822) 
“matrifocality is a property of kinship systems where the complex of affective ties 
among mother and children assumes a structural prominence because of the 
diminution (but not disappearance) of male authority in domestic relations”. He 
argued that, in matrifocality, the centre in the relationship is the woman’s role as 
mother (Smith, 1973). The maternal grandmother also has significant authority in the 
upbringing of her daughter’s children, but not her son’s (Smith, 1956). However, 
matrifocality is not merely applied to families with matrilineal systems, as Tanner 
(1974, p.132) explained, it can be found in many different kinship types: bilateral, 
patrilineal, matrilineal and other kinship systems. Hence, the application of 
matrifocality varies in many societies in the world. 
In Indonesia, Aceh is one out of only a few societies that has matrifocal 
traditions, even though it has a patrilineal system at the same time. In 1974, Nancy 
Tanner published a paper about matrifocality in three societies in Indonesia, namely 
Java, Minangkabau (Sumatra) and Aceh. She defined matrifocality as a: 
(1) [k]inship system in which (a) the role of the mother is structurally, 
culturally, and affectively central and (b) this multi-dimensional 
centrality is legitimate and; (2) the societies in which these features 
coexist, where (a) the relationship between the sexes is relatively 
egalitarian and (b) both women and men are important actors in the 
economic and ritual spheres. (Tanner, 1974, p. 131) 
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In saying women have a structurally central role, Tanner emphasised the 
mother’s power in term of economics and decision making in the family. The 
reference to women’s roles being culturally central shows how the mother is valued in 
the society, while “affectively central” emphasises how affect in the kinship system is 
valued (Tanner, 1974, p.132). Similar to Smith, Tanner’s concept of matrifocality 
stresses the centrality of mother roles in the household, and male marginal power in 
this space.  
The aforementioned Dutch scholar who was also a colonial advisor in the East 
Indies, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, discussed women’s position in the household in 
Aceh. In his work, The Acehnese, an ethnography account on Aceh, Hurgronje 
(1906a) highlighted women’s strong position in the household. Instead of being 
referred to as a housewife, a married woman was referred to as po rumoh (the one 
who owns the house). Hurgronje explained that, in Aceh society, the inheritance of a 
house is assigned to female heirs. Similarly, Jacqueline Siapno also described the 
inheritance system in Aceh society, in which the daughters are prioritised to inherit 
the family house and land, then the rest of their parents’ wealth will be divided for the 
sons (Siapno, 2013). Thus in Aceh, particularly in the district of Aceh Besar and 
Pidie, women owned economic resources, such as rice lands, in which sometimes their 
husbands worked (Jayawardena, 1977). This gave women a relatively independent 
position, as they did not only own the house where they lived but also the economic 
resources on which to live. 
Both Hurgronje (1906) and Siegel (2000), who studied the society in the 
1960s, mentioned that a woman would live in her natal village surrounded by her 
kinfolks from her mother’s line and when she married, her husband would move to 
her village. Men would be mostly absent in the house as they worked outside or even 
in other towns, hence when they came home to their wives they felt like guests. They 
had marginal roles at home and in child rearing, as their responsibilities were mainly 
to bring money to the house. Similarly, in her research, Tanner (1974) explained how 
in Aceh, matrifocality and male marginality in the domestic space is affected by 
men’s relative absence from home. She reported that many men had to go for rantau 
(migrate to other towns) to work and earn money for the family, while women stayed 
in the village and took care of their children. Children spent most of their time with 
their mother and mother’s families, while the father and father’s families were far 
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away (Tanner, 1974). As in the Guyanese societies, as mentioned earlier in this 
section, a mother was a central figure for her children, with whom they establish 
stronger relations. Children saw their mother as the one who fed them, helped them 
grow, and who was responsible and working hard in the family (Tanner, 1974). 
Meanwhile, the father’s role was relatively unseen by his children, which made them 
less close to him compared to the mother-child relationship. 
As a region with a strong Islamic identity, in which the religious tradition is 
often seen as very patrilineal, Jacqueline Siapno was interested to see the complex 
interplay of Aceh’s indigenous matrifocal tradition with Islamic belief and practices. 
In her findings, Siapno (2013) argued that gender relations in Aceh societies are 
different for those who live in the city and those in the rural area, “in Aceh, the culture 
of patriarchy and sex-segregation and discrimination is most intense in the cities, the 
centres of supposed “‘modern living’” (Siapno, 2013, p.108). She claimed the city is 
the frontline that first faced the Indonesian government’s development ideas and other 
foreign values which were seen as an outside threat. Therefore, the dynamics of 
resistance, in terms of Islamic identity, are stronger in the urban areas than the rural 
ones. 
During the New Order era (1966-1988) under President Soeharto, the 
Indonesian government promoted some ‘development’ programmes for women all 
over Indonesia. According to Suryakusuma (2011) the Soeharto Administration 
implemented what she called “Ibuisme Negara” (State Ibuism), an ideology where 
women were expected to follow their kodrat or destiny as mothers and wives, and 
men were expected to be the protector of the family. Suryakusuma investigated New 
Order gender ideology, in which she explored state roles on the social construction of 
womanhood in the country. Her findings highlighted how state gender ideology 
developed through women’s organisations like Dharma Wanita, an association for 
wives of civil servants, and Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) (Family 
Guidance Welfare). Both organisations emphasised women’s kodrat as mothers and 
housewives. At the same time, there was no organisation for a man whose wife was a 
civil servant or any organisation to educate a man to be a good husband and father for 
his family. The formations of the two aforementioned groups highlighted gender role 
expectation of men as breadwinners working in the public space and women as wives 
and mothers in the domestic space. The two organisations also controlled women’s 
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freedom by regulating them regarding their roles, position in the family and 
responsibilities. 
Robinson (2009) described Dharma Wanita as an elite women’s organisation 
for the wives of government officials. Dharma Wanita has five fundamental roles for 
women or Panca Dharma Wanita. These are, women as: 
1. wife accompanying husband 
2. manager of the household 
3. nation builder  
4. children’s educator 
5. Indonesian citizen 
The five roles all point to government gender constructions of women’s roles and 
responsibilities. A woman was expected to be a mother and support her husband’s 
career path and follow him wherever he was assigned. Women were also required to 
be responsible in the domestic space by managing the household and taking care of 
the children. The structural organisation of Dharma Wanita mirrored the male 
hierarchy, the higher the husband’s position in the government, the higher the wife’s 
position in Dharma Wanita (Suryakusuma, 2011, Robinson, 2009). Therefore, 
women’s personal capacity and qualifications were not necessary, as their position in 
the organisation would follow their husband’s position in the government. According 
to Suryakusuma (2011) even though Dharma Wanita emphasised a woman’s role as 
loyal wife to her husband and mother for their children, the organisation’s activities 
often took women away from their family and home. This indicates women’s loyalty 
to the state was expected beyond that to the family, and the organisation’s activities 
were mostly to promote the state’s development programme such as training in home-
economic activities (Suryakusuma, 2011).  
Unlike Dharma Wanita which was designed for civil servants’ wives, PKK 
involved urban and rural village women. PKK disseminated the state’s patriarchal 
ideology during the New Order regime, and with it, women’s subordinate status in the 
family (Robinson, 2009). The PKK programme often engaged with traditionally 
female activities, such as cooking, sewing, handicrafts, and flower arrangement. As 
mentioned by Suryakusuma (2011), PKK was the main mediating institution between 
the state and rural women in five main sectors: social, cultural, ideological, political 
and economic. 
Socially, it mediated the concept of domestication; culturally it mediated 
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priyayization and ibuism; politically, it mediated state power through a 
quasi-militaristic, hierarchical structure; economically, it mediated the 
notion of the housewife and the nuclear-family norm to buttress state-led 
capitalist development; ideologically, it mediated Pancasila through the 
propagation of state ibuism. 
(Suryakusuma, 2011, p.105) 
Priyayization is originally from the word priyayi, a social class which has existed 
since the Dutch colonial era to describe an elite group close to power in Javanese 
society. Suryakusuma uses the term in the context of PKK to highlight the 
organisational power hierarchy in which elite people have control over ordinary 
people, particularly those who live in the urban and rural village. Similar to Dharma 
Wanita, the structural organisation of PKK followed men’s occupational position in 
the government, which means women’s personal capabilities would not affect their 
position in the organisational structure. At the national level, PKK was led by the wife 
of the minister of home affairs. This elite system was sustained at the lower level of 
government – at provincial, municipality and village level – and led by the wife of the 
particular leader. 
The state’s gender ideology was propagated to the whole provinces in 
Indonesia, including Aceh where women were relatively independent and held a 
strong position in domestic life. The national government disseminated some 
‘development’ programmes to domesticate women, and encourage them to be 
supportive wives for their husbands and good mothers for their children at home. 
These policies affected the practice of matrifocality in Aceh. Unlike in the past where 
a woman would stay at her home in her village when her husband worked in another 
town (see Siegel, 2000), according to Srimulyani (2010) now a woman would follow 
her husband, leave her natal village and live with her husband in another town. 
Suryakusuma (2011) calls this concept ikut suami culture which literally means 
‘follow the husband culture’, propagated by the New Order regime through Dharma 
Wanita and PKK. The term po rumoh has now shifted in meaning from someone who 




3.2 Narrative of Women in Aceh History 
3.2.1 Women and the Sultanate of Aceh 
“Aceh women are great in terms of diplomacy and competing with other countries. In 
the Samudera Pasai Kingdom, there were two famous queens, and Pasai was the most 
influential kingdom in Southeast Asia in the 13th century”. These words were spoken 
by a speaker in the Aceh within Historical Trajectory seminar held in Banda Aceh, in 
January 2017. The historical narrative of the female queen and heroine are everywhere 
in Aceh. Every time I met people during my fieldwork, they were proud of their 
history, listing the queen rulers during the Samudera Pasai kingdom and national 
heroines during the war against the Portuguese or Dutch. 
There is not much literature about pre-Islamic Aceh. In the Indonesian 
archipelago in general, before the beginning of the first century the inhabitants were 
adherents of indigenous belief. According to Brown (2003) the first to circa 15th 
century was the golden era of Indonesian history. During this period of time, three 
world religions Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam penetrated and brought with them 
civilisations that influenced the development of literature, language, culture and 
religious monuments. Many of the Hindu and Buddhist monuments lay on Java, such 
as the 9th century Hindu temple, the Prambanan, and Borobudur, the world’s largest 
Buddhist temple (Guinness Book of World Records, 2012). Both Hindu and Buddhist 
civilisations spread across the Indonesian islands and beyond. In the 7th to 13th 
century, a Buddhist kingdom of Sriwijaya rose on Sumatera and extended its power to 
the Straits of Malacca. Buddhist relics of the head of a statue of Lokesvara (a 
bodhisattva) were found in an unrecorded place in Aceh in 1880 (McKinnon, 1998). 
According to McKinnon (1998) the style of Lokesvara’s crown is similar to a tenth 
century statue found in the ancient city Polonarruva in Sri Lanka. Hinduism also 
influenced pre-Islamic Aceh. In the 13th century, the Hindu kingdom of Majapahit, 
which was based in Eastern Java, raised and extended its control beyond, and 
Majapahit influence reached the Lamuri kingdom in the Western most tip of Sumatera 
or present-day Aceh (McKinnon, 1998). Then, the kingdom, located in Aceh Besar, 
converted to Islam following its rise in Aceh. Indrapuri, a Hindu temple was 
transformed as a building for Islamic prayer and religious activities (see Zein, 1999). 
Early information on Islamic civilisation in Aceh can be found in a travel 
journal of the Venetian explorer Marco Polo on his return voyage from China to 
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Venice. In 1292, he stopped by the kingdom of Felech (Perlak), in northeast Sumatera, 
and wrote that the majority of the inhabitants were idolaters, but there were substantial 
numbers of Muslim followers living in the seaport area (Polo, 1914, p.338). Hence, 
many scholars believe Perlak, was the first site of Islam in the archipelago (Andaya, 
2008, p.113). 
Another early history of Islam in Aceh can be found in Moroccan traveller Ibn 
Batuta’s journal. In 1345 he visited a kingdom in Sumatera which was led by El Malik 
El Zahir (Batuta, 1829). Batuta wrote that the king was a pious Muslim from the 
school of jurisprudence or madhab shafiie (Batuta, 1829, p.200). Batuta mentioned 
that the inhabitants of El Malik El Zahir’s district were also Islamic followers. In the 
Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai (The Story of the Kings of Pasai) it is mentioned that El 
Malik El Zahir is the son of Malik al-Saleh, the first Muslim ruler of Samudera Pasai, 
a kingdom situated on the north coast of Sumatera which is now part of the Aceh 
province (cited in Ruslan, 2020). 
The Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai also highlighted the story of the first sultan of 
Samudera Pasai, Malik al-Saleh, known as Merah Silu, before his conversion to Islam 
(Hill, 1960, p.118). Merah Silu’s conversion was followed by the whole population in 
his district which then meant that the city of Samudera became known as Darul Islam 
(Abode of Islam) (Hill, 1960). As mentioned above, the Samudera Pasai was the most 
influential kingdom in Southeast Asia. 
Islamic kingdoms in Aceh developed through time. In 1511 the Sultanate of 
Aceh Darussalam was declared, it was a continuation of all previous and smaller 
Islamic kingdoms in the region from Perlak, Samudera Pasai, Islam Benua, Islam 
Lingga and Islam Samainra, Jaya and Darussalam (Hasjmy, 1977). The Sultanate of 
Aceh Darussalam grew and became a major port in the Straits of Malacca. Aceh 
benefited from its economically and politically strategic location (Hadi, 2004). One 
out of two majors ports in the Straits of Malacca was in Aceh (the other one was 
Melaka port) which was used as a transit point for merchants from the Middle East 
and India before continuing to China (Andaya, 2008). According to Hadi (2004) 
Aceh’s strategic location helped the region in building relationships with the Muslim 
world which connected it through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Many merchants 
from Gujarat in India, Turkey, Yemen and Mecca in Saudi Arabia passed through this 
route, which then opened the gate for further dissemination of Islam in the region. 
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Aceh’s relationship with Muslim countries developed from trading to 
education and military support as well. In the field of Islamic knowledge, many 
Islamic scholars from Yemen, Mecca and Gujarat, taught Islamic study and Arabic 
literature in Aceh (Hadi, 2004, Reid, 1969), and it became the centre of Islamic 
learning and dissemination of Islam in the archipelago. Islamic education was not the 
only value absorbed by the region from other Muslim kingdoms. In the sixteenth 
century, Arab dress was required for the kingdom officials and at the same time, as 
mentioned above, some Islamic scholars from Mecca were also invited to preach there 
(Andaya, 2008, p.119). Andaya also highlighted some traditions, activities and 
ceremonies in the kingdom that were influenced by values from Islamic empires in 
Central Asia and India. Arab influence in the kingdom can also be seen from Arabic 
characters on the coinage which was being used there in 1778 (Marsden, 1784). Many 
letters sent from Aceh to kingdoms all over the world were written in Arabic 
characters, including the ones sent to the Ottoman Empire, King James I and King 
Charles II of England (see Gallop, 2011, Göksoy, 2011). The legacy of Arabic 
characters remains in the region until today. Qanun no 11/2002 Article 12(2) requires 
all government and private institutions, public agencies and individuals to use the 





In the political and military context, according to Göksoy (2011), in 1567 
Sultan Alau'd-Din Ri'ayat Shah al-Kahar of Aceh sent a letter to the Ottoman Empire 
asking the Islamic kingdom to consider Aceh as an Ottoman village and treat the 
Sultan and his people as servants to the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Selim II of the 
Ottoman Empire was very pleased with his fellow Islamic kingdom in the Far East 
and willing to give the support and help which was requested. He promised his new 
Figure 3.1:  
The Sultanate Safiatuddin Park in 
Banda Aceh. In addition to Latin 
text, the name of the park is also 
written in Malay Arabic script. 
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ally to send envoys with 15 galleys and two galleons, soldiers from Egypt and 
Istanbul, and military equipment including cannons and rifles (Göksoy, 2011). 
However, a sudden insurgency in Yemen forced the delay of the envoys to Aceh and 
prioritised sending military to Yemen. The Ottoman Empire later on kept its word by 
sending military support to Aceh (Göksoy, 2011), helped build a military academy 
known as Mahad Baitul Makdis in the 16th century, and provided all the instructors to 
train Aceh’s army (Salam, 1995). 
Aceh’s relationship with Muslim countries is also maintained to a degree, 
during conflict between GAM and Indonesian government in 1976 to 2005. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, after the Iranian revolution GAM tried to gain support from 
Iran and other Muslim countries (Aspinal, 2007; Schulze, 2006). Malik Mahmud, one 
of GAM’s top leaders, claimed Iran has offered to train GAM guerrilla fighters with 
one condition that they involved in Islamic revolution (Nessen, 2006).  The group 
turned down this offer as they emphasised their interest in Aceh’s independence, not 
religion. Mahmud claimed in late 1980s they accepted Libya’s offer to give military 
training for GAM fighters with only few strings attached. Thus from 1986 to 1990 the 
group sent more than 1000 men to the North African country (Nessen, 2006). The 
relationship with Libya was only ephemeral, as GAM prioritised to get Western 
support and avoid being seen as a religious movement (See chapter 1). Thus, it can be 
said that global Islamic movement in the 1970s did not have a huge impact on Aceh’s 
rebel movement, despite its spirit of anti-colonialism. 
GAM founder Hasan Tiro always stated its sentiment towards both European 
and Indonesian colonialism. As he mentioned in one of his speeches,  “colonialism, 
either by white, Dutch, Europeans, or by brown, Javanese Asians is not acceptable to 
the people of Aceh Sumatra” (di Tiro, 1984; p.16). However, since many GAM 
leaders were forced into exile in 1979, the group believed internationalisation was the 
only way to achieve their goal of an Independent Aceh (Schulze, 2006). Thus, even 
though in his speech at the beginning of the formation of GAM Hasan Tiro stated his 
antipathy towards colonialism, he also realised he need support from former European 
empires and its allies in order to win against the Indonesian government. This 
highlighted the dynamism of GAM’s political view, affected by various aspects that 
often forced it to negotiate or compromise in order to achieve its goal. 
Meanwhile, Aceh relationships with Muslim countries are still growing until 
today. With Turkey for instance, after the tsunami of 2004, Turkey was one of the 
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countries that helped Aceh by sending volunteers, medical facilities, food and building 
houses for local people. Gampong (village) Atjeh-Istanbul was established in 2005 
providing shelter for local people, a school and mosque. Another Turkish legacy that 
remains is the Turkish Graveyard in Gampong Bitai, Banda Aceh. In this village, 
there is tomb of an Islamic scholar from Turkey Muthalib Ghazi bin Mustafa Ghazi, 
later known as Tengku Syech Di Bitai. 
It was Islamic identities that tied and still tie Aceh and Turkey since the 16th 
century until today. This highlights the power of religion in society. This was the 
same religious discourse that brought Aceh women into power in the 17th century and 
at the same time ended it after almost six decades. The first female ruler of Aceh was 
Sultanah Safiatuddin who was elevated to the throne in 1641 after the death of her 
husband Sultan Iskandar Thani. Safiatuddin was the daughter of Sultan Iskandar 
Muda, known as the greatest sultan in Aceh. Under his reign, Aceh grew as a centre of 
Islamic studies and had one of the biggest Malayu-Islamic scholars, Syams al-Din al-
Samatrani (Andaya, 2008). 
Islamic scholars have fundamental roles within Aceh politics. It was the 
Islamic scholar Nuruddin Ar-Raniry who gave way for Safiatuddin to be enthroned as 
the first female ruler in the Aceh kingdom amidst many debates about whether a 
woman could be a leader. Like Ar-Raniry, another Islamic scholar in Aceh in the 17th 
century, Syaikh Abdurrauf al-Singkili also known as Syiah Kuala accepted women as 
leaders and considered female rulers as a normal phenomenon (Hadi, 2004, p.85). 
Syiah Kuala, in his book Mi’rat al-Tullab, referred to Queen Safiatuddin as khalifah, 
deputy of God, to implement God’s rule in Aceh Darussalam (Hadi, 2004, p.60). 
Nuruddin Ar-Raniry and Syiah Kuala were the two most prominent religious 
leaders in Aceh, after which two of the biggest universities in the province are now 
named. As Kadli Malikul Adil (a most respected and outstanding Islamic scholar) at 
that time and second highest in the government was just below the sultan; Ar-Raniry 
and Syiah Kuala also had strong influence in the kingdom. Ar-Raniry served the 
office of Sultan Iskandar Thani and Queen Safiatuddin at the beginning of her reign. 
After him it was Syiah Kuala, who served as Syaikh al Islam (the highest Islamic 
scholar) during Queen Safiatuddin’s reign and three more queens after her. 
Syiah Kuala was one of the biggest ulama (religious scholars) of all time in 
Aceh. There is a famous local saying “Adat Bak Po Teumeureuhom, Hukom Bak Syiah 
Kuala, Qanun Bak Putroe Phang, Reusam Bak Lakseumana”, which means that 
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culture or local customs are decided by the king; the law is based on the religious 
leader Syiah Kuala; qanun (local regulations) are in the hands of Putroe Phang,7 
Princess Kamaliah of Pahang, the wife of Sultan Iskandar Muda; and reusam (the 
military) is under the admiral’s responsibilities. It is interesting that regarding law and 
qanun the saying does not mention the positions of who is in charge of both aspects 
but rather mentions the names of Syiah Kuala and Putroe Phang. I would argue this 
emphasises the significant position and achievement of the two persons. According to 
Hasjmy (1977), during Iskandar Muda’s administration (1607-1636), Putroe Pang 
established the House of Representatives which was responsible for making 
legislation. During this period, the representatives were male and female. However, it 
was during his daughter Queen Safiatuddin’s era that the number of women in this 
legislative body increased. According to Hasjmy (1977) there were 22 females out of 
73 members, led by Kadli Malikul Adil. 
Queen Safiatuddin took the throne when her husband, Sultan Iskandar Thani 
passed away. The couple did not have any male heirs, hence, according to Hasjmy 
(1977) Ar-Raniry, who was the Syaikh al Islam (the highest Islamic scholar) during 
the reign of Iskandar Thani, held a meeting with top officials and ulama to decide who 
would take the throne. The ulama agreed a woman could be a leader as long as she 
had religious knowledge, attitude and knowledge of science, the same requirement 
that applied to a male leader. Hence, Queen Safiatuddin became the first female ruler 
of Aceh Sultanate and took the title Taj al-Alam Safiatuddin Syahi or Safiyyat al-Din 
Syah. Taj al-Alam means Crown of the World and al-Din refers to Allah’s laws 
(Khan, 2017). In using this title, Khan argues the queen wanted to emphasise her 
position as the ruler of the sovereign kingdom and that she had been chosen to rule 
based on Allah’s law (2017, p.177). 
Queen Safiatuddin was known for her respect towards religious scholars, even 
those who were against her leadership as a women ruler. According to Ar-Raniry, 
during her reign, the capital was an affluent kingdom, food prices were cheap and 
people lived in peace (Cited in Hasjmy, 1977, Reid, 1988b). He praised the queen 
called her a just leader with a lot of respect toward ulama. During her time, Islamic 
schools grew and she supported religious scholars to write books. 
                                                7	She	was	called	Putroe	Phang	(princess	of	Pahang)	by	the	people	
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According to Hasjmy (1977) Queen Safiatuddin was the one who opened up 
access for all women to study and work in any government office, including the 
military. It seems that the matrifocal culture developed during her time as she 
proposed laws regarding women and children to the House of Representatives. 
Hasjmy (1977, p.127-128) lists some of these laws as follows: 
1. Everyone has to provide a house for their daughters, which will be given 
when she gets married. 
2. In addition to a house the daughters should be given land and gold as well. 
3. A husband should give land and gold to his wife which will be hers. 
4. A husband has to stay with his wife at her house. 
5. As long as they are together, all assets are considered as joint property. 
6. All assets gathered since marriage are considered as shared ownership, 50% 
each. 
7. In case of divorce, all properties go to the wife while assets gathered during 
their married life will be shared equally between them. 
8. During iddah (the waiting period after divorce in which women are not 
allowed to re-marry), an ex-husband is still responsible for the livelihood of 
his ex-wife.  
Many of the queen’s policies indicate her concern for women’s rights and equality. 
She also focused on developing Islamic knowledge and it was in her era and the three 
queens after her, the biggest ulama of Aceh, Syiah Kuala, was in charge as Kadli 
Malikul Adil. His name as a distinguished Islamic scholar is still alive today as in the 
aforementioned local saying; and Syiah Kuala University, in Banda Aceh is named 
after him. 
Queen Safiatuddin ruled Aceh for 34 years. During her era, she also prepared 
the three female rulers after her to take the throne when she was gone (Hasjmy, 1977). 
She died in 1675 and soon after that Queen Nurul Alam Naqiatuddin was installed as 
the new ruler. During her reign, the movement to overthrow women rulers grew. 
Protestors did not only campaign against women as leaders but also burnt down the 
grand mosque of Baiturrahman (Hasjmy, 1977). Queen Naqiatuddin died in 1678 and 
was replaced by Queen Zakiatuddin Inayat Syah who died in 1688. According to 
Hasjmy (1977) during the four female rulers’ era, knowledge, culture and arts grew 
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rapidly. Under female rulers, Aceh also promoted religious tolerance. However, this 
ended with the end of the female leadership era in the Aceh sultanate (Khan, 2017). 
Kamalat Syah became the last queen in Aceh Darussalam, her leadership only lasting 
until 1699. She was deposed after a fatwa (a religious scholar’s opinion) from Mecca 
was issued saying that women could not be leaders. 
Therefore, it was a religious leader who paved the way for women to be rulers 
in Aceh Darussalam, but it was also a religious leader who took women off the throne. 
Nuruddin Ar-Raniry was a religious scholar who had lived in Aceh for so many years 
when he and other ulama decided that Queen Safiatuddin could be crowned as 
Sultanah. The Sultanahs’ era in Aceh lasted for almost six decades from 1641-1699 
and it was inseparable from the two biggest religious scholars’ support (Nuruddin Ar-
Raniry and Syiah Kuala) support. Syiah Kuala died 1693, which left the last ruling 
queen of Aceh Darussalam, Kamalat Syah without any support from a strong local 
religious figure. P.J. Veth argued her abdication was influenced by a group of Arabs 
in Aceh who were against female leadership (Cited in Khan, 2017). She was 
succeeded by a sultan of Arab descent, Sultan Badr al-Alam Syariff Hasym Jamal Al-
Din. From then, until the end of the sultanate era in 1903, the throne was held by 
several short-lived sultans. The last one, Muhammad Daud Syah surrendered to the 
Dutch in 1903, which marked the beginning of colonial rule in Aceh. 
Female queens in Islamic society did not only reign in Aceh. Mernissi (2006) 
investigated the existence of female rulers in Islamic society elsewhere. She criticised 
how the story of female queens in Arab society, in particular, is often forgotten not 
only by ordinary people but also by academia. Mernissi wrote that other scholars who 
studied history questioned her when she mentioned the existence of female rulers in 
Arab society in the past. This ignorance could perpetuate the stereotype of Arab 
Islamic patriarchal culture, which gives no space for women to compete in the public 
domain, especially on the political stage. Mernissi (2006) highlights the story of Asma 
Bint Shihab al-Sulayhiyya and Arwa Bint Ahmad Sulayhiyya from the Shi’ite dynasty 
of Yemen. Asma ruled Yemen together with her husband Ali Ibn Muhammad al-
Sulayhi in the 11th century. When Ali officially took power in Yemen, he introduced 
Asma as an equal and partner to help him govern the country until his death in 1066. 
In 1091, Arwa Bint Ahmad Sulayhiyya, who was the daughter-in-law of Asma, 
became the second queen to rule the Shi’ite dynasty in Yemen. Like her parent-in-law, 
Asma governed the country together as a couple with her husband al-Mukarram 
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(Asma’s son). Unlike Asma, Arwa still ruled the country after the death of her 
husband but faced several challenges by the ruling caliph. Despite some attempts to 
take her throne, Arwa remained in power as head of state until her death in 1138, 
dying of natural causes after she had ruled the country for almost fifty years (1091-
1138). 
According to Mernissi, within Islamic society a sultan/sultanah needs the 
caliph’s approval to rule. 
The origin of the word caliph is very different (from Imam who leads 
prayer at mosque), it derives from khalafa, which means to come 
afterward, to succeed someone in time. The first to bear the title of caliph 
was Abu Bakr, he was called caliph because he replaced the Prophet after 
his death. […] The caliph’s duty is to use religion to harmonise the 
political administration of the universe, politics and religion being 
inextricably linked. (Mernissi, 2006, p.32) 
 
Mernissi also describes how the caliph is often addressed as the representative of God 
on earth. The caliph’s duty is associated with the definition of Islamic law (Crone and 
Hinds, 2003). This emphasises the caliph’s power in religious discourse which could 
affect the political stage. As discussed by Mernissi (2006) the caliph often opposed 
the idea to enthrone women as rulers, and without his approval, a female ruler would 
be unlikely to last long regardless of her capacity and ability as a leader. Mernissi 
mentioned that Sultanah Shajarat al-Durr in Egypt who decided to take her husband’s 
position as the ruler after his death in 1250 encountered rejection from the caliph, 
despite her capacity and victory in a military campaign against the crusaders. She tried 
to rule without the caliph’s approval, however she lost support from many different 
parties soon after they learned of his disagreement towards her leadership. This 
confirmed the power of religious leaders in eliminating women from political power. 
Similar to this, the sultanahs’ era in Aceh also highlights a contestation in 
religious discourse within the political stage. It was two locally based religious 
scholars who were behind the success of four women occupying the throne of the 
sultanate of Aceh in the second half of the 17th century. According to Abdurrahman 
Wahid, a Muslim religious leader and Indonesian President from 1999-2001, many 
local ulama in the past wrote religious books with consideration of local culture. 
Wahid (2006) called it “limited renewal” towards religious law (fiqh). He gave an 
example of an ulama from Banjarmasin, who wrote a religious book called Sabilal 
Muhtadin. According to Wahid, Arsyad al-Banjari wrote about “limited renewal” 
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towards inheritance law. Generally, in Islam the share of a male heir is twice that of a 
female, however Arsyad al-Banjari considered local Banjarese culture in South and 
Central Borneo, in which a husband and wife both work together for their livelihood. 
If one of them dies, the inheritance must be divided into two, the first half would be 
given to the spouse who is still alive, and the other half would be shared based on 
Islamic law (Wahid, 2006, p.250-251). Here, Wahid emphasised how religious 
interpretation could vary and relate to the local context.  
The death of Syiah Kuala in the 17th century meant Aceh lost a strong local 
ulama and role model in religious and Islamic law. Along with Nuruddin Ar-Raniry 
and Syiah Kuala, Arsyad al-Banjari is categorised as a reformist ulama in Indonesia 
(Azra, 2004). Efforts to ban women from the throne would have never succeeded 
when Nuruddin Ar-Raniry and Syiah Kuala were still alive. When both great scholars 
had gone, some opposition groups managed to overthrow the queen from the throne, 
using religious discourse in the form of the aforementioned fatwa from Mecca. There 
has to be a legitimation to ban women from the throne, in this case a fatwa from 
Mecca, the birthplace of Islam, as it did not only come from a religious scholar but 
also from someone in charge of Islamic law in the holy place of Islam. 
The use of religious discourse to exclude women from public leadership did 
not only happen during the sultanahs’ era in the 17th century, it remains until today. In 
2010, the local council of Bireun (a district in Aceh) urged the regent to fire Anisah, a 
woman sub-district head of Plimbang. The local council argued that shari’a forbids 
women from being leaders (Tribun News, 07. 10.2010). Anisah also received many 
threats, including texts saying they would do jihad and burn her office (Women's 
Voices Now, 2011). In a documentary made by Women’s Voice Now, an NGO 
focusing on mobilising women via film media, showed a local ulama quoting a Quran 
verse An-Nisa: 34: “Men are in charge of women by [the right of] what Allah has 
given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth”. 
In Indonesia, this text is often interpreted as discussing public leadership and 
used to rule out women from political competition. The claim is that the sacred text 
has legitimised that men were destined to be leaders of women, because they excel 
over them not only in the domestic but also the public sphere. Hence, it was no 
surprise, for example, during a public seminar ‘Engaging Men on Women’s 
Empowerment’ which was held at the State Islamic University Ar-Raniry, in January 
2017, a female member of the audience raised this question with a speaker who was a 
	 78	
religious scholar and asked why this religious text was used by many people to attack 
women’s competition in public leadership. Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir, the speaker in 
the seminar, agreed that many used the verses to prohibit women from becoming 
leaders, but he argued women could be leaders in Islam. According to Kodir (2001) 
there are different translations of the Arabic text amongst scholars, some define 
qawwam as leader, others define it as protector. According to Kodir, it is important to 
study the whole text and compare it to another text; and in interpreting the religious 
text he urged people to learn about the historical context of the text. In addition, 
according to Hassan (1991b, p.55) the Quran text literally means “some in relation to 
some”, therefore the passage could be interpreted as some men are superior to some 
other women/men, so some women are superior to some other women/men. 
In Anisah’s case, for example, as reported in the documentary, the ulama 
claimed God says that men are superior to women because of a certain ability, hence 
women cannot be leaders. However, this argument was denied by the regent as he 
argued the verses do not talk about public leadership, therefore he believed his 
appointment of Anisah as sub-district head was appropriate. Anisah’s appointment 
was also supported by Aceh’s governor at that time, Irwandi Yusuf, and head of the 
provincial ulama council, Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam, Prof. Muslim Ibrahim, who said there was no prohibitions for a woman 
to be a leader as long as she had the qualifications required (Komnas Perempuan, 
2011). Ibrahim’s comments were similar to Nuruddin Ar-Raniry’s decision when he 
and other ulama in the 17th century agreed to let a woman rule the sultanate as long as 
she could fulfil the qualification in religious knowledge, attitude and knowledge of 
science. These were the same qualifications which also applied to men to be 
enthroned as Sultan. 
However religious contestation of women’s leadership in the public sphere is 
still one of the major barriers for women. 
Banda Aceh, 1st February 2017 (field notes) 
 
Tonight, my flatmate showed me a picture of a newspaper where a 
religious leader said, “the decline of Islam in Aceh began from women’s 
leadership”. I had mixed feelings reading this. I cannot verify if the source 
is legitimate or not, I checked the social media that posted this news, and it 
is associated with one of the city’s mayoral candidates for the local 
election this year. It reminds me of one discussion I had with a local friend 
here. She told me about an experience of one of her friends who is running 
for a political campaign. Then in her constituent area, a tape recorder 
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always played every afternoon from the praying room/mosque saying that 
it is forbidden to choose a woman as leader according to Islam. 
 
When I conducted my fieldwork between August 2016 and February 2017, 
Illiza Sa’aduddin Djamal was the mayor. Previously, she had been deputy mayor from 
2012 until 2014, when she became the mayor, following the death of the previous one, 
Mawardy Nurdin. In 2017, Illiza joined the new election campaign, and ran with 
with a male politician Farid Nyak Umar as her deputy candidate.  Illiza’s candidacy in 
the local election brought back the debates about women’s leadership in the public 
sphere. In one interview with a local woman, I was also told that it is forbidden for 
women to be a leader. 
“I disagree with women’s leadership. If we talk about shari’a, it means 
women cannot be a leader, because we talk about shari’a. How can we 
implement shari’a if the leader is a woman? Where is the shari’a part of 
this, because in shari’a it is forbidden [for women to be a leader]” (Pipit, a 
local woman in Banda Aceh) 
 
During that interview, a man also interrupted me when I asked Pipit what was 
her opinion about some ulama like Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur, see 
below) who said woman could be leaders. The man said, women cannot be leaders 
and Gus Dur was not an ulama. I responded by saying he was an ulama of the biggest 
Islamic organisation in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, which literally mean the Revival 
of Ulama. “He is not an ulama” he insisted without further explanation. As I tried to 
avoid conflict during my interview, I changed the conversation as I started to feel 
tense and uneasy with the situation. I asked him to let me finish the interview. 
In Indonesia, Gus Dur is known as a reformist and moderate Muslim scholar. 
His father, Wahid Hasyim is a well-known ulama, and his grandfather Hasyim Ashari 
is the founder of the aforementioned organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. He studied in a 
traditional Islamic school or pesantren before continuing his Islamic studies in Al-
Azhar University, Egypt and the University of Baghdad, Iraq. In 1984, he was chosen 
as the chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama. 
I found the debate about women’s leadership in the public sphere could be 
very intense, especially when facing people with a different perspective. Many 
religious scholars still argue that women should be prohibited from being leaders. This 
religious discourse is used by many politicians to eliminate women from the political 
contest. During local elections in 2017, for example, ulama voices became central in 
the media debate about women’s leadership in the public sphere. The news 
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publication, Waspada (6.02.2017), for example, published some ulama comments 
about prohibiting women as leaders and claimed that all ulama agreed it is haram. 
Abu Tumin, a charismatic local ulama, even had to make clarifications after being 
misquoted by some media for banning women in leadership. He said he had never 
been interviewed about women in leadership, so he was surprised when online media 
quoted him as saying women could not be leaders, according to Islam (Kanal Aceh, 
2017). He then explained that there is no absolute text in the Quran and hadith that 
forbid women from being leaders. He emphasised that the An-Nisa verse 34 which is 
often quoted to justify this, is more about the domestic relationship. 
The case of women’s leadership in the public sphere demonstrates different 
translations and interpretations amongst religious scholars, and is used by politicians 
to support their interest. In this situation, the religious discourse is brought into the 
political arena. In a society with a strong religious identity like Aceh, as has been 
discussed in the previous section, religious discourse is an option to lure constituents 
during elections. Its use could also polarise people, which could lead to some 
dissenters’ exclusion. This has happened to ordinary people and even the ulama, as 
reported in my interview above. Sometimes, it comes with labelling people with a 
different view as liberal, secular or deviant. The discussion about how differences 
matter and how homogenising society could lead to exclusion will be further 
discussed in chapter 4.  
This section highlighted a glorious period of Aceh’s past history where women 
were able to lead the sultanate of Aceh Darussalam for 59 years. This was made 
possible with the support of two of the most prominent Aceh ulama, Nuruddin Ar-
Raniry and Syiah Kuala. The sultanah era in Aceh ended in 1699, after the two ulama 
had gone, and the last queen was deposed by a fatwa from Mecca that prohibited 
female leadership. The debates about female leadership in the public sphere are still 
major barriers for women in Aceh and possibly in other regions in Indonesia, a 
Muslim majority country. The religious views on women and leadership are open to 
interpretation and there is no single definitive interpretation of religious text. In the 
political arena, religious discourse is used to gain people’s support or to dismiss a 
political competitor. 
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3.2.2 Women and the Colonial Era 
In Indonesia, Aceh is known as the province that resisted the most against Dutch 
invasion. It took 270 years for the Dutch to conquer Aceh, and more than 15000 of 
their forces were killed before they succeeded in occupying this region in 1873 
(Brown, 2003). However, Aceh’s strong resistance against the Dutch never stopped, 
and the war continued until 1945 when Indonesia declared independence from Dutch 
colonialism. Aceh prided itself with its resistance and the fact that it was not only 
males who led the war but also females. Pictures of national heroes and heroines are 
everywhere in Aceh and some roads in the province and other regions in Indonesia are 
also named after them. 
People mention with pride the historical narrative of Aceh women’s bravery 
and their leadership. However, female achievement in Aceh history is now merely just 
a narrative that many younger people might not even know about. One woman 
commented about this in a recent seminar in Banda Aceh in January 2017: 
Aceh’s women are great, but when people asked me what is the greatness 
of Cut Nyak Dhien, what is the greatness of Cut Meutia, what is the 
greatness of Queen Safiatuddin? I cannot answer that, and I believe almost 
all the youth, especially in Banda Aceh, cannot answer this question. What 
is Queen Safiatuddin’s achievement beside [being] enthroned as a queen? 
What did Cut Meutia do in addition to fighting with her rencong (Aceh 
sword) and killing people (the enemy)? They do not know. (Aceh dalam 
Lintasan Sejarah (Aceh within Historical Trajectory)) 
 
In addition to female queens, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Aceh is also 
known for its female heroes, some of whom were mentioned above. Laksamana 
Keumalahayati was another hero and the first female admiral in the Sultanate Aceh, 
Darussalam. She lived in the late 15th century and fought against the Portuguese and 
the Dutch during the sultanate era. She was trained at the Mahad Baitul Makdis, the 
military academy in Aceh that was built with the support of the Ottoman Empire 
(Salam, 1995). Her husband was a navy admiral when she was serving as the protocol 
commander of the Istana Darud Dunia palace at the Sultanate Aceh Darussalam. Her 
husband died during a battle at sea against the Portuguese. Keumalahayati then 
formed a military command consisting of widows of those who had died fighting 
against the Portuguese to fight against the Portuguese and the Dutch. This command 
was known as Inong Balee; as can be seen, the same name was used much later by 
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GAM for its women’s military wing. Keumalahayati was bestowed as a national 
heroine on National Hero Day, by President Joko Widodo in 2017. 
Another Aceh heroine who fought against foreign invasions was Cut Nyak 
Dhien. She is known as a guerrilla fighter who encouraged and led her people against 
the Dutch, who she referred to as kafee, the Acehnese word for kafir or the infidels 
(Ibrahim, 1996). The Dutch captured her in 1905, after one of her trusted persons 
reported her position to the colonials. When captured, she was ill and suffered from 
near-sightedness, which affected her guerrilla ability. The Dutch exiled her to 
Sumedang, West Java as they worried she would manage to mobilise Acehnese to 
fight against their power again (Ibrahim, 1996). Cut Nyak Dhien is not only known 
for her bravery as a guerrilla fighter but also as a religious person as well. In exile, she 
taught religion until her death in 1908. 
In Aceh, I visited the house of Cut Nyak Dhien, which is now a museum, with 
some local friends.  
Aceh Besar, 15 January 2017 (field notes) 
In the museum, I saw a picture of a woman in a veil. The woman (the 
guide of the museum) told us the woman in that picture was Cut Nyak 
Dhien. I asked her, ‘What about the other picture?’, the one who was not 
veiled. She said that one was only a painting made by the Dutch. “They 
just speculate about her face as they never saw her. She always went out 




Figure 3.2: A picture taken from the museum of 
Cut Nyak Dhien, in Aceh.  
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I was informed that the original documents of all the pictures were in Leiden. 
According to the KITLV 8  Digital Image Library, at the University of Leiden, 
Netherlands, the woman in the picture (figure 3.2) is Vrouw van Teukoe Panglima 
Polim te Sigli (wife of Teuku Panglima Polim from Sigli) dated 1903. KITLV also has 
another picture of Panglima Polim’s wife, in which she was not wearing a veil; and 
only one of Cut Nyak Dhien, dated 1905, when she was captured and suffered from 
near-sightedness. However, this picture was not on display at the museum in Aceh. 
  
Many people have debated Female heroes’ public appearance instead of their 
heroic acts during the war. 
Field notes Banda Aceh, 17 December 2016 
I showed a local friend photos of a banner I took in Lhokseumawe 
including one with a picture of Aceh’s National Heroine Cut Nyak Meutia, 
without a veil, unlike women in Aceh now. Then her son said, when he and 
his schoolmates were at the museum of Cut Nyak Dhien (another national 
heroine), they were told Cut Nyak Dhien’s picture was not ‘correct’ (not 
her) because she did actually wear a veil. He said, ‘Someone from the 
museum told them, that it was only the Dutch way to ‘merendahkan’ 
degrade her (because she is not wearing veil). 
  
The discussion about Cut Nyak Dhien’s veil also received lots of responses on 
social media, as reported in the print media. The claims were that as a Muslim woman 
from a province known as the veranda of Mecca, she must have worn a veil, unlike in 
the official painting of the heroine (Republika, 24.12.2014; Tribun News, 23.12.2014). 
One account quoted by Tribun News posted an official painting of Cut Nyak Dhien 
together with the same photo, with the following statement: “photo of a Muslim 
                                                
8 	The	 Koninklijk	 Instituut	 voor	 Taal-,	 Land-	 en	 Volkenkunde	 /	 Royal	 Netherlands	Institute	of	Southeast	Asian	and	Caribbean	Studies	
Figure 3.3: Picture of Cut Nyak Dhien, 
1905 (KITLV Digital Image library). 
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woman who protects her honour by covering her aurat [part of the body that needs to 
be covered], they can turn it into a picture of a woman who exposes her aurat, even 
when she is a national heroine” (Tribun News, 23.12.2014). 
The post suggested if women do not cover their aurat, then they do not protect 
their own honour. This narrative will, to some extent, alienate those who do not do so. 
Many Islamic scholars have different interpretations about covering the aurat. 
However, in practice the definition depends on who has the power in the interpretation 
of shari’a law. 
As can be seen from the field notes above, the discourse about the veil has also 
been applied to Cut Nyak Meutia, another national heroine from Aceh, who is also 
known for her guerrilla ability. She would hide in the forest with her followers and 
often got logistical support from people in the villages (Zainuddin, n.d). She had a 
reputation as a democratic leader who was open to criticism from her followers. She 
would tell them if she made a mistake, then they should remind her (Yakub, 1979). 
Cut Meutia died in 1910 after being ambushed in the forest by the Dutch military 
under the command of W.J. Mosselman (Yakub, 1979). 
In 2017, in order to honour her struggle, the Indonesian government released 
new currency with her unveiled picture on it. According to the Indonesian Central 
Bank, the picture had been approved by the heroine’s family/heirs and traditional 
leaders (Detik Finance, 21.12.2016). The grandson did not want any debate about his 
grandmother’s picture; she was never captured by the Dutch, hence there is no real 
photo of her (Liputan 6, 23.12.2016). He also emphasised that the veils women wore 
in the past were more like a scarf. This case is now going to court as a local male 
councillor, Asrizal H. Asnawi from Aceh sued the Central Bank, regarding the female 
heroine’s veil. During the aforementioned seminar in January 2017, he said: 
“As Muthia talked about Cut Meutia and Mr. Azhari also mentioned it, I 
happen to be the one who will pursue this case, Insha’Allah (God willing) 
next Monday or Wednesday we bring it to Central Jakarta. I am not a 
history expert Mr. Azhari, I do not know history, but I know that an 
Acehnese has to cover her head”. (Asrizal H. Asnawi, Aceh Local Council) 
 
Even though he admitted he was not a historian, he insisted in arguing that in the past, 
Acehnese women wore a head cover. In the court case, the plaintiff also urged the 
Central Bank to replace the picture of the female hero with one wearing a head cover 
(20.09.2017b).  
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Instead of focusing on the discussion about Cut Nyak Meutia’s heroic struggle 
during the war against Dutch colonialism, people have been debating about her public 
appearance, a debate that in fact would never have happened to a male hero. In 
addition, Cut Nyak Meutia’s heroic struggle was not the main topic of her photo 
displayed in Blang Padang, Banda Aceh. Unlike male heroes’ descriptions displayed 
there, her profile emphasised her personal life. 
 
The two cases highlight that public discussions about the two heroines have 
been dominated by their public appearance or personal life, instead of their struggle or 
war strategy. The dominant narrative tries to homogenise the current discourse of 
women’s public appearance with past history. In many history books, women’s 
appearances vary, some wore a scarf while others did not. Current shari’a regulations 
applied in Aceh require women to wear Islamic dress, which includes a veil. Even 
though many Islamic scholars have different opinions about it, the local government 
has its own specific definition of what kind of dress women should wear (see chapter 
4). Hence, the veil has become part of Aceh women’s identity, particularly since 2002 
when the local qanun was first passed. 
The reconstruction of history here, particularly regarding women’s public 
appearance can be seen as an effort to control women’s bodies, which is in contrast 
Figure 3.4:  
 
“Cut Nyak Meutia (Keureutoe, Pirak A. Utara, 1870-
Alue Kurieng 1910).  
 
Indonesian national heroine, married twice with men 
that also fought against the Dutch (1905-September 
1910). Fighting up to Gayo Forest, she died in a 
battle in Alue Kurieng, October 1910”. 
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with Aceh’s indigenous culture in the past, where women were relatively independent. 
This discourse has also meant that Aceh women’s bravery and leadership in public is 
being forgotten, as in the present day, any discussion is about their public appearance 
instead of their heroic acts.  
In this next part, I discuss the work of Edward Said and some other scholars. I 
argue that if we focus on the issue of the veil, from a Western feminist viewpoint, this 
only creates more sentiment among the conservatives and at the same time neglects 
women’s agency (see chapter 6). I would say this could perpetuate what Edward Said 
referred to as Orientalism. In this case, the reconstruction of history could perpetuate 
judgements in which non-European countries and Islamic culture are seen as 
patriarchal and male dominated. Said (2003) criticised Western domination of the 
construction of knowledge of non-European countries and Islamic societies - the 
‘Orient’ and argued that Orientalism was “a Western [Occidental] style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (p.3). He claimed that 
many scholars’ writing, especially during colonial times, could not be separated from 
their identity as colonials. Many of those scholars worked with the colonial 
governments, which might have a particular interest. In the case of Aceh, the 
aforementioned Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch anthropologist researched the society but 
at the same time also worked for the Dutch administration. According to Said, these 
people’s positions as scholars writing academic work would make their work be seen 
as scientific with a claim to truth or knowledge, yet, there was a hierarchical 
relationship between the colonials and the colony. Many of these works viewed the 
colony as one single category or generalised about the society but were recognised as 
knowledge about the society and often used by scholars from non-European countries 
as well. The colonies and Islam were viewed as inferior, underdeveloped, less 
civilised, male dominated and patriarchal (see Said, 1989, Said, 2003).  
The same criticism is also coming from some Middle Eastern feminist 
scholars, such as Lila Abu Lughod (1998) and Leila Ahmed (Abu-Lughod, 1998, 
Ahmed, 1992, Ahmed, 2011). The two scholars criticised Western hegemonic 
knowledge perpetuated by Middle Eastern scholars, such as Qasim Amin who wrote 
The Liberation of Woman. Amin is an Egyptian, educated in Paris, France. Their 
criticism of Amin is regarding his standpoint mirroring ‘the Orientalist’ works which 
see European civilisation and culture as superior that the colony, in this case Egypt, 
needs to follow. Amin did not only praise European society and undermine Egyptian 
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Muslim society that he saw as backward, he also suggested that women there should 
cast off their veil in order to be advanced like European women (Abu-Lughod, 1998, 
Ahmed, 1992, Ahmed, 2011). Ahmed (1992) admitted that women are often 
oppressed in Islamic societies, but her concern is the political use of this phenomenon 
by the West. I would argue, many feminist agendas like Amin’s only create more 
sentiment among conservatives in his local culture. This is often counterproductive, as 
feminism would be seen as only Western and in need of adoption by other societies. It 
will be followed by more conservative responses in order to protect women from the 
Western influence of feminism, which could lead to further control over them. If it 
happens, it will only confirm ‘the Orientalist’ stereotype about Muslim communities 
where women are oppressed. Therefore, Ahmed and Abu-Lughod are against the idea 
of importing a Western/European feminist agenda which often focuses on the veil as a 
symbol of oppression. They suggest that Muslim women need to create their own 
feminist ideas and write their own history of feminism without neglecting the local 
culture. 
The case of forgotten Arab queens, as mentioned previously in this chapter, 
also highlighted how feminist history has been ignored and disregarded by local 
societies and scholars. This ignorance could perpetuate the assumptions of Islam and 
Arab culture as patriarchal. With regard to Aceh, the history of female queens and 
heroes is only made into a narrative in which women’s public appearance is discussed 
instead of their work and achievement. 
In the case of Aceh, the existence of female rulers during the Sultanate era and 
brave heroines during the war against Dutch colonialism did not fit the stereotype of 
women’s oppression in Muslim society. However, I would argue the present narrative 
of female queens, which some have claimed as evidence of the decline of the 
Sultanate era, only show that women’s leadership in the public sphere is still contested 
within the society. Meanwhile, debates about female heroes’ public appearance 
indicate that control over women’s bodies has been prioritised beyond their bravery 
and achievements. These narratives only confirm ‘the Orientalist’ belief about 
women’s position in Muslim societies, as male dominated and controlling. Thus, 
narratives about women subjugation in Muslim society are not only created by 
Western writers/colonialists, but also authorities in the very communities from which 
these women come. 
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Here, I would like to emphasise that my standpoint is neither against veiling 
nor based on anti-Western sentiment. As I explained in chapter 2, in this research I 
want to build an insider perspective as an Indonesian Muslim women, which at the 
same time is also critical of my own culture. I believe the decision to wear a veil or 
not to wear one should be given to each person and I am also against the idea of 
control over anyone’s body. 
I would argue, the reconstruction of this historical narrative of Aceh’s heroine 
is also part of an effort to strengthen Aceh’s identity as a province that has 
implemented shari’a. Keyes (1981, p.5) argued that “ethnic identities implicate a 
‘primordial’ relationship between people”. Here, Keyes emphasised identities as the 
element that connect people to others. Identity describes a person’s status and sense of 
belonging and connection to a group of people that differentiates them from others. 
Shari’a is part of the values that characterise Aceh’s identity, especially since shari’a 
was formally legalised in Aceh in 2002. This contributes to the shifting of Aceh’s 
identity. This status differentiates Aceh from the rest of Indonesia, as it is the only 
province that has an autonomous right to implement shari’a. The beginning of the 
implementation of shari’a was marked by the issuance of Qanun no. 11 (2002) which 
included the regulation of people’s public appearance. This regulation is particularly 
applied to women, who are expected to wear a veil and loose-fitting clothes. Thus, 
women’s public appearance became central to the implementation of shari’a law. 
Reinforcing the implementation of shari’a, veiling for women in this case, 
would be seen as respectful towards religion or even as pious. On the other hand, for 
politicians, this position benefits them in terms of political populism. In 2016, Pisani 
and Buehler published a paper about what motivates Indonesian politicians to promote 
shari’a regulations. Since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, the numbers 
of shari’a regulations passed by local governments in many provinces in Indonesia 
have been growing. Between 1998 and 2013, at least 443 shari’a regulations were 
issued all over Indonesia (Buehler, 2016). According to Pisani and Buehler (2016) 
shari’a dress code, such as requiring women to wear a veil, was categorised as a 
regulation which spurs a local government’s Islamic credentials that will increase their 
popularity among some constituents. As a Muslim majority country, promoting 
shari’a regulations is a populist idea, which could attract many constituents during 
elections. This applies particularly in Aceh province which prides itself on its Islamic 
identity as the gateway of Islam in Indonesia, and the only province with an 
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autonomous right to implement shari’a law, as previously mentioned. The situation 
makes the province prone to the politics of identity in which religion is used as a 
political commodity by certain groups or parties in order to gain popularity and 
people’s support. On the other hand, this could also lead to exclusion or 
marginalisation of those who do not share the same identity.  
3.2.3 Women, the Aceh Conflict and the Tsunami Disaster 
Aceh is one of the provinces with a long history of conflict due to its strong resistance 
against foreign occupation. During the Sultanate era, Aceh built strong resistance 
against the Portuguese who wanted to control the Straits of Malacca. After that, during 
colonial times, Aceh was listed as the most costly war for the Dutch when they 
occupied Indonesia, due to the people’s strong resistance. Since Indonesia’s 
independence, Aceh experienced some more prolonged conflicts (chapter 1). Aceh 
finally achieved a peace agreement in 2005, deal which was triggered by the 
devastating tsunami disaster of December 2004. The disaster required urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Thus, both the Indonesian Government and 
GAM needed to hasten the peace agreement in order to allow international aid to help 
to rebuild the region, a programme that would have been harder if Aceh had still been 
a conflict zone. 
During the war between GAM and the Government of Indonesia, women’s 
involvement was also fundamental. GAM organised female combatants under its 
women’s military wing, Inong Balee (see chapter 2). Many women joined the rebel 
group for several reasons, including the death or torture experienced by their family 
members because of the war, as well as to defend their own people from the national 
government which was seen as marginalising them (see Santoso and Yuniver, 2009, 
Marshall, 2002, McCall, 2000). 
Aceh’s women were also active in initiating peace. In February 2000, about 
500 women who had been affected by the conflict called for peace at the first All 
Acehnese Women’s Congress known as Duek Pakat Inong Aceh (Kamaruzzaman, 
2008). The Congress generated 22 recommendations including the need for dialogue 
towards peace in Aceh and greater women’s participation in the political decision-
making. During the actual peace negotiations, there was only one woman involved, 
Shadia Marhaban, from GAM, still, women’s contributions during the whole process 
of this effort should not be forgotten. 
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On the other hand, the war killed men, women and children of Aceh. Amnesty 
International reported there were about 10000 to 30000 people killed and most of 
them were civilians (Amnesty International, 2013). According to the National 
Commission on Violence against Women there were 103 cases of abuses against 
women between 1990 and 2005 (Komnas Perempuan, 2007); 61 were for sexual 
violence, followed by other cases such as torture, persecution and assault. Violence 
against women during conflict affects society’s attitude towards women in order to 
avoid cases of abuse or worse happening. Hence, according to Siapno (2013) the 
prolonged war has made Islamic identity in Aceh more militant and patriarchal, and 
this restricts women’s role and mobility, as discussed in chapter 1. 
As previously mentioned, in addition to violent conflict, Aceh also 
experienced the tsunami disaster when, on 26 December 2004, an earthquake of a 
magnitude of 9.0 took place beneath the Indian Ocean, which triggered the tsunami. 
The disaster changed the conflict zone, which until then had not been visited by many 
people. Suddenly, many people from all over the world were coming to bring 
international aid and help the recovery process. In an interview with a local women, 
Alia, she said: 
“Yes, in general there was a strengthening of religious identity, and in 
Aceh too, so the momentum was the tsunami. I would say, during the 
tsunami many people from abroad were coming. Aceh back then was still 
a conflict zone, it had not ended yet. During conflict, we usually… well 
the characters of people who live in conflict are always suspicious and 
it’s common. Because in the last 30 years, during conflict we did not 
know who were friends who was the enemy. We always had to be 
suspicious of people, because we never knew and we were not safe… and 
during that time there were many issues including apostasy, many foreign 
organisations [were] thought to bring a Christianisation mission”. (Alia, 
local woman) 
 
More than USD 7 billion poured in through the international agencies working 
in the post-tsunami disaster area (BRR and partners, 2006). The people of Aceh, who 
had lived through war and were then hit by natural disaster, saw many new people and 
new faces from different cultures. 
One concern that was raised during that time was evangelism, as mentioned by 
Alia, brought by some foreign aid organisations. An Australian based newspaper The 
Sydney Morning Herald and UK based media The Guardian reported stories of some 
volunteers who came to Aceh with missionary assignments (Berger, 2005, Burke, 
2005). A missionary organisation based in Virginia, World Help planned to move 300 
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Muslim orphans from Aceh to a Christian children’s home, but then had to cancel it 
after a huge backlash from the local Islamic community, which made the government 
refuse the organisation’s proposal (Cooperman, 2005).  
The coming of many foreign people to Aceh brought changes to the society. In 
Aceh I was told that before the tsunami, coffee shops had been mostly attended by 
men only, but after the tsunami many female foreigners went to coffee shops either 
just to have a cup of coffee - Aceh is famous for its coffee - or to meet up. In addition, 
in many cultures a coffee shop is not a gendered territory but rather a public place for 
everyone. The coffee shop business grew rapidly in Aceh, and attracted many local 
young people, males and females, to come either to work or just to chat with their 
friends. This was not something common for the older generation. When I was there, I 
was often asked by my landlady and her brother where I was going and when I said, 
‘I’m going to a coffee shop’, they looked a bit confused. On another occasion, I spoke 
with a woman food seller who told me that in Aceh culture, women were supposed to 
be at home not around in a public space like a coffee shop.  
 
Field notes, 26 October 2016 
Food seller: It’s like now, everyone goes to coffee shops - men and 
women. In the past, it was only men, but now women go to coffee shops as 
well and sometimes they bring their children there. Many of the women 
also stay there during maghreb or praying time and sometimes even up to 
late at night. 
 
Me: Oh, so you do not agree with this, that they are there during praying 
time and at night and sometimes with their children. 
 
Food seller: Yes, if they are in a coffee shop at night, what about their 
children, who is going to teach them at home, who will teach them to recite 
the quran? 
 
Me: I see, what about the men who are also there? 
 
Food seller: Men have occupied coffee shops since many years ago. In 
Aceh tradition, males should not do anything at home they should be 
outside. 
 
Me: So, what are they doing? 
 
Food seller: Children, boys should be out playing or studying, while girls 
should be home helping their family to do housework. So, when the boys 
grow up they will be responsible to help their sister. 
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Me: So, males are responsible for their sister? 
 
Food seller: Yes, they help their sister, but then women are expected to get 
married and she will be her husband’s responsibility. In gender equality it 
means men can also work at home like women, doesn’t it? For example, to 
clean up the garden or yard, in Aceh its only for women. 
 
In this conversation, there is a gendered territory, a place that belongs to men 
only or women only. The gendered space has shifted, following the tsunami disaster, 
coffee shops are now visited by male and female customers. This change raised 
concerns for some people who consider coffee shops as male territory while females 
belong to the domestic space. This reminds me about the aforementioned indigenous 
matrifocal culture in Aceh in which Aceh women have power at home; the po rumoh, 
however, seem to have no power in public. As explained early in this chapter, 
according to Srimulyani (2010) the definition of matrifocality has shifted from the one 
who owns the house to a housewife. However, if Srimulyani argued it was affected by 
modernisation, I would say the conflict and the tsunami disaster has also contributed 
to this change in the society. 
The disaster is also often associated with religious narratives in the society. 
Many people saw the tsunami as a warning from God or even God’s wrath for their 
sinful deeds; and the disaster was a way to remind them to be more devout Muslims 
(Salim, 2008). According to Salim, for many Acehnese, the disaster brought a 
message to them to comply with God’s law and they believe the government should 
implement it truthfully. People often pointed out that many mosques were still 
standing after being hit by the disaster, even though most of the village surrounding 
them had gone. On the 12th anniversary of the tsunami in 2016, for example, the 
government’s theme was to make the anniversary of the tsunami of 26 December 
2004 a moment to repent and surrender to Allah Subhanahu wa ta'ala (The most 
glorified, the most high). Hence, the disaster contributed to bringing about a stronger 
religious identity which was already prone to being politicised, and could also lead to 




This chapter provides some historical context, which has affected constructions and 
re-constructions of gender in Aceh society. It also highlighted how legacies of Aceh’s 
past still remain today and are part of its identities. Within Aceh’s indigenous 
matrifocal culture, women, (po rumoh the one who owns the house), have a strong 
position in the household. However, over time, following many social changes and 
government policies, the meaning of po rumoh has shifted to ‘housewife’ where they 
no longer have much power at home as in the past. 
The prolonged wars in Aceh built stronger religious identities among the 
people, especially after the war against the Portuguese in the 16th century, during the 
Sultanate era in which religious narratives were always echoed by the use of words 
such as kafee to describe the Portuguese and Jihad fi sabil Allah (fighting in the path 
of God) to describe the war. The Portuguese did not only want to control the strategic 
trading strait, but also brought missionaries. A religious narrative was also used 
during the colonial era against the Dutch, even though the Dutch mission in 
conquering Aceh was more to control spice production, particularly pepper. The 
Portuguese and the Dutch were therefore seen as enemies. The clash of religious 
narrative against foreign powers, particularly Western power also appeared in post-
tsunami Aceh following some international organisations evangelist missions. This 
cultural clash also affected some gender based programmes as ‘gender’ is seen as 
associated with ‘Western’ values. 
On the other hand, historically, relationships with other foreigners were 
established through trading. Many merchants from the Middle East and India came to 
Aceh not only to do business and trade, but also to live in the coastal area then marry 
local people. The cultural assimilation between Aceh and those merchants ran rather 
smoothly. Hence it is possible that those foreign cultures were absorbed into people’s 
daily life. Additionally, the relationship between Aceh and other Muslim kingdoms 
also expanded to education, politics and military co-operation during the Sultanate 
era. As explained earlier in this chapter, Aceh absorbed some traditions and cultures 
from its Muslim allies including the requirement to wear Arab dress for the kingdom’s 
officials in the 16th century. The smooth assimilation between those cultures created a 
hybrid culture, values that are seen as part of what is called Aceh culture now. Before 
the coming of Islam, for instance, according to Marco Polo, many people lived in this 
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region were pagan. However, when Islam was introduced, it became an integral part 
of Aceh’s identity until today. The Arabic character and dress which was made 
official during the sultanate era, became part of Aceh’s identity that has now been 
legalised through local law or qanun.  
This chapter also explored Aceh’s pride in its history where women played 
significant roles. Histories of female leadership in Aceh, either in the 17th century 
during the sultanate era or during war against the Dutch colonials, are glorified until 
the present day. People are proud of their past history of having female leaders, 
however, in current daily life few people seem to be interested in discussing how 
women could have been leaders in an Islamic society at that time. How did religious 
scholars or ulama deal with the issue during the sultanate era? Why did the queen’s 
era end after almost 60 years and why was it never repeated? A male speaker once 
mentioned the lack of interest in these women’s achievements, during the 
aforementioned seminar ‘Women in the Historical Trajectory’: 
“I think, discourse about women in Indonesia and in Aceh in particular, it 
is all only being used to support glorification towards men. It is almost 
certain! For example, the recent case about Cut Meuthia, what was the 
criticism toward Cut Meuthia? Her veil! Nothing else, not about how she 
led a political organisation at that time, for example. Not such a thing as 
that!” (Azhari) 
 
Discussion in this chapter confirmed Azhari’s criticism about the lack of 
interest in narratives about women in Aceh history. Women’s leadership is only a 
narrative that has always been echoed to counter those who argued that the society 
was becoming more patriarchal and gave no space for women in public leadership. 
However, in reality, women’s efforts to compete on the political stage are often 
curtailed using religious discourse. It happened during the sultanate era and in the 
present day. 
Overall, this chapter highlights the dynamics within Aceh’s history that 
transformed the society in various ways. Religious narrative has played a key role and 
has often been used in resistance movements, from the war against the European 
empires to the war against the Indonesian government. Then, in 2004, Aceh was hit by 
the tsunami. The region that had been isolated from the outside world due to the 
prolonged conflict, was suddenly filled with international aid and donors, foreigners 
from all over the world. This thesis argued that all these dynamics, since the war 
against the European empires; the prolonged conflict with the Indonesian government 
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and its gender ideology policy under the New Order (1967–1998); and the tsunami 
disaster have brought about a stronger religious identity and, in addition, contributed 
to the diminishing of Aceh’s traditional matrifocal culture.  
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Chapter 4. Gender Construction within Aceh’s Shari’a 
This chapter examines how gender is constructed within local shari’a law in 
Aceh, particularly in terms of how men and women should behave. Many new local 
shari’a laws or qanun have been passed, following the first one of 11/2002. In this 
chapter I focus on some of them, particularly those that regulate how people should 
behave. As mentioned in chapter 2, six regulations will be analysed: 1) Qanun no.11 
(2002) on religious affairs, worship and religious symbols; 2) Qanun no. 6/2014 about 
jinayat (criminal) law; 3) GI no. 02/INSTR/2014 about policing cafes and internet 
services in Aceh; 4) CMI no.1/2015 about supervision and policing of tourist 
services/recreation/ entertainment and internet services, cafés/other similar services 
and sports facilities in Banda Aceh city; 5) and its revised version, no.2/2015. The 
sixth, GR no. 10 (2005) on technical guidance for implementation of uqubat 
(punishment) by caning will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
The laws analysed in this chapter regulate people who live or visit Aceh, in 
several aspects, including religiosity, public appearance, morality, behaviour, mobility 
and sexuality. In this thesis, I would like to emphasise that shari’a here refers to the 
local codification often called as shari’a law. This research analysed some local 
qanun (local shari’a regulations at the provincial level), and some other local 
regulations (made by the governor or city mayor) in the name of reinforcing the 
implementation of shari’a as part of Aceh’s autonomous rights.  
As mentioned above, this chapter aims to find out how gender is constructed 
within local shari’a law and how men and women should behave accordingly. The 
terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ are often used interchangeably (Mikkola, 2017), however 
some scholars have distinguished the two terms. According to Stone (2007), many 
feminist scholars have discussed the distinction between the two since the late 1960s. 
Sex is defined as a biological attribution at birth, while gender refers to the “social 
expectations” and characteristics counted as feminine and masculine (Stone, 2007, 
p.30). Gender construction is determined by the culture and society and at the same 
times the biological sex dictates gender expectations towards people in the society. In 
the case of Aceh for instance, a woman is expected to wear skirts instead of trousers 
and vice versa for men. Those who breach this expectation are considered as deviant. 
In the case of transgender women, the police have been heavy handed. In January 
2018, police raided some beauty salons in Aceh, where there were transgender 
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women; the police then cut their hair, gave them male outfits and told them to speak in 
‘masculine’ voices (The Guardian, 2018; BBC, 2018). They were also held for a few 
days to get counselling and be coached to become ‘normal’, according to their 
biological sexes at birth. This example highlights how gender expectations towards 
people were determined by their biological sexes. Regarding LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and questioning/queer) local shari’a only mentioned about 
lesbianism (musahaqah) and gay relationships between men (liwath). However, at a 
national level, the Indonesia Islamic Council (MUI) declared LGBT and 
homosexuality as deviant and as diseases that need to be cured. 
In Aceh, the term ‘gender’ is also often misinterpreted and associated with 
Western values (See chapter 2). When I mentioned it to local people they often saw it 
as women wanting to outperform men; to deny their ‘kodrat’ or destiny to bear 
children; and used examples of women occupying (male) public space, such as a 
coffee shop (see chapter 3). Sentiment towards this term also could be linked to the 
post-tsunami period, as discussed in chapter 2. 
In the case of Aceh, I would argue that gender construction is influenced not 
only by culture and the society, but also central, state or local government policy 
(shari’a regulations), the prolonged conflict (see chapter 3), sentiment towards 
Western values, the political situation as well as religious discourse. Within the 
religious discourse, the construction of gender is often linked to Islamic tradition, in 
which many interpret men as the head of the family, the guardian, who can use any 
necessary measure in order to ‘protect’ their family.  
This chapter discusses how men and women are expected to behave in Aceh. 
According to Yuval-Davis (1997) Women are seen as a burden and marked as a 
collective symbol, which represents the society’s honour, thus women’s bodies are 
expected to represent the application of Islamic law in Aceh. The state (local 
government) has imposed cultural uniformity onto women’s bodies, to unify a 
standard model of femininity. 
The first section discusses the laws mentioned above and how they expect 
women and men to behave. I highlight Michel Foucault’s concept of discipline and 
punishment to discuss the Aceh government’s effort to ensure local shari’a law is 
followed. The second section focuses on the practice of shari’a in the society, how 
people’s practice is constructed by the government, and the gender discourse that 
exists. 
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This banner was exhibited at the Shari’a Police stand during Piasan Seni, an 
arts festival at Taman Sari, now known as Bustanussalatin Park. It lists ten activities 
which are banned according to Qanun Jinayat, which is one of the latest to be passed 
by the Aceh government, and has raised some controversy and criticism. In 2017, for 
example, some NGOs belonging to the Civil Society Network for Advocacy of Qanun 
Jinayat criticised it saying that it was against the Indonesian State Constitution and 
discriminates against women (BBC, 23.10.2017). One law that was criticised a lot is 
regarding rape, in which the rape survivor is required to provide witnesses or 
evidence. If they cannot, they may take an oath to God. However, if the accused 
denies the accusation and also takes an oath to God, swearing their innocence, they 
will be free from any charge. 
In addition to this, the Universal Periodic Review published by Solidaritas 
Perempuan (SP) in 2016 also criticised some other aspects of the law as well. The 
report claimed that it was one among a total of 421 discriminative policies in 
Indonesia. The report criticised its claims to be based on Islamic law and that it only 
acknowledges one single interpretation of religious text, ignoring diversities within 
Islam and Aceh society (Solidaritas Perempuan, 2016). The law also does not consider 
diversities in the society as it applies to all people, regardless of their religion or 
Figure 4.1: 
Qanun Jinayat regulates 10 forbidden things: 
 
1. Drinking alcohol 
2. Gambling 
3. Khalwat (being together with a non-muhrim or 
unmarried and non-blood relative in a quiet place) 
4. Ikhtilath (unmarried couple being romantic 
behind a closed door or in an open space) 
5. Zina or sex without marriage between a man and 
woman 
6. Sexual harassment (immorality/obscenity without 
victim's willingness) 
7. Rape (Sex without willingness, with force and 
threat towards victims) 
8. Qadzaf (accusing people of committing adultery 
without being able to present witnesses) 
9. Liwath (Sex between man and man) 
10. Musahaqah (Sex between woman and woman) 
 
The Islamic Shari’a Department  
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belief. Additionally, it was claimed that it was violating people’s privacy as it 
regulates khalwat, ikhtilath and zina. 
As this chapter aims to analyse how gender is constructed within local shari’a 
law and how women and men should behave, I will now focus on what kind of 
regulations and requirements are applied to people, by analysing the documents 
mentioned above. The texts are written in Indonesian, but also use some Arabic terms 
and religious text. The table below demonstrates what elements of people’s lives are 
regulated within the law. As can be seen, they regulate the society in many different 
aspects: 
 
Table 4.1: Regulating Society 
 
1. Qanun no.11 (2002) on religious affairs, worship and religious symbols. 
 
 




Islamic dress (covering 
aurat and women must 
wear a veil, and loose 
fitting clothes) 
 






(Not compulsory for 
women) 
 
Must go to Friday prayer 
(Compulsory) 
People are not allowed to do any activities that would hinder 
or affect those who pray 
 
2. GR no. 10 (2005) on technical guidance for implementation of uqubat (punishment) 
by caning. 
 









3. Qanun no. 6/2014 about jinayat.  
 









Khamar, an intoxicating, alcoholic drink of 2% or more.  
Drinking alcohol, producing, buying, keeping, bringing/carrying 
alcohol or giving it as a present. 
 
Maisir (Articles 18, 19 & 20) 
 
Maisir is an action containing the element of betting and/or an 
element of gambling made between two parties or more, 
accompanied by an agreement that the winner will get paid/profit 
from the losers either directly or indirectly. 
Gambling and providing facilities or finance for gambling 
 
Khalwat (Articles 23 & 24) 
 
Khalwath is the act of two people of different sexes, being in a 
closed or hidden place; not Mahram (husband or blood relatives), 
with no marital ties, and being willing to lead to the act of Zina 
 
Ikhtilath (Articles 25-32) 
 
Ikhtilath is the act of romance like making out, touching, hugging 
and kissing between a man and a woman who are not a husband 
and wife, with the willingness of both parties, either in a closed or 
open place.  
 
Zina (Articles 33-45) 
 
Zina is intercourse between a man or more with a woman or more 
without marital ties with the willingness of both parties. 
 
Sexual Harassment (Article 46&47) 
 
Sexual Harassment is an act of immoral or obscene acts 
committed personally in public against either men or women, as 
victims, without their consent. 
 
Rape (Articles 48-56) 
 
Rape is sexual intercourse, with the faraj (vagina) or rectum of 
another person as a victim by an offender or another object used 
by the perpetrator against the victim’s faraj or penis by the 
perpetrator’s mouth or against the victim’s mouth by the offender, 
by force or by coercion or threat to the victim. 
 
Qadzaf (Articles 57-62) 
 
Qadzaf is accusing a person of Zina without being able to file at 
least 4 (four) witnesses. 
 
Sexuality Musahaqah (Article 64) Liwath (Article 63) 
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(Article 63 & 64)  
Musahaqah is the action of 
two women or more by 
mutually rubbing limbs or 
faraj to obtain sexual 
stimulation (pleasure) with 
the willingness of both 
parties.  
 
Liwath is the deed of a man by 
placing his zakar (penis) into the 
other male’s anus with the 
willingness of both parties. 
 
4. GI no. 02/INSTR/2014 about policing cafe and Internet services in Aceh. 
 
Regulating Women Men 
Religiosity 
(No. 3a & b; 4d) 
Café/Cyber cafe Management should stop activities during and 
close to Magrib prayer time and Friday prayer. 
 
Encourage customers to pray during praying time 
 
Public appearance 
(No. 3c & g; 4f) 
Waiter, waitress and customers must wear Islamic dress 
Mobility (No. 3d; 
4g) 
Not allowed to work 
beyond 9 p.m. 
 
Not applied 
Mobility (No. 3f) It is forbidden to serve 
women customers who are 
not with their mahram 
beyond 9 p.m. 
 
Not applied 
Morality (No. 4k) Cyber cafés should forbid males and females who are non-




5. CMI no.1/2015 about supervision and policing tourist services/recreation/ 
entertainment and internet services, cafés/other similar services and sports facilities in 
Banda Aceh city. 
 
Regulating Women Men 
Mobility (No. 
1.13) 
Female employees should 






Employees at Cafés, Cybercafés, and sport facilities should wear 




Service towards female 
customers is only allowed 
until 10 p.m. except if they 







6. CMI no.2/2015 about supervision and policing tourist services/recreation/ 
entertainment and internet services, cafés/other similar services and sports facilities in 
Banda Aceh city. 
 
Regulating Women Men 
Mobility 
(No.1.13) 
Female employees should 






Employees of cafés, cybercafés, and sport facilities should wear 




The tables above demonstrate regulations applied to women and men in Aceh, 
and how they are expected to behave according to the law. The law also mentions 
punishment for those who breach the regulations. Regulation and practice of 
punishment will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. As can be seen, the laws (qanun) 
regulate the society in many different ways: public appearance; religiosity; mobility; 
morality and behaviour, even the most private aspects, such as their sexuality, with 
punishment for those who breach these regulations. In many cases, the five main 
themes regulate women and men in different ways.  
To begin with, I read the law and investigated the language used and how it is 
written, in Indonesian but with many Arabic terms also being used. This indicates how 
the province has been influenced by Arab values which is seen as where Islam comes 
from. I would argue the use of Arabic terms is to build proximity with the original 
language of the religious text itself and to make it seen as more Islamic. However, 
Abdurrahman Wahid (2006) warns that people in Indonesia need to differentiate 
between Arab values and Islamic values. He argued that people’s lack of confidence 
in Western modernisation and advancement has caused them to subordinate 
themselves towards Arabic values which could make them feel more Islamic. Here, 
we can see the sentiment of a postcolonial country where people have tried to 
differentiate themselves from the European colonial powers. 
On the other hand, the effort to insert Arabic into local law also shows how the 
province negotiates with foreign values, which indicates a so-called hybrid culture. As 
discussed in chapter 3, soft penetration of Arab values through trading and marriage 
with local people helped the acculturation process. Arab values then became part of 
people’s identity. For example, Qanun no. 11/2002 Chapter V Article 12 about the 
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implementation of Islamic dissemination, mentions that the government and 
community institutions recommend the celebration of Islamic feast days. The law also 
recommends all government, private and community institutions to use Malay Arabic 
writing in addition to Latin text. 
The two qanun analysed in this thesis begin with the religious text 
“Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim” (In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most 
Merciful). This is a common practice in Indonesia, a country with more than 200 
million Muslim followers. The text is then followed by the words, “Governor of Aceh 
Province”, which indicates the highest authorities at the provincial level who authorise 
and legislate the law. The law also claims to be based on the Quran, the holy book of 
Islam, and the hadith. Qanun Jinayat no. 6/2014, for example, states that it considers: 
“the Qur’an and Al-Hadith are the main basis of Islam that brings grace to the whole 
universe and has become the conviction and foundation of Acehnese society”. 
The usage of religious text at the beginning of the law demonstrates how 
Islamic identity has been brought into official documents. It indicates an attempt to 
make Islam the province’s identity. Being associated with Islam also strengthens the 
image of the law as God’s law. In addition, the qanun’s claim of the Quran and hadith 
as the basis of the law is perceived as an effort to reinforce God’s rule in the region, 
which makes the government be seen as religious. However, with that claim, the 
interpretation of religious text in the Quran and hadith is reflected in the regulations 
mentioned in the qanun. It has produced regulations that involve a single 
interpretation of religious texts, particularly in several aspects, as mentioned in the 
table above. This has led not only towards a homogenised interpretation of religious 
texts, but also an attempt at homogenising the society.  
However, even though the law is based on the Quran and hadith, it only 
acknowledges one single interpretation of the religious text. The first qanun, which 
marked the beginning of the implementation of shari’a in Aceh is Qanun no. 11/2002; 
one of its points is requiring people to wear Islamic attire. In the explanation section 
of the law, it mentions Islamic attire should protect the aurat, not be transparent and 
not show the shape of the body. In addition to that, leaders of government, 
educational, business and community institutions are also expected to be responsible 
regarding the implementations of these regulations at their workplace, including 
during sport or exercise sessions. 
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As a matter of fact, there is no so-called Islamic attire for men, as many 
Islamic scholars agree that men are only obliged to cover from their navel to knees. In 
addition, many Islamic scholars debate which part of the women’s bodies should be 
considered as aurat. Instead of discussing how different interpretations have been 
developed regarding women’s aurat, the government decided to enforce and promote 
one single interpretation of how women and men should appear in public, while at the 
same time eliminating other different interpretations by Islamic scholars in this field. 
The law not only regulates how people should appear in public space, but also 
compels certain people to be active participants to support and promote this regulation 
in their institutions to make sure it is being enforced and implemented. In addition, the 
government, through its shari’a police institution, WH, has conducted dress raids, and 
those women who do not veil have their names recorded and are warned not to do it 
again. 
Other efforts to regulate women’s public appearance by promoting the idea of 















This banner is displayed at the office of the Department of Islamic Shari’a, and 
I was informed during my fieldwork in Aceh that it has also been placed in many 
other government offices and the public university. Beneath the heading, “The 
Department of Islamic Shari’a”, the translation of the text is as follows: 




words: “Girls that are mature enough, should not be seen except for their 
face and both of their palms to their wrist” (Abu Daud). The veil must be 
long and covering chest, dress must be long and loose-fitting, dresses must 
be long-sleeved and covering wrist, clothes must be long reaching to the 
ankle, socks must be worn, soundless high-heels (if you wear high heels, 
they should be soundless, and make sure heels are made of rubber). 
 
The banner highlights how the government focuses on regulating women’s 
bodies and appearance, there is no banner made for regulating men’s attire. It also 
shows three different pictures of the ‘wrong way’ to dress. The first picture is a 
woman character wearing a veil and a body shaping outfit. There is a note next to the 
picture saying, “the wrong thing in this picture is tight clothes and showing the shape 
of the body”. It is followed by, a quote from the Prophet: “Shall you lend her long and 
loose fitting clothes”. The second picture shows a woman wearing a shoulder length 
veil and loose fitting dress, saying, “The wrong thing in this picture is that the veil 
does not cover the chest, Allah mentioned in the Quran chapter An-Noor, verse 31: 
“they should wear a veil to cover their chest”. And the last picture in the section is a 
woman wearing a veil and high heels, and the explanation next to it saying, “The 
wrong things in this picture are as follows: the veil does not cover the chest, the tight 
outfit shows the body shape, she is wearing short clothes, and no socks”. This is 
followed by “Indeed, hell’s residents are those women who are dressed but naked, 
who are inclined toward immorality and attract others to commit immorality. They 
will not go to heaven and will not smell it”. There is no explanation regarding the 
sources of the last quote, however it refers to the Prophet’s words.9 
Homogenisation of women’s dress is in the making: the banner shows one 
‘correct’ way of how women’s clothes should be, while the rest are called “the wrong 
way”. This official banner from the Shari’a Department also uses certain religious 
texts to justify all the rules of the ‘correct’ and the ‘wrong’ way to dress. In addition, 
the placement of the banner in government buildings and public places has the public 
as its target audience. 
The law itself at the beginning mentioned in Qanun no. 11/2002 only required 
women to cover their aurat, by not wearing tight and transparent clothes. Now, after 
more than fifteen years, the government also recommends women to wear one kind of 
                                                9	https://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/18/10/17/pgqiq9313-santun-berpakaian;	https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/121048	
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dress style, which is beyond all requirements mentioned in the law. Government 
efforts to promote this law are also mentioned in the GR as well as Banda Aceh CMI 
which require employees of business entities in tourism and the entertainment industry 
to wear Islamic attire in accordance with shari’a. 
The government never discusses the context of the religious texts it uses in its 
policies. The religious text is used as a single entity and order but its context is never 
discussed to inform the public and make them understand why one such regulation in 
the past was made. So, the public is indoctrinated by one single interpretation of a 
religious text.  
Within the same qanun, the government also regulates people’s religiosity and 
mobility by instructing them to go to Friday prayer. Even though the regulation 
mentions all people must do Friday prayer, in practice, this obligation only applies to 
men, while women, along with other people who are not Muslim are expected not to 
do any activities that would not hinder the prayer service. However, the regulations 
also advise mosques to provide space for women to pray during this time. Regulations 
to control people’s religiosity and mobility can also be seen in regulations, such as GI 
no. 02/INSTR/2014, CMI no.1/2015 which was then replaced by CMI no.2/2015, 
regarding business operators in the tourism and entertainment industry. The GI 
requires business operators to stop their activities during Friday prayer time and 
Maghrib (prayer time after sunset) every day. The instruction also requires business 
entities to provide praying facilities and advise customers to pray during prayer time. 
The government claims the regulations on people’s religiosity are intended to 
encourage Muslims in Aceh to increase the quality of their faith and observance to 
God. In this regard, it considers itself as having responsibility to not only support 
people’s religiosity but also to control people in practicing their religion in everyday 
life. People’s faith has become a public rights issue, which could go beyond 
government control but also society, following the implementation of shari’a as the 
rule of law. How the society has responded and acts regarding the implementation of 
shari’a will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
In addition to regional leader’s orders, both the CMI and the GI regulate 
business entities regarding female employees and female customers at night. GI 
require enterprises to bar women employees from working after 9 p.m. and refuse 
service to female customers who do not come with their mahram after this time. 
Following this instruction, the mayor of Banda Aceh passed CMI no.1/2015 which 
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has the same order but extended the time to 10 p.m., which the media refer to as a 
“partial curfew”.10 The mayor later replaced this instruction with CMI no.2/2015 after 
receiving many complaints. The new instruction further extended the time for female 
employees to 11p.m., and lifted instructions regarding service towards female 
customers. 
This regulation is indeed echoing the prohibition of female night labour in 
Europe, first introduced in England in 1844, which then was followed by Switzerland 
in 1877, Austria in 1885 and France in 1892. In 1925, the Dutch government, through 
its proto-parliament in the Dutch East Indies Volksraad or People’s Council, discussed 
a bill to eliminate female night labour. Following this trend, the Dutch also wanted to 
bring its culture and values to the colony. At that time in the Netherlands a married 
women was expected to be a housewife, working outside the domestic space was 
believed to be ‘detrimental’ for the healthy family relations (Platenga, 2018). Thus, 
the discussion about female night labour was raised in the colonies after the same 
approach had been implemented in the Netherlands in 1889.  
According to Locher-Scholten (2000) in the Volksraad, whose members were 
all male, there were two different viewpoints raised during the discussion of this bill. 
One viewpoint was from the European member in the council as well as progressive 
native member who had a Western educational background. This group has two main 
arguments: first that women belong to the weaker sex and the night labour was too 
hard and demanding for them thus they should be protected from this; and second that 
a woman’s place is with her family to look after her husband and children, hence 
working at night would not be suitable for them as she would neglect her husband and 
children at home (Locher-Scholten, 2000). Another viewpoint coming from Volksraad 
members with experience in the colony was that Eastern culture or adat was different 
from the West and women’s labour in this region was relatively equal to that of men. 
However, this viewpoint was actually influenced by economic values due to the need 
for female labour in some large-scale industries, such as sugar and palm oil factories, 
particularly during harvesting or grinding periods (Locher-Scholten, 2000). Thus, 
during this period under Dutch colonialism, women’s bodies and mobility were also 
subject to regulations from all-male council members. 
                                                10	See	http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/10/indonesias-aceh-sets-partial-curfew-for-women.html	
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In the current time, in the case of Aceh, the city mayor of Banda Aceh claimed 
the CMI are to protect women who work in the tourism and entertainment industry 
against overwork and harassment (Humas Banda Aceh, 06.06.2015). The first claim 
here is similar to the debate in the Volksraad above in which women are categorised 
as the weaker sex. The city mayor’s claim was also criticised by the National 
Commission on Violence against Women which argued that this regulation has 
limited women’s mobility. The Commission also said if the government cared about 
women as victims of harassment, they should consider educating the potential 
perpetrators (Rappler, 04.06.2015). The idea of reducing sexual harassment by asking 
women to cover themselves or keep them away from public space is rooted in a 
patriarchal standpoint. This concept perceives harassment as something that happens 
because women are ‘asking for it’ and involves blaming the victims instead of 
regulating how men should behave and control themselves. Regulations regarding the 
partial curfew were only implemented and reinforced for a while after receiving a lot 
of criticism from people and watchdog organisations. However, the regulation itself 
has never actually been withdrawn. 
In 2014, the government passed a more controversial law, Qanun Jinayat no. 
6/2014 that not only applied to Muslim followers in Aceh but also members of the 
non-Muslim community. Article 5 of the law says: 
The qanun applies to: a. All Muslims who have committed a crime in 
Aceh; b. All non-Muslim followers who have committed a crime in Aceh 
together with Muslim followers and those who voluntarily choose to obey 
jinayat law; c. All non-Muslim followers who have committed a crime that 
is not regulated by the Penal Code of Indonesia (KUHP) or other penal 
regulations, but is regulated in this qanun; and d. all business entities in 
Aceh. 
 
This shows there is a shift within Qanun no. 11/2002 as when it was first 
implemented it did not mention explicitly how it affected the non-Muslim community, 
but the recent Qanun Jinayat no.6/2014 clearly mentioned that it applied to all people 
either Muslim or non-Muslim followers, particularly regarding all rules not regulated 
by the Penal Code of Indonesia. Even though the first section mentions that the law 
only applies to Muslims, the next section said states it applies to non-Muslims who 
agree to follow this law voluntarily. When the crime is not regulated in the Penal 
Code of Indonesia, a non-Muslim follower must abide by this law. Zina, ikhtilath, 
khalwath are not regulated by current national law, which means non-Muslims who 
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commit these acts in Aceh will be punished according to this qanun. Additionally, 
Article 72 of this law also mentions that in the case that one crime is regulated in both 
the Penal Code of Indonesia and Qanun Jinayat, then the one that is applied is the one 
mentioned in the qanun. Hence, it means in most cases, local qanun law is the one 
applied if someone has committed any violations towards the ten ‘crimes’ regulated in 
the Qanun Jinayat, regardless of their religion or belief. Therefore, the law goes 
beyond homogenising the interpretation of religious text, but also homogenises the 
society by making everyone, including those who have different beliefs and religions, 
follow it. 
As can be seen from the table above, Qanun Jinayat regulates people regarding 
their sexuality, morality and behaviour. This law regulates the most intimate and 
private parts of the human body so that people’s sexuality, relationships and activities 
with their partner are part of the state’s business. The qanun states clearly that same 
sex sexual activities are forbidden and considered as a crime. Those being caught 
committing this crime will be punished with up to 100 lashes of public flogging, a 
penalty of up to 100 grams of pure gold or a jail sentence of 100 months.  
All this qanun highlights how government interpretation of religious text is 
made legitimate and powerful as it is made into laws that control and regulate people, 
especially women. According to Smart (1990, p.10) the “law sets itself above other 
knowledge like psychology, sociology, or common sense. It claims to have the 
method to establish the truth of events”. This represents the situation in Aceh in which 
laws, particularly qanun set a standard of knowledge that must be followed by the 
people. Therefore, the government has a legal and legitimate right to control, 
discipline and punish people through the qanun that is presented as the interpretation 
of religious text, Islam, a religion followed by the majority of the society.  
4.2. Institutionalising the Shari’a 
In order to make sure that the law is enforced, the government also has institutions to 
support the shari’a practice in Aceh, such as the Shari’a Court, the Aceh Ulama 
Council, and the WH, which are in charge of overseeing the implementation of 
shari’a, with the rights to punish offenders. In the case of people who breach the 
Islamic attire regulations as mentioned in Qanun no. 11/2002, they will receive ta’zir 
(punishment) after being warned and ‘re-educated’ by the WH. Thus, the 
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formalisation of shari’a in Aceh is followed by its institutions producing regulations, 
supervising their implementation and conducting punishments on those who breach 
the law, which highlights the unequal power relations in which some are responsible 
for producing and enforcing the law while others are only subject to it. 
The phenomena that I have been analysing in this chapter accords with the 
view of Foucault (1991) that discipline is an essential key to domination. He argued 
that it “produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile bodies’”(Foucault, 1991, 
p.138). In order to produce docile bodies, there are three modern means needed, which 
are hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and examination (Gutting, 2005). 
Hierarchical observation means there is an observation mechanism to control people’s 
activities. In the case of Aceh, through the institutionalisation of shari’a, the WH 
actively conduct patrols and public raids in order to discipline people in following the 
shari’a regulations.  
The second means as mentioned by Gutting is normalising judgement, in 
which people are expected to follow certain standards. The standard is a necessary 
means to control people, so if they are different they would be seen as abnormal, 
deviants that might need to be ‘normalised’. The next section will highlight how this 
normalising judgment affects those who do not follow or criticise the standard norms 
that are applied in the society.  
The last one, as mentioned by Gutting (2005, p.84-86), is examination, which 
combines hierarchical observation with normative judgement to control people’s 
behaviour. People are watched and scrutinised to judge if they meet the norms set. In 
the case of Aceh, through the WH, the government controls people’s bodies and 
behaviour to follow the standard it set in the local qanun. An act of ignoring the norm 
could lead to social punishment, warning to not repeat the same mistake or even 
public humiliation, such as punishment by flogging in a public space. There is no 
specific schedule of when a public raid is going to be held, so people think they are 
being constantly monitored, hence they need to be prepared and not risk being caught. 
Those who are caught will get their name written down and be warned not to repeat 
the offence again, so they must, for example, wear ‘proper’ Islamic attire. A woman I 
met during my fieldwork told me her experiences of being caught in a dress raid 
twice. The second time she was caught, the officer realised that she had been caught 
before and been warned. He shouted at her, “If I catch you once again, I will put you 
in jail!”. According to Qanun 11/2002, Article 23, those who do not wear Islamic 
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attire would be liable to ta’zir after being warned and coached under the WH. The law 
does not mention details about the kind of ta’zir for this case, unlike other offences 
such as missing Friday prayers up to three times, which would be penalised by up to 
six months in jail. Neither does the law mention details about what it means by ta’zir. 
According to Mir-Hosseini and Hamzić (2010, p. xvii) Ta’zir is “discipline; 
punishments that are at the discretion of the judge”. Ta’zir is a punishment for some 
offences that are not even being regulated or mentioned in religious text, hence the 
judge is given the right to decide what kind of penalty can be given for a violation. 
This demonstrates that according to local qanun, people’s public appearance is subject 
to ta’zir (punishment) and at least two government bodies/officers, the WH and the 
judge, could exercise their power to discipline the society. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault discussed the panopticon design of Jeremy 
Bentham from the late 18th century. Panopticon is a prison architecture design with a 
central observation tower for the guards which make the prisoners feels they are under 
constants surveillance at all times (Bentham and Bozovic, 1995). Foucault suggests 
that power is visible and people are constantly aware that they might be being 
monitored at any time, which makes them think they are always under the surveillance 
(1995, p.201). This disciplines them to follow the regulations. As mentioned above, in 
the case of Aceh, the routine patrols and public raids of the WH make their power 
visible but at the same time unverifiable as people do not know when they will 
happen, so they constantly think they are being watched. In the next stage to this, 
those who do not follow the order would be seen as deviant or ‘abnormal’ and this 
distinguishes them from the rest of society. This is one step towards a homogenised 
society, in which people are expected to follow strict orders particularly with regard to 
public appearance.  
I would now like to start with a discussion about the production of the law 
itself, which has become a norm in the society. Aceh’s House of People’s 
Representative (DPRA), with the approval from the Governor, is responsible for 
drafting qanun at the provincial level. In drafting policies, the government also needs 
to consider any advice from the Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (Aceh Ulama 
Council) that acts as the government’s equal partner and is also responsible to pass 
any religious fatwa. This religious body also gives government advice regarding the 
findings of the shari’a police. According to the law, in drafting qanun, the 
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government must also listen to the public’s views. However, in my research, a number 
of people claimed their advice was never taken into consideration. 
 
If today the face of qanun shari’a seems to be dehumanising people, 
treating humans just as mmm… [it] does not respect human nature etc. I 
think because it [qanun] is a political product [made] to answer some 
political interest and it does not represent the majority of the society. Yes, 
they did ask and consult on it [qanun], took it to the university and so on, 
but all those processes and advice were never taken when the qanun was 
being legalised. (Alia, local woman) 
 
In 2009, the legislation of Qanun Jinayat was postponed, as women 
activists pushed for it to be postponed because it did not protect women. 
But, at that time the governor was Irwandy, he is smart and he rejected it as 
well. He asked for it (qanun) to be postponed as well, so that is probably 
why women (activists’) concerns and the governor’s matched. But then in 
2014 it was legalised, we had hoped as some women activists had given 
their advice, but the more advice they gave, the thicker the qanun files and 
the implementation is more unclear… random. [They said] they had taken 
women activists’ advice. Yes, women activists gave advice but the content 
was not like that. (Hadijah, local woman) 
 
At the end, the final result of the qanun was in the government’s hands, 
particularly the DPRA and Governor, as provincial leader responsible to legalise the 
draft. After the qanun has been passed into law, other government institutions, such as 
the WH and the shari’a court were responsible for its reinforcement and 
implementation. 
The WH often conduct public raids in order to ensure that people are following 
regulations as mentioned in the qanun. Along with dress raids, they often conduct 
other operations. Every Friday, female officers conduct patrols to oversee if there are 
men who do not go to mass prayer, or business entities that stay open during Friday 
prayer. Regarding dress raids, this operation is usually held on public roads, 
subjecting people who are not wearing ‘proper Islamic attire’, to inspections. Those 
who are caught are mostly unveiled women or those wearing tight outfits. As a 
government body that has power to reinforce shari’a, the WH are known for their 
arrogance, particularly during public raids. Masyitah, a resident of Banda Aceh 
described her experience of being caught by the shari’a police during a dress raid: 
I was caught in a dress raid, then there was a lady, she was big so the 
clothes … well actually the clothes were already [big]. Because she was 
really big any clothes would only just fit her, but she was scolded, and told 
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off. Then I said [to the shari’a police], ‘Why are you shouting at her? She 
is big, any clothes she wears will just fit, there is no way she can just wear 
a sarong [long big fabric] to go around. If there is a [motorbike] accident 
[because of] her clothes getting stuck in the motorbike’s wheel spokes, 
who wants to be responsible? Does the WH want to be responsible for 
that?’. Then after that, the shari’a police did not talk to me anymore. If all 
women are required to wear skirts, then the skirt gets stuck in the wheel 
spokes, they could fall and cause accidents, will the WH pay for the 
hospital?  
 
Like Masytah, Fatimah also had a similar experience of dealing with the 
arrogance of the WH in reinforcing the shari’a. She and her friend were caught for not 
wearing a veil a few years ago, when they were at a café at around 8 p.m.  
 
Fatimah : When we were at the cafe, there were other customers, a police 
officer with his girlfriend who was not wearing a veil as well. 
We just started eating our food when the cars/vans came, first 
only one then another four cars came. At the beginning, we took 
it easy as we thought they would not shout angrily at us, nor be 
arrogant. So, we decided to pay for our food first as we did not 
want to just run away and leave the café without paying for our 
food; some other people were already running [trying to escape]. 
We were called [by the shari’a police], they do it in groups so 
not only one person but many of them and they interrogated us 
asking our names and so on. They ‘judged’ us, saying all 
negative things like what kind of women we were, have we 
never had any religious lesson etc. 
 
Me : Was it the WH? 
 
Fatimah : Yes, from the WH and they were rude. Also, those who spoke 
were not the only ones, but many of them liked attacking us, so 
we did not know what to say. Then I realised there was that 
police officer with his girlfriend who was not wearing a veil as 
well. So, I said ‘Sir why are you only mad at us? Look there she 
is not wearing a veil as well’. So, they went there, and I took that 
opportunity to escape. But I heard that man say, ‘I am an 
officer’, so does it mean it was OK for the officer and not for 
ordinary people? But then I just wanted to run while I got the 
chance. 
 
I would argue the apparent arrogance of the WH officers comes from their position as 
members of a government institution with the rights to enforce shari’a regulations. It 
gives them power to argue that they are doing the right thing, not only based on law 
but also their religion. The concept of amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar (commanding the 
good and forbidding the evil), which is always echoed in religious narrative in 
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Indonesia, and Aceh particularly, is used as justification. This religious concept is not 
only used by government officials, but also those in the society who are keen to 
reinforce shari’a in the name of defending what is always claimed as God’s law. 
In this situation, people have no other options but to obey the rules, any 
disobedience would lead to punishment, as the government, through its 
institutionalised shari’a body, has coercive power over the people. Here I would 
borrow the concept of coercive authority by El Fadl (2014, p.50) who defines it as 
power to control others and make them obey anything through persuasion, benefits, 
threats or even punishment. In the case of Aceh, I would say that the government is 
exercising coercive authority to implement its shari’a codification, by convincing the 
people, who are proud of their Islamic identity. People believe that they have 
responsibilities to uphold God’s law on earth, hence the government narrative is 
perceived as part of this mission. The punishment mentioned in the qanun is seen as 
an effort to follow God’s rule, and religious narrative is used as justification. The 
explanation of Qanun no. 11/2002, for example, states: 
In the Islamic legal system there are two types of sanctions; one is 
ukhrawi, which will be accepted in the hereafter, and the second one is 
sanctions applied by humans through the power of executive, legislative 
and judicial institutions. Both types of sanctions encourage people to abide 
by the law. The state’s role is needed within law enforcement. The law has 
no meaning if it is not enforced by the state. On the other hand, a country 
will not be orderly if the law is not enforced. 
 
The law emphasises the sanctions in the qanun as part of the Islamic legal 
system applied through the power of the government body at the provincial level. The 
sanctions vary, from warnings, fines, jail to public flogging, depending on the 
infringement committed. Public flogging marks the distinction between Aceh, as the 
province which has an autonomous right to implement shari’a law, and the rest of 
Indonesia. The Aceh government claims this punishment is aimed at educating the 
perpetrators so they regret their sins and do taubat nasuha (sincere repentance). This 
kind of punishment is also expected to make the perpetrators ashamed of what they 
have done, and at the same time is given as a ‘warning’ to others not to make the same 
mistake. In this narrative, the government is practicing coercive authority, in which 
people are being controlled through their faith. 
By using religious narrative, the government emphasised the law as their effort 
to implement God’s order and make Islam the guidance for life. Those who are ‘good’ 
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and obey the law, indicating they are good Muslims, will be rewarded in the afterlife, 
and those who breach the law will be punished based on the government’s 
interpretation of God’s law. This process shows how the government exercises 
coercive authority where people are persuaded to follow the rules as a form of piety 
which will be rewarded in the afterlife. At the same time, violations against this law 
mean punishment, such as public flogging, which also plays its role as a warning or 
‘threat’ towards others, as it is conducted in an open area and the public humiliation 
sanctions can be witnessed. Discussion on this will be elaborated further in chapter 5. 
People are being forced to follow government interpretations of religious texts 
which are manifested through qanun. Such power is a “monopoly over Islamic 
knowledge” according to Sirelkhatim (2015), in which only certain groups of people 
have authority to interpret religion. He argued this kind of situation, which happens in 
many Arab and Islamic states, prevents people’s critical thinking and leaves the 
government and its religious bodies or institutions as the sole interpreter of religious 
text. In the case of Aceh, the government’s monopoly over religious knowledge and 
interpretation in a religious society, makes this power prone to being used only as a 
political populist tool. The law may only focus on certain aspects which could be used 
as symbols of shari’a to distinguish Aceh from other places. Regulations on Islamic 
attire for example, differ from other places in Indonesia, as Aceh is the only province 
known for its veiling obligations, which are always perceived as an essential part of its 
Islamic identity.  
Government authoritative power to interpret religious text, which is then made 
into formal legislation that should be followed by people in the region, is getting 
stronger as there is no channel for people to challenge the law. Those who try to do so 
are often seen as deviant and need to be straightened out. As people have a strong 
belief in religion, the government’s or politicians’ claims in the name of religion are 
supported, especially if the authorities have some respected religious scholars or 
religious body behind them. Hence, religious doctrine promoted by authorities using 
any religious text will be accepted as the truth, regardless the topic itself may still 
debatable among Muslim scholars or that the texts (in the case of hadith) may not 
necessarily from legitimate sources. 
Criticising the qanun could be perceived as an effort to disrupt the 
implementation of shari’a and any person doing this is regarded as an enemy of Islam, 
and often intimidated and threatened by some vigilante groups. Hilda, who criticised 
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how shari’a in Aceh often only focuses on regulating women’s bodies, instead of 
some other fundamental values in Islam reported that her life had been threatened: “I 
got lots of insults, threats, intimidation like killing and even some people claiming to 
be Islamic groups were looking for me, some radical groups”. 
Hilda had also been called a Jewish stooge, missionary and someone who 
wants to vilify shari’a. These situations indicate how the construction of shari’a in the 
society is not only enforced by the Aceh government through its official bodies, but 
also by people who believe that it is their responsibility as Muslims to ensure that 
God’s law is being carried out. They are keen to implement shari’a as the religious 
discourse in everyday life, always promoting the idea that a good Muslim must do so. 
During my stay in Aceh, I heard a Friday sermon from a nearby mosque where 
the preacher asked people to support shari’a implementation and reminded people that 
there are others who hate Islam as well. He also said “if a Muslim is keen and 
persistent in implementing Islamic law, they will get some help (from God). We 
remember the history of the Badar war, where Muslims were the minority then won 
over the much bigger troops”. Here the discourses of shari’a law enforcement were 
linked to the history of war during the Prophet’s time as if those who disagree with 
this law are the enemy that must be fought against. Associating this narrative with war 
also further perpetuates the binary division.  
Religious discourse in the society has also gone beyond just regulating 
people’s bodies but has promoted homogeneity and exclusion towards those who are 
different. Diversity is not celebrated but viewed rather as something that could lead to 





“There are 3 requirements of Muslim men and 
Muslim women 
 
Not covering aurat: 
 
not Islamic, crazy, pre-pubescent 
 
So, if you see male and female Muslims not 
covering aurat, they are probably from one of those 
groups above. 
 
Library of Islamic Centre, Lhokseumawe city”. 
	 117	
This huge public billboard is situated in front of the government owned 
Islamic Centre library at the heart of Lhokseumawe city, Aceh. Standing in front of 
the iconic building and next to the main road in the downtown area makes this banner 
very salient. The text is problematic because it classifies the three groups as 
exceptions towards the veiling obligation but also excludes them from the ‘norms’. 
This kind of situation could lead towards discrimination or even vigilante acts, in the 
name of defending Islam.  
Along with warnings about the veil, warnings about morality, particularly 




This public notice is situated in a public space next to a reservoir, a place often 
visited by people to relax and enjoy the view. On the sign is the city symbol, which 
indicates that the banner was made by the local (city) government through the Islamic 
Shari’a Office of Lhokseumawe, as mentioned at the bottom. The words ‘prohibited’ 
in the text are written in red to emphasise the message and the activities that are 
prohibited in this area. This is a way to discipline people and police their morality at 
the same time. It aims to control people’s behaviour and prevent them from breaching 
common agreed moral values. 
Warnings about khalwat are either made by the government or community 
groups in the society and as mentioned, are often placed in recreational areas, like 
parks, beaches and other places usually used by people to spend their free time and 
relax. It indicates there is a presumption that these kinds of places will be used by 
people to breach moral values by being together with their partner. This is contrary to 
the definition of khalwat as stated in Qanun Jinayat no. 6/2014, in which this crime is 
defined as an act by two unmarried people of different sexes in a closed or hidden 
Figure 4.4: The banner says,  
 
“According to Qanun Aceh no. 6 year 
2014 about jinayat law, it is prohibited to 
be paired with someone who is not a 
husband or wife or blood relative”. 
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place that could lead to zina. Parks, beaches and other public recreational areas are 
open and public places which people can easily access, and can see and witness 
anything that happens there. Hence, in practice there is a shifting between the 
regulations mentioned in the qanun and the reality which subjects people to further 
intimidation. In fact, public space like this is often being used by unmarried couples, 
who could be accused of committing khalwat. On every New Year’s Eve, for 
example, the WH conduct a public raid in recreational areas in many places in Aceh 
including the beach and reservoir area (Detik News, 31.12.2012; Serambi Indonesia, 
01.01.2017a). 
 
4.3. Shari’a in Practice 
People’s active voluntary participation is central to the implementation of shari’a in 
Aceh. As explained in the previous chapter, Islam has long been rooted as part of 
Acehnese identity. Hence, the use of religious discourse in modern day Aceh attracts 
people who are proud of their past history and Islamic identity. 
Prior to the first qanun, Qanun no. 11/2002, being passed, in 1999, some 
vigilante groups had already conducted veil raids on the road on women who did not 
cover their head (see chapter 1). This regulation of people’s public appearance, which 
in practice focuses mostly on women’s bodies, has continued and after more than 
fifteen years, people are used to veiling. They are not used to seeing unveiled women, 
hence those coming, regardless of their religion would feel uncomfortable. They are 
very conspicuous and attract attention that makes them feels uncomfortable. 
I went to a pharmacy with Tina, and none of us were wearing any veil. I 
decided not to bring a scarf because I was wearing a hoody jacket. At the 
pharmacy, I was aware of some people staring at me as I was not veiled, 
while Tina told me she would wait at the parking. After I finished, I met 
Tina at the parking and she told me she did not feel comfortable because 
she also felt the same as me, that people were staring at us because we 
were not wearing a veil. That is why she decided to wait for me at the 
parking outside. The way people were staring at us felt like a social 
punishment because we do not follow what local law asked. 
(Field notes, 25 September 2016) 
 
Some local women I met in Aceh told me many of their friends who are not 




Many friends of mine who are Catholic or Buddhist they wear veils 
because they feel they have to, even just use a scarf. The reason is they do 
not want to look strikingly different, so they wear a veil and in a formal 
event they even wear a proper veil like Acehnese. So, I wonder, what is the 
point of it all? Why do we only play at the symbolic level, formality level.  
 
Women who do not veil or who wear tight clothes, seen as a more common 
problem nowadays, are seen as breaching the law and deserve to be punished. In this 
case, they would receive social punishment, such as people staring at them, which is 
now a new norm, a practice that never happened in Aceh before the formalisation of 
shari’a. In addition, as the qanun is interpreted as an effort to impose God’s law, 
regulations that claim to be based on religious text, an act of following it would be 
seen as a sign of piety, while breaching it would mean a form of sin. Therefore, 
punishing a sinner is considered as an act of amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar (commanding 
the good and forbidding the evil). 
It is becoming common in everyday life that people ask women to veil or 
cover their aurat. When I was in a food hall in Banda Aceh, the food seller was 




In addition to the text, the t-shirt also showed a picture of woman in a veil, 
which indicates that aurat here refers to wearing a veil. The text was clearly produced 
based on a patriarchal standpoint as the next phrases said, “help us (males) to protect 
our gaze”. Here, the text clearly give the order towards women in order to help men 
Figure 4.5: A man wearing a t-shirt saying: 
 
“Cover your aurat (body) 
 
ukhti (Arabic: sister) ... 
 
help us to protect our gaze”. 
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do their part of protecting their gaze, instead of asking men to be responsible for 
lowering their gaze. The words used are emphasising and regulating women’s 
appearance, instead of reminding men to change their attitude and behaviour. Like 
regulations about the partial curfew towards women, which claimed to protect them 
from harassment, women are constructed as the cause of the problem and have to be 




This poster displays patriarchal values and highlights how women and men are 
perceived in the society. Points 2 and 3 refer only to males, and the only picture that 
uses a woman as a symbol is in a crossed circle; it demonstrates how women are 
perceived as seducers; and a man who can resist will be in a group of great people in 
the afterlife. A similar perception of women can also be seen on a banner in Sabang, 
Aceh, a tourism resort on Weh Island. 
 
Figure 4.6: 
A poster in a public space (bus stop): 
 
 “7 great groups will be protected in Mahsyar 
(the after life): 
 
1. Just leaders 
2. The pemuda (young males) who always 
pray to God 
3. A man whose heart is always connected to 
the mosque 
4. People who are in love because of God, then 
they are together and separated because of 
God 
5. A man who was invited to commit adultery 
by a beautiful and high-up woman, but 
responded by saying, ‘I am afraid of God’ 
6. Someone who give alms then hides his/her 
actions so the left hand does not know what 
the right hand did 
7. Someone who remember God in a quiet 





In this banner, the word “Exclamations” is written in red with three 
exclamation marks, which aims to warn people. The banner associates the disasters 
with immoral behaviour. The background of this banner shows people celebrating the 
new year, and warns people not to. The banner is made by a group which calls itself 
the Society Concerned for Shari’a in Sabang City. At the bottom corner of the banner 
they also give a warning to people if they do not follow the advice mentioned, the risk 
will be their own responsibility. This sentence emphasises the threat to those who dare 
to ignore the warning. The symbol on the left, (note the short skirt), warns unmarried 
couples not to be together, and on the right, (note the short skirts and ‘provocative’ 
poses) warns that dress regulations are aimed at women only. According to a report 
from the National Commission on Violence against Women, in many sexual 
harassment cases in 2017 and 2018, a victim blaming culture exists in Indonesia. 




In connection with the more frequent disasters (catastrophes) in our country, especially Aceh, 
we hereby appeal to all visitors and the community of Sabang city to stay away from actions 
that smell immoral, such as: 
 
1. Being together with no marriage bond 
2. Impolite dressing 
3. Celebrating the new year of Christ which does not fit with Islamic values 
4. etc. 
 
Thus, this appeal to be understood 
 
Signed 
MPS (Society Concerned for Syariah in Kota Sabang) 
Note: If you do not follow this advice, the risk is yours”. 
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(Komnas Perempuan, 2018, Komnas Perempuan, 2017). There is a sense that women 
victims of violence should take the blame, for being the ‘seducer’ or not having good 
morality, hence deserving the assault (Komnas Perempuan, 2017). Here, the gender 
stereotype is being shaped and re-shaped over time through various forms. The banner 
above, for instance, perpetuates unequal power relations in which women are often 
perceived as the seducer. Women are often blamed for wearing so-called ‘provocative 
outfits’ in order to justify men’s immoral attitude and behaviour. As a local woman 
told me in Aceh: 
Rahimah : So, there is a saying, Men’s biggest temptation are 
women, the biggest temptation are wealth, power and 
women. Those are men’s biggest temptation, so if men are 
… it’s like, women are like bones and men are like… 
 
Me : Like what? 
 
Rahimah : Like dogs 
 
This is actually a common saying I have heard since I was a child, coming 
from people, including religious scholars. Women are seen as a temptation that could 
bring down men and are also to be blamed for men’s failure. This belief is rooted in 
patriarchal values, which position men as the centre and superior to women. Hassan 
(1991a) studied the belief in women’s inferiority in three religious traditions: Islam, 
Judaism and Christianity. She concluded there are three theological based assumptions 
used as arguments to support this belief. The first assumption is that at the beginning 
God created man as the first human being, then women were made of man’s ribs 
(Hassan, 1991b, Hassan, 1991a). In fact, the Quran mentions that men and women 
were made from a single source and does not differentiate the creation of the first 
parents of humankind (Hassan, 1991b, Wadud, 1999). The belief that women were 
created from the crooked rib came from the hadith, even though all the references 
which mentioned women’s creation from the man’s rib are flawed, both regarding 
their “formal (isnad or the chain of the narrators of the hadith) and material (main) 
aspect” (Hassan, 1991b, p.46). The second assumption Hassan proposed is regarding 
Man’s expulsion from the Garden of Eden. In the religious traditions, Eve is the one 
blamed as the tempter, deceiver and seducer of Adam to eat the forbidden fruit, 
although in the Quran both are claimed responsible for the disobedience (Hassan, 
1991b, p.47). The last assumptions, as mentioned by Hassan, is that woman is often 
mentioned as having been created for man, hence her existence is only 
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complementary. The supporters of this claim often refer to Quran verse An-Nisa: 34. 
Even though many religious scholars have different arguments about these verses and 
their interpretation (see chapter 3), still it has often been used to claim men’s 
superiority over women, either in the public or private space. As discussed in chapter 
3, here it can be seen that the interpretation of religious text can vary, hence those 
with the authority for the interpretation have the power to choose a dominant 
discourse, particularly in a society in which religion is considered as part of people’s 
fundamental identity.  
Hassan’s three fundamental assumptions regarding men’s superiority over 
women in religious traditions could be used to explain the construction of gender in 
many Islamic societies, including Aceh. Men are often perceived as the main 
character, while women are only instrumental and portrayed as seducers of men that 
could bring them down. These unequal power relations have been produced and 
reproduced over time. As women are portrayed as seducers, therefore, they need to be 
more regulated, controlled, and disciplined than men so they do not ‘provoke’ men to 
commit harassment. Such an assumption about women would lead to more vigilante 
acts in the name of disciplining them and enforcing God’s law. 
The practice of warning women about their public appearance is also 




This banner was placed in front of a mosque in the city of Lhokseumawe, 
Aceh. Again, like many other warnings about so-called ‘Islamic attire’, it warns 
women not even to enter the mosque yard if they are wearing a tight outfit. This 
banner is placed at the front side of the mosque and next to main road, so it can be 
seen from the road. The first phrase “Dilarang Masuk” (No Entry) is written in red as 
Figure 4.8: 
 
Warning banner for women who want 
to enter the mosque yard:  
 
“No entry to the mosque's yard for 
women wearing tight pants and tight 
clothes (it is not Islamic dress)” 
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a warning or to emphasise the message. The words “ke halaman masjid” (the mosque 
yard) is written in yellow, which makes it so distinct, and emphasises that it is 
forbidden to enter that particular space. A mosque is a public space, however, people 
make regulations for how women should dress to be able to enter the site. This is also 
interesting how “tight clothes” have an identity as un-Islamic dress, hence women in 
such clothes are not allowed to enter the mosque yard. In this case people want to 
protect the mosque, but end up limiting its interaction with people. Instead of making 
a mosque a place that is welcoming every human being, this banner makes it a 
restricted area which can only be visited by people, women in particular, with certain 
qualifications especially regarding their dress. 
Even though the government already has its own legitimate body and the 
shari’a police, who are responsible to make sure people follow the shari’a 
regulations, vigilante groups still exist and such groups even feel they have more 
rights to take all necessary actions in ensuring shari’a is being implemented in the 
region. I discussed this with a participant in my research: 
 
Ratna: In many villages, there is a group which acts like the village keeper, 
they consist of young people who are always controlling the village. For 
example, if there is a teenage girl doing ‘many things’ (referring to 
activities that might breach the norm), she will definitely be reproved for 
that. But if we do not do anything we will be fine. 
 
Me: What do you mean by doing ‘many things’? 
 
Ratna: for example, if she is often going out (with a man) and she has not 
married yet, and they are often going out, they will be reproved for sure. 
 
Me: By the group of young people in the villages? 
 
Ratna: Yes, it happens in our village. 
 
Me: Young people you mean here, are they only men or women as well? 
 
Ratna: No. its only men. I saw them rebuke those who are unmarried and 
always going out, and also if it’s at night and they are together inside the 
house, we do not know what they do, they will be arrested (raided). 
 
This highlighted the male hegemonic practice of Aceh’s shari’a in which men 
consider they have the right to control people or even raid their homes if they are 
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considered as breaching the norm or shari’a. In some cases, they even force people 
who were caught being together or committing khalwat to get married. 
An undergraduate thesis by Barmawi (2016) submitted to the State Islamic 
University Ar-Raniry mentioned some cases of forced marriage of underage couples 
because of being caught committing khalwat. Barmawi mentioned three khalwat cases 
in which two couples had been warned by young people in the village for being 
together on a motorbike then brought to the village assembly and forced to get 
married straight away. The other case was a couple caught together in the backyard of 
someone’s house who later reported it to the village assembly, which then decided to 
force the couple to get married immediately. 
During my stay in Aceh, I often heard people mention this kind of case as a 
common practice in some villages. I would argue, that the fact that Qanun Jinayat 
no.6/2014, Article 24, mentions that a khalwat case is the responsibility of a village 
customary court, has created a loophole in which the village assembly could decide by 
themselves regarding this case. This situation means the accused have no opportunity 
to defend themselves legally in front of a court. In addition, it also demonstrates how 
the definition of khalwat mentioned in the legislation has shifted and could be defined 
in many different ways. Religious interpretation that has been constructed by the 
government, as manifested in many regulations or qanun, in practice can be re-
constructed by the local community, particularly regarding cases that control people’s 
morality, behaviour, and sexuality. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how men and women should behave within local 
shari’a law. People are being subjected to increasing degrees of control in many 
different aspects of their lives, including public appearance, religiosity, morality and 
behaviour, as well as mobility and sexuality. The state, in this case the local 
government sets the standard, through the local law, of how people should behave. It 
also regulates women more than men, particularly regarding their public appearance 
and mobility. Local shari’a gender ideology expects men to be heterosexual and 
religious, measured by not missing Friday congregation. Meanwhile for women, in 
addition to the expectation to be heterosexual, they also face some further control and 
restrictions. The law endorses a unitary standard of one standard model of femininity, 
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particularly regarding women’s public appearance. It highlights the state control over 
the image of women’s bodies in public and can also be seen as an attempt to impose 
cultural uniformity on to them. In this case, dress symbolises power relations, the 
state, in this case the local government, wants to impose it values and collective 
identity onto women’s bodies. Women’s bodies become a manifest to express the 
society’s collective identity, an important signifier which marks the distinction of one 
society from another (see discussion in chapter 1). 
The Aceh government has also formed institutions with the authority to make 
sure that all laws are followed accordingly, with a range of punishments for men and 
women who breach those rules. The laws constructed are claimed to be based on 
Islamic values, as recorded in the Quran and hadiths. However, the authorities ignore 
divergent interpretations of religious text, and monopolise religious knowledge and 
interpretation and claim it as Islamic law or shari’a. But: 
Islamic law, like other laws, are the product of socio-cultural assumptions 
and juristic reasoning about the nature of relations between men and 
women. In other words, they are ‘man-made’ juristic constructs, shaped 
by the social, cultural and political conditions within which Islam’s 
sacred texts are understood and turned into law. (Mir-Hosseini and 
Hamzić (2010, p.23) 
 
Hence in the case of Aceh, I would argue the law is constructed within the 
framework of patriarchal interpretation. It can be seen in how the very first qanun, 
since the implementation of shari’a, focuses on people’s public appearance, 
particularly women’s dress, which is still one of the most discussed and regulated 
within the society. The patriarchal interpretation of religious text began from the 
drafting of the law, its implementation in the society, either by government or 
vigilante groups, who consider the enforcement of shari’a as part of their 
responsibilities as good Muslims. The patriarchal interpretation of religious text could 
also be linked to the time of the Quranic revelation in the seventh century when the 
patriarchal culture dominated in the Arabian Peninsula (Wadud, 1999). Wadud argued 
that within the androcentric culture in the Arabian society at that time, women’s value 
was based on their avail for men, particularly their reproductive function. Wadud 
claimed the Quran ‘spirit’ of bringing harmony in the society, at that time was seen as 
accommodating those values. Many societies today take the text literally without any 
understanding of the contextual situation at that time. According to Wadud (1999) 
many religious scholars of the 20th century are against this literal interpretation and 
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application of some religious texts. Religious texts need to be understood within the 
framework of their context and any rationale following the revelation at that time 
(Wadud, 1999, p.81). So, such a literal interpretation of some religious texts 
reproduces the patriarchal culture that was rooted in the seventh century Arabian 
Peninsula. Here, I would like to quote Mernissi from her work The Veil and the Male 
elite: A feminist Interpretation of Women’s Right in Islam: “If women’s rights are a 
problem for some modern Muslim men, it is neither because of the Quran nor the 
prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because those rights conflict with the 
interest of a male elite” (Mernissi, 1991, p.ix). 
In Aceh in particular, the use of religious discourse in many aspects of 
everyday life has shaped people’s belief about their religion. However, domination 
over religious knowledge, in which religious interpretation is being monopolised by 
the government or its religious body has created a society which only follows the 
orders or regulations constructed. This has created a homogenised society, in which 
people are expected to follow certain norms, while diversity is not celebrated and is 
being eliminated from the society. Those who do not follow the law or criticise the 
practice of shari’a and qanun, experience exclusion or even intimidation. 
 To conclude, here the government exercises the politics of sameness through 
its power and authority. Through this, people are homogenised and diversities that 
already exist in the society are ignored. People with different beliefs are forced to 
negotiate with the majority’s faith. It has created unequal power relations between the 
government and the society and also the majority and minority groups that exist. The 
focus of shari’a practice in Aceh is more about regulating people to create what 
Foucault called “docile bodies”, regulated and controlled by certain norms set by the 
government. The government’s active campaign using religious discourse to engage 
the society in implementing the rules that have been set, make people only focus on 
aspects that have been regulated. People become less critical towards the shari’a 
legislation which mainly focuses on controlling the human body, particularly the 
woman’s body, instead of other aspects which are more related to the society’s 
welfare, such as creating an accountable government administration, eliminating 
poverty and fighting corruption, which are still the main problems in Indonesia. In 
addition, laws that control the body distinguish the province from the rest of 
Indonesia, as veiling and other regulations which use Arabic terms make it seem more 
religious.  
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Chapter 5. Corporal Punishment and Public Caning Ceremony 
It was Monday morning, 28 November 2016. Unlike any other day, this 
morning many people gathered around the Ar-Rahman mosque at Cinta Kasih area in 
Gampong Panteriek, Lueng Bata, Banda Aceh. This area, is also known as komplek 
Budha tzu chi, as the residential houses in this area were built by the Buddhist 
Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation Indonesia after the tsunami disaster in 2004. 
A stage was built in the middle of the mosque yard, people were already standing 
outside the gate to watch the public punishment event, while government officers 
from some shari’a institutions were getting everything ready for the ceremony. 
The mosque yard is the most common place to hold public caning ceremonies 
in Aceh. This symbolises that the activities held are associated with religious values 
that make it seen as a sacred ceremony. The ceremony itself is usually held either 
before or afternoon prayer time, Dhuhur. Mosque or masjid in Arabic, means place of 
prostration (Kersten, n.d), it is a symbolic building and a sacred space at the same 
time. It is also often called a house of God and, obviously, it is a place for Muslims to 
hold congregational prayer. In many societies, including Aceh, the mosque is not only 
a place for communal praying, but it is also for other socio-cultural activities, 
including religious education and community meetings. Conducting a public caning 
ceremony in the mosque area emphasises the religious connection between the 
audience who witness the ceremony, which is seen as a ‘religious activity’, and their 
identities as Muslims. 
This morning, men, women and children were coming from nearby area or 
even from other gampong or villages. People wore everyday clothes. Men were 
wearing jeans, trousers, casual shirts or t-shirts, some were even in shorts. Meanwhile, 
most women who came were wearing the common style of veil worn in Indonesia 
today, trousers or skirts, and long sleeved tops, but there were also some who just 
wore short sleeved top and no veil. If there had been a dress raid, many people would 
have been subjected to the discipline charge (see chapter 4). Even though there were 
many shari’a police officers around today, they seemed busy and focused on the 
preparation for the event, as did other government officials and regular police officers. 
Children wearing their school uniform also filled the area even though it was still 
during school time, and they seemed not to bother about the announcement which 
warned attendees that the event was only for people aged eighteen and over. 
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There were many journalists as well waiting to cover the event, at the same 
time many civilians who came to the area also looked enthusiastic to record the event 
using their mobile devices. Some attendees discussed those who were to be punished 
that day. Some people told me one of the women convicted would not be punished as 
she was pregnant. An attendee who was also a resident in the area told me this 
morning there was announcement that the public caning ceremony would be held 
today. Modern technology helped the news spread quickly, which made people from 
other villages come to this area, including myself. I had received a text from a local 
friend who had been informed by her friend that a public caning ceremony was to be 
held.  
This is one out of many public caning ceremonies held in Aceh since first 
implemented in 2005. In 2016, according to a report by the Community Legal Aid 
Institute there were 332 people punished by public caning and 66 others threatened 
with this punishment (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Masyarakat, 2017). The report based 
on media publications regarding public caning ceremonies in Aceh also mentioned 
that the other 66 people would eventually be very likely to be punished as well.  
This chapter aims to answer the research question about punishment conducted 
on those who do not follow the local codification of shari’a. My aim here is not only 
to highlight the process of public punishment in Aceh under local shari’a regulations 
but also to critically discuss the practice. I will also discuss the transformation of 
judicial system practice that affect Islamic law in Indonesia. 
This chapter will first give an overview of corporal punishment, its definition 
and the role of religion in this practice. The next section will highlight the legacy of 
colonialism in the Indonesian judicial system and how it affected the implementation 
of Islamic law today. I draw upon Foucault’s Discipline and Punish in the European 
context and how modernity in its judicial system transforms the practice of torture to a 
non-corporal penalty. Then I take the concept of modernity of the judicial system into 
the post-colonial context of Indonesia. In this chapter, I argue that Dutch colonialism 
changed the character and practice of the judicial system in Indonesia, including 
Islamic law. This change transformed the law into a new form which is different from 
the practice in the pre-colonial era, and I would argue this new formation and 
character persists in the practice of modern Islamic law in Indonesia. The discussion 
then follows by highlighting the legal basis of public caning within the 
implementation of shari’a law in Aceh. In this section I will also elaborate a 
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discussion about malu or shame as the aim of the punishment mentioned in the qanun. 
Malu is an emotion, however it is exploited by the legal system as punishment. The 
last section will narrate the implementation of the public caning ceremony, which was 
held in November 2016. In this section I emphasise that the punishment works in two 
different ways: physically, by torturing the body, and psychologically, by shaming the 
offenders in the public space. In addition, I argue the practice of this punishment 
reproduces male hegemony and perpetuates gender hierarchy in ways which link with 
the effects of the new regulations concerning everyday behaviour and appearance 
which I analysed in chapter four. 
5.1 Corporal Punishment: An Overview 
Corporal punishment is one of the oldest forms of punishment in human civilisation, 
and happens in the domestic space and in public areas such as the case of caning 
ceremony in Aceh. According to Pate and Gould (2012) corporal punishment as a 
form of penalty endorsed by the state could be tracked as early as 2000 BC. It is a 
product of many civilisations, and associated with the history of slavery to religious 
tradition, for example. 
According to Durrant and Poppelwell (2017) religion plays a significant role in 
the construction of the legal system in many societies. Religion is often concerned 
with people’s morality and behaviour and setting so-called ‘right way to behave’ 
which becomes the standard norms and at the same time it also regulates punishment 
for breaching the norms (Durrant and Poppelwell, 2017, p.128). According to Sadique 
(2016, p.48) the concept of lex talionis or retributive punishment is mentioned in the 
Bible, in Exodus 21: 23–36 and reasserted in Leviticus 24: 20 “fracture for fracture, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth; whatever injury he has given a person shall be given to 
him” (King James Version). She further mentioned a similar account in the Quran 
sura Al-Maida: 
We ordained therein for them: ‘Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear 
for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal’. But if any one remits 
the retaliation by way of charity, it is an act of atonement for himself. And if 
any fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah [God] hath revealed, they are 
(no better than) wrong-doers. (5: 45, Yusuf Ali Translation). (Sadique, 2016, 
p.49) 
 
However, Sadique emphasised even though the two religious texts mentioned forms 
of punishment, it also suggested that forgiving is the better option and if punishment is 
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chosen it should be to uphold justice. In 2005, Tariq Ramadan called for a moratorium 
on corporal punishment, stoning and the death penalty in the Muslim world. He 
argued repressive measures and punishment would not make a society’s fidelity to 
Islamic teaching increase, hence he urged Muslim society to demand social justice 
instead (Ramadan, 2005). Despite many critics, from scholars and the international 
community, the practice of corporal punishment using religious justification still 
widely exists in many countries. 
So, how we define corporal punishment? According to the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, corporal punishment is “any punishment in which physical 
force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however 
light”.11 Similar to this, Pate and Gould (2012, p:xvi) described it as the imposition of 
physical punishment or ordeal to make the recipients obey the rules or norms. It 
comprises many forms such as whipping, birching, caning and spanking. In this thesis, 
the forms of corporal punishment discussed will be whipping, flogging and caning. 
In 1955, the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders adopted Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners.12 Point 31 mentioned that corporal punishment that is cruel, inhuman and 
degrading should be prohibited. In 2015, the United Nations revised what are now 
known as Nelson Mandela Rules,13 to emphasise what it refers to as “humanisation of 
criminal justice and the protection of human rights”. Rule 1 states that no prisoners 
should be subjected to any cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Additionally, in 
Rule 43 the prohibition of corporal punishment was clearly expressed. 
Despite many criticisms and efforts from the international community to 
eliminate the practice of corporal punishment, it is still a part of the legal systems in 
many places in the world.  




5.2 Colonialism and Judicial System Transformation in Indonesia 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, the great spectacle 
of physical punishment disappeared; the tortured body was avoided; 
the theatrical representation of pain was excluded from punishment. 
The age of sobriety in punishment had begun. (Foucault, 1995, p.14) 
 
The quote is taken from Michel Foucault’s works Discipline and Punish in which he 
highlighted some forms of torture used as punishment methods in the past. Foucault 
begins his book by explicitly describing a public torture that was held in 1757 in Paris. 
According to Foucault (1995, p.11) the spectacle of public torture as punishment 
started to disappear a few decades later and was replaced by ‘modern’ penalties which 
no longer touched the body or did so as little as possible. However, Foucault’s work is 
based on the historical practice in European countries, particularly France and 
England. Albeit the number might not be as high as in earlier centuries, the practice of 
public torture as punishment remains, particularly in some former, mainly, British 
colonies. Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia, for example, still implement 
corporal punishment inherited from the British who installed British Common Law 
and Indian Penal Law during its domination in the region (see Yao, 2007, Amnesty 
International, 2010). In Indonesia, the Dutch administration introduced the Wetboek 
van straftrecht voor Nederlands Indie (WvSNI), or the Criminal Code for Indonesian 
Citizens, in 1918, which kept the death penalty as a form of punishment to be 
implemented in the colony, even though it had been abolished in the Netherlands in 
1870; Van den Haag (1986, p.1662) called this the harshest kind of corporal 
punishment.  
According to the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (2017) the Dutch 
decision to maintain the death penalty in the WvSNI was based on racial prejudice 
that the indigenous people could not be trusted, and often gave false statements in 
front of the court. Therefore, the colony which was often considered as a ‘less 
civilised’ society still needed to be regulated, controlled and disciplined through the 
threat of capital punishment to make them civilised and docile to the coloniser 
administration. This legacy remains until today, the KUHP inherited from Dutch law 
still maintains the death penalty for extraordinary crimes (Wijaya, 2016). 
Thus, when Foucault (1995) argued that by the beginning of 19th century the 
body was no longer the target of penal repression and physical punishment in Europe, 
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it actually still persisted in many European colonies. In the Dutch East Indies, for 
example, even though the Dutch has abolished torture from their statutory law in 
1798, followed by the abolition of flogging and branding in 1854, the practice 
remained in the colony at least until 1862. During the period of the Cultuur Stelsel 
(Cultivation System) from 1830 to 1870, corporal punishment was used to ensure the 
agricultural production targets were achieved. This punishment applied to village 
chiefs who then meted out the punishment to farmers (ban Klaberen, 1983). The type 
of punishment varied from people being tied to a tree in the full sun all day, put in a 
pond for a night or being lashed with a cane (ban Klaberen, 1983, p.121). Like the 
British, the Dutch also implemented flogging or caning with rattan known as 
rottingslagen. According to Cribb (2010) a thin strip of rattan (sometimes split, 
soaked in water or hardened in fire to create a more painful effect) was used to whip 
to the victim’s buttock. In 1844, The Dutch administration regulated that the amount 
of flogging in a single punishment to a maximum of 40 hits, the number was reduced 
to 20 in 1848 along with excluding women from this punishment (Cribb, 2010, p.59). 
As mentioned above, the practice finally came to an end in August 1862 or about 
eight years after its been banned in the Netherlands. However, in 1862 alone, the 
record of rattan blows reached 474,375, most of which were conducted in Java (Cribb, 
2010). The practice of corporal punishment here indicates that it took longer to 
eliminate physical punishment in the colony. Some type of punishment, such as the 
death penalty, were even preserved until the end of colonial domination and still 
remain until today. 
One element of modernisation of the judicial system in the European context 
was marked with the transformation of punishment from physical torture or corporal 
punishment to the non-corporal nature of penalty, such as imprisonment. Gutting 
(2005, p.80) summarised Foucault’s four major transitions of punishment from pre-
modern to modern: 
1) Punishment no longer a spectacle for the society 
2) The criminal is the main target of punishment instead of the crime 
3) The judicial sentences lie in the hand of ‘experts’ (psychiatrist, social 
workers), not the judge in conformity with the law 
4) Retribution is not the main purpose of punishment but rather to reform 
and rehabilitate the criminal 
 
	 134	
In this chapter I will investigate whether these four major transitions also applied in 
the post-colonial context. 
Before continuing to discuss the context of modernity of judicial system in 
Europe and its effect on the European colonies, here I would like to highlight my 
interest in applying Foucault’s works to colonialisation, particularly in Indonesia. My 
interest derives from some scholars’ criticism of Foucault’s focus on the European 
context only. Spivak in her work “Can the Subaltern Speak?” referred to it as 
“sanctioned ignorance” of the Western intellectual (Spivak, 1988b). She wrote: 
Foucault is a brilliant thinker of power-in-spacing, but the awareness of 
the topographical reinscription of imperialism does not inform his 
presuppositions. He is taken in by the restricted version of the West 
produced by that reinscription and thus helps to consolidate its effects. 
(Spivak, 1988b, p.290). 
 
Similar criticism came from Hallaq (2018) who argued that Foucault’s focus on the 
European context makes it hard to understand the uniqueness, exceptionality or 
genealogy of some phenomena. According to Hallaq, no phenomenon can be 
appreciated if we only know one perspective or situation. Timothy Mitchell criticises 
Foucault, whose work makes France and Northern Europe taken for granted as the 
location of modernity. He argued that Bentham’s panopticon, which is discussed in 
Discipline and Punish, and which incorporated self-monitoring was originally a 
design of Jeremy Bentham’s brother Samuel when helping Russia’s colonisation of 
the Ottoman territory; and the practice of monitoring at school was invented in Bengal 
in the 19th century (Mitchell, 2000, p.3). All this criticism encouraged me to apply 
Foucault’s work to the colonial context and examine how modernity in the judicial 
system in Europe affected the European colonies. 
I would argue, Foucault’s ignorance of the non-European context could lead to 
universalisation of one phenomenon as history of the world, a concern which was 
raised by Hallaq as well in his book Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern 
Knowledge. My concern occurred when I read Discipline and Punish in which 
Foucault explained the transformation of punishment in Paris and other European 
countries (as mentioned earlier in this chapter) from public display to a carceral 
system. It was the practice of the public caning ceremony I witnessed in 2016 during 
my fieldwork that led me to question the changes that Foucault described in his work, 
as I came to a new proposition that it seems that both public spectacle punishment and 
surveillance are supporting each other in my fieldwork region, rather than replacing 
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one with another as happened in the European context. Therefore, we need to revisit 
Foucault’s work in the Non-European context, in this case Aceh. We also need to 
investigate how the transformation of the judicial system and punishment from the 
pre-modern to modern era in the European empire, particularly the Netherlands, 
affected the practice in its former colony, Indonesia.  
Modernisation is usually associated with Westernisation (see Gray, 2007) and 
in the case of European colonialisation, modernisation is often associated with its 
‘civilising’ influence. This includes the insertion of the colonialist (European) legal 
system into the colonies (see Hallaq, 2009b, Hallaq, 2009a). In the post-colonial 
context, modernisation could also be interpreted as transformation of local law, which 
was often fluid in practice and existed in the oral tradition, into written form which 
gave it a fixed position as law. The transformation of local law was claimed as 
necessary by scholars like Vandenbosch (1943) who argued the uncertainty of local 
law created confusion, hence the need to adopt Western law in order to cope with 
modern development. For the European empire, the modernisation of judicial system 
brought an effective policing and control over their colonies. Like many Orientalists, 
Vandenbosch saw the coloniser as the more civilised, the one who brought many 
developments and a civilising influence to the indigenous natives of the Dutch East 
Indies. 
The European territories consisted of about 35% of the world land surface as in 
1800 and expanded to 84% by 1914. Their legacy to their colonies is hard to quantify 
(Headrick, 1981). According to Hallaq (2009b, p.358-359) even though the main 
motive of European colonialism in the 19th century was economic, in order to 
maintain power and domination, the political and cultural domain had to be 
controlled, and this was entwined with the legal system. The colonisers translated the 
colonies’ indigenous law into their language, such as English or Dutch, which resulted 
in an homogenised interpretation of the law which had previously been diverse by its 
nature due to various local ethnicities and beliefs. They also established judicial 
administration that was chaired by the colonial administrator and local religious 
scholars, as advisers (see Hallaq, 2009b, Hallaq, 2009a, Otto, 2010).  
At the beginning of its occupation in Indonesia in 1619, the Dutch via its 
corporation Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) or known as the Dutch East 
India Company primarily focused on economic benefit and were not really involved in 
the native customary legal system. However, as argued by Hallaq (2018) this lack of 
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interest was not derived from the idea of respecting the natives’ culture and tradition, 
rather it was just not the time yet. He argued in the 19th century, following the growth 
in intellectual-scientific field as well as military technology, the coloniser’s interest 
expanded beyond just economic exploitation. The development in military weapon 
technology became the backbone of Dutch expansion in the Dutch East Indies, which 
was also followed by the involvement of Orientalists to preserve law and order, as will 
be discussed later in this section. 
As the VOC’s main priorities were business and profit, hence their early focus 
was mainly to conduct any measure that could affect the business directly. Therefore, 
even though the Dutch lacked any interest in local laws at the beginning of their 
domination, when it came to their business and economic goals their rules applied, 
including implementing punishment, that had been abolished in the Netherlands, 
particularly to the native slaves or those who worked in their enterprises and territory. 
At the beginning, the VOC introduced the Dutch model of legal system in the coastal 
area where they operated (Hallaq, 2009b). This meant the company recognised 
judicial torture and corporal punishment applied to company employees, Europeans, 
Chinese residents and local people who were mostly slaves who lived in the city of 
Batavia (presently Jakarta) on Java. (Ward, n.d, Cribb, 2010). The slaves were from 
Eastern Islands like Bali, Lombok and Celebes, while the Javanese were not allowed 
to live in the city as the Dutch feared they would organise rebellious acts from within 
(Oostindie and Paasman, 1998). Hence, even though the Dutch did not really 
intervene in the legal system in the Dutch East Indies during the early time of their 
domination, their rules were applied to those who worked in their enterprises, 
including natives Indonesians. 
In 1811, the British took control of domination over Indonesia following the 
Napoleonic wars. As Otto (2010, p.437) highlighted, Thomas Stamford Raffles was 
appointed as governor and introduced some legal reform particularly regarding land. 
Raffles declared that all land was state property, policies which were adopted by the 
Dutch after the British left in 1814 and transferred back the power to the Dutch 
(Hallaq, 2009b, Hallaq, 2009a). The VOC was no longer in charge as the corporation 
had gone bankrupt and its power fully transferred to the Dutch state by 1800. Raffles’ 
reformation in terms of the legal system seemed to encourage the Dutch to get 
involved in the judicial system of the colony. 
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In the 1840s, the Dutch experienced more pressure to implement legal 
universalism in the colony, through the widespread application of European law 
(Cribb, 2010, p.55). Cribb (2010) further explained that the aforementioned fluidity 
and diversity of the native legal system raised some concern about the abuse of power 
by indigenous rulers, hence it needed more supervision by the colonial administration. 
Here, the Dutch tried to position themselves as the rescuers of the Indonesian judicial 
system from the tyranny and despotism of native rulers, similar ideological 
assumptions to Spivak’s comment that “white men are saving brown women from 
brown men” (1988b, p.296). The colonisers claimed to be saving the community from 
their indigenous rulers and at the same time introduced their legal system which they 
often claimed as more ‘civilised and modern’ only to perpetuate their hegemony over 
the colony. In 1873, the Dutch administration started to introduce the European 
duplicate of penal codes, in which unlike their early occupation where their law was 
only applied to Europeans in the colony, this time the codes also applied to natives 
(Fasseur, 2007). The Dutch administration’s effort to unify the legal system and 
implement law and order in the colony continued by transforming the face of the dual 
judicial system of Islamic law and adat law or customary law (see below).  
As an archipelagic country with more than 300 different ethnic groups, 
Indonesia is a diverse country by nature including in terms of its legal system. 
Anderson (1965) described it as an area in the Dutch East Indies which shared the 
burden of the white colonial. Before the Dutch intervention in Indonesia’s judicial 
system, the society had a dual legal system that is Islamic law and adat (customary) 
law. An example of how adat and Islamic law support each other can be seen from the 
concept of inheritance law written by Syaikh Arsyad Al-Banjari, an Islamic scholar 
from South Kalimantan, Indonesia, in his manuscript Sabilal Muhtadin, in which he 
considered the local culture of people in South Kalimantan regarding inheritance. In 
many cases based on Islamic law, it is often claimed that the share of the male is twice 
that of the female, however Al-Banjari argued that in the culture of South Kalimantan, 
males and females work together for the family, hence when either the husband or the 
wife died, half of the inheritance first must be given to the one who still alive then the 
rest can be shared based on Islamic law (Wahid, 2006, p.250-251). This highlights the 
harmonious relationship of Islamic law and local adat or customary law. However, 
under Dutch occupation the character and practice of the dual judicial system 
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changed. Dutch policies regarding legal universalism metamorphosed the pre-colonial 
implementation of Islamic law and customary law in the colony. 
Islam was one of the biggest enemies of the Dutch from the beginning of their 
occupation. The dissonance of Islam and colonialism can be seen from the many acts 
of resistance by religious scholars, using religious narrative (see chapter 3). According 
to Benda (1958) even though religious mission was not the colonisers’ primary 
intention, many Dutch who lived either in the Netherlands or Indonesia sought to 
eliminate Islamic influence and brought with them a missionary task in the colony. 
Hence, the colonisers encountered Islamic inspired resistance in many areas they tried 
to occupy in the archipelago. Additionally, as Benda (1958) pointed out, at the 
beginning of their occupation, the Dutch policies towards Islam were dominated by 
misconception and fear. Benda highlighted how the Dutch perceived Islam as an 
organised religion like Roman Catholicism with a hierarchical clergy under the 
Turkish Caliph. This misconception led to the Dutch decision in 1882 to formalise and 
regulate the Islamic legal system by establishing Priesterraden (‘priest council’), 
some defined it as a religious council or Islamic court, where its members were 
appointed by the colonial administrator instead of local native ruler (Benda, 1958, 
p.338). All the local institutions established were also still subordinated to the colonial 
administration (Noer, 1978, Otto, 2010, Benda, 1958). In addition, the Islamic court 
only dealt with family law such as marriage, inheritance and waqf (religious 
endowment) and any decisions made still needed approval from the civil court chaired 
by the colonial administrator (Noer, 1978). Furthermore, in 1927, following the Dutch 
decision to make the customary law normative, the Islamic court jurisdiction was 
narrowed down by transferring inheritance and waqf disputes to civil courts (Noer, 
1978, p.43). This highlights how the practice of local law was changed by the 
colonisers during their domination. Additionally, I would argue the Dutch policy of 
establishing some Islamic institutions was an effort to pretend that they were 
accommodative towards local values. However, at the same time, this policy aimed to 
reduce the scope of Islamic law and ensure that Islam could be controlled under their 
institutional bodies. 
According to Buskens and Dupret (2014) the very first translation of an 
Islamic related manuscript from the Dutch East Indies was started in 1844 by the 
publication of An Introduction to Islamic Law by Albert Meursinge which is an 
adaptation of Cermin Segala Mereka yang Menuntut Ilmu Fiqh pada Memudahkan 
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Syari’at Allah (Mirror for those who seek the knowledge of Fiqh to easily understand 
Allah’s Law), a manuscript written in Malay by Syiah Kuala, an Islamic scholar from 
Aceh (Amiruddin, 1994). Meursinge’s work was then followed by Solomo Keyzer’s 
about Islamic law in Indonesia which he claimed was sourced from the books of fiqh, 
the normative text of Muslim scholars (Buskens and Dupret, 2014, p.34). Meanwhile, 
Christian Snouck Hurgronje (1906b) in his work on the Acehnese described how the 
theory of Islamic teaching and practice in everyday life are often different, the 
practice is often much more fluid. He emphasised that the practice is often shaped by 
the ethnological characteristic, political and social development in the society. Here, 
he recognised that Islam and adat (customs) are elements that are intertwined and 
related to each other. Amongst all scholars, Hurgronje, a Professor in Islamic studies 
as well as Dutch colonial officer was the one that mainly shaped the Dutch policy 
regarding Islamic law.  
In 1893, Hurgronje was assigned to Aceh to give advice to the colonial 
administration about how to solve the Aceh war, which (as mentioned in a previous 
chapter) was the most costly war in Dutch history. In Indonesia at school, when 
learning about this part of history we were told that Hurgronje was a deceiver who 
pretended to be an ulama (Islamic scholar) named Abdul Ghafar in order to find a way 
of colonialising us. According to van Koningsveld (2016) Hurgronje’s conversion to 
Islam was a conversion of convenience performed to gain special interest. Hurgronje’s 
work later on became the major influence for Dutch Islamic policies and its related 
institutions in Indonesia. Hurgronje advised the colonial administration to release 
Indonesian Muslims, particularly Mecca Pilgrims, who had considered leading 
rebellious acts. This decision later brought acceptance and loyalty from many 
religious scholars towards the Dutch administration who also then became the 
colonials’ allies (Benda, 1958). Hurgronje also recognised the existence of the dual 
judicial system in the colony with its fluidity and diversity in practice. In his work, 
based on a fieldwork in Aceh, Hurgronje (1906a, p.14) described how the majority of 
people’s daily lives were regulated by adat or customary law rather than Islamic law, 
and that they should go for customary law whenever the Islamic law was silent. Like 
customary law in Indonesia, pluralism is also the very nature of Islamic law. Pluralism 
in the context of Islamic law can be seen from the diversity of schools of 
jurisprudence; in Sunni Islam only there are at least four major schools: Shafiii, 
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Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki. Hence an effort to transform the law into a fixed legal 
standard would only change its very fundamental character and practice.  
However, like many other Orientalists, Hurgronje also perceived the people of 
the Dutch East Indies as less civilised and in need of modernity (Hurgronje, 1906a, 
Hurgronje, 1906b), based on the Dutch model to achieve political integration between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands (Jung, 2010, p.292). Modernising Indonesia meant to 
westernise Indonesia, not to be ruled by Islamic law or Adat (Benda, 1958). In 1901, 
the Dutch implemented the so-called Ethical Policy which aimed to bring Indonesians 
closer to Dutch culture to encourage their loyalty and common values (Benda, 1958) 
(see chapter 2). This policy shared the same belief with Hurgronje who saw Western 
civilisation as superior. Arguably, it helped the Dutch to integrate its values and 
‘modernise’ the colony, and at the same time distance the society from its own values. 
Meanwhile, regarding customary law following the British imperial strategy in 
India in which local law was translated into English to make it accessible for the 
colonisers, the Dutch used Cornelius van Vollenhoven’s work regarding customary 
law in Indonesia which was written in Dutch. In many societies in Indonesia, 
customary law existed only in oral form. “Orality required communal participation in, 
and understanding of, customary law” (Hallaq, 2009a, p.90). Hence customary law is 
fluid in practice as it requires local community engagement, and there are no elites, 
hierarchy or bureaucracy with more power over the law. This fluidity and orality 
made it hard for the colonial government to understand the community and to 
implement law and order.  
The translation of customary law into the coloniser’s language also meant the 
law was written based on their interpretation and assumptions, which was later 
transformed into the colonial policy (Hallaq, 2009a). Translating law which existed in 
an oral tradition and highly relied on the local communities’ participation, was already 
problematic as it transformed the fluidity of the law into a fixed form of rules which 
might no longer need the community’s involvement. This meant that the operation of 
the law also changed, following the documentation of the oral tradition into written 
code. Unlike Hurgronje, whose work was based on long ethnographic fieldwork in 
Indonesia, most of van Vollenhoven’s work was done behind his desk in Leiden as he 
only visited Indonesia twice in his life, in 1907 and 1932, after he published his 
notable work Het Adatrecht Van Nederlandsch-Indie in 1931 (Benda-Beckmann and 
Benda-Beckmann, 2011). This means the customary law which had existed and been 
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preserved in the society via oral traditions was translated and interpreted into written 
text indirectly and from a long distance. In addition, the customary law varied from 
one society to another in the Indonesian archipelago which not only differed in 
ethnicity but also languages; van Vollenhoven translated customary laws from only 19 
geographical areas in Indonesia, while the archipelago consists of over 17,000 islands 
with over 300 different ethnic groups and over 500 local languages. Regardless, still 
his work was later used as a reference for legal policies to be implemented throughout 
the Dutch East Indies (Van Vollenhoven et al., 1981). Hence the Dutch simplified and 
homogenised the society when it applied the policy to the whole region. The writing 
of indigenous customary law into written text by the Dutch scholar meant that 
customary law was recreated and at the same time this emphasised the Western or 
European hegemony of knowledge.  
In 1927, following van Vollenhoven and other Orientalist scholarly works, the 
Dutch declared customary law instead of shari’a, as the normative law (Hallaq, 
2009b, Hallaq, 2009a). This policy neglected the role of the two types of law which 
supported each other during the pre-colonial era. Even though Vollenhoven admitted 
the pluralism of adat or customary law in the Dutch East Indies, at the same time he 
disregarded the role of Islamic law. His preference for adat over Islamic law can be 
seen from his book. In Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law, which is the 
English translation of his book, he admitted that Islamic law applied in the society, 
however he emphasised it was mainly used in “administration [of] religious justice, 
religious levies, parts of family law, inheritance and pious foundations; and even in 
these cases it applies by no means fully or universally” (Van Vollenhoven et al., 1981, 
p.11). Arguably, van Vollenhoven contributed to Dutch policies of reducing the 
application of Islamic law in the Dutch East Indies. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, after the Dutch declared adat law as normative, inheritance and waqf 
(religious endowment) disputes were transferred to civil courts which further 
narrowed the jurisdiction of the Islamic court; he also argued that religious law came 
secondary to adat. Thus, the writing and translation of native customary law into 
Dutch helped the colonials to preserve law and order in Indonesia. As Lev (1985) 
said, the colonial customary law policy helped them to police, control or even to make 
Indonesian communities docile. For the coloniser, the written law also gave them 
fixed standard rules which were also accessible for the colonial officers. 
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Hurgronje and van Vollenhoven’s works did not only contribute as the major 
influences for the Dutch policy in Indonesia, but their works have also been used as 
key textbooks for Orientalists and scholars who want to study about the Dutch East 
Indies. Many Dutch Orientalists became experts in classical Shafii text, which is the 
major Islamic school of jurisprudence in Indonesia; British orientalists became experts 
in the Hanafi school which is dominant in South Asia; and the French and Italians 
concentrated on the Maliki manuscript which is the main school in the Maghreb 
region (Buskens and Dupret, 2014, p.36). Hence, this process did not only help the 
colonisers to maintain their power, law and order in the colonies, it also preserved the 
European hegemony of knowledge, or to borrow from Mutaqin (2012), it was “the 
West that invented and created the image of the East” which in this case refers to the 
Dutch over Indonesia. 
The legacy of the Dutch legal system persists until today in Indonesia. The 
KUHP still has the death penalty which was mentioned in the WvSNI introduced by 
the Dutch in 1918. More than that, the pluralism and fluidity of the previous practice 
were not in line with the European legal system that required certainty as well as 
universalism. Colonialism transformed the character of the judicial system in the 
colony, where customary law was re-created into a new form and Islamic law was 
marginalised, although still kept for some limited aspect. Echoing the Dutch system, 
the judicial system in the colony was converted into a homogenised fixed written 
standard (Hallaq, 2009a, p.91). 
After colonialism ended, the urge to implement Islamic law arose with the 
growth of some groups such as Darul Islam in some regions including Central Java, 
South Sulawesi and Aceh (see chapter 1). Almost six decades after Indonesia declared 
independence from Dutch colonialism, Islamic law has been restored particularly in 
Aceh which officially declared it in 2002. However, the practice of Islamic law in 
Aceh today or in other words ‘the codification of shari’a’ maintains some core 
characteristics of the judicial system introduced by the Dutch colonial administration, 
the unified legal standard that homogenises religious textual interpretation. Thus, in 
today’s practice, Islamic law has transformed into a fixed legal standard with a 
definitive interpretation of religious text. As Azra (2004, p.150) put it “Islam itself 
began to be redefined in European (Dutch and English) terms”. The pluralism of 
religious interpretation which was one core character of Islamic law in the pre-modern 
era (see Hallaq, 2009b, Hallaq, 2009a), has been converted into a homogenised 
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interpretation which is supported by state coercion to be implemented in the society. 
Diversity is no longer maintained but eliminated and the state, through its judicial 
institutions, has the authority to enforce the law (see chapter 4 for shari’a institutions 
in Aceh). The judicial system transformation gave the coloniser (or the state, in the 
post-colonial era) with all its supportive institutional authority, the ability to construct 
the legal standard and enforce implementation.  
I would argue the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh today is following 
this pattern which was inherited from the Dutch legal system. During the colonial era, 
the relationship between Islam and colonialism was never harmonious, as religious 
narrative was often used to fight against the Dutch, described as the ‘infidel’. 
However, even after the Dutch left, its legacy of the fixed legal standard as a core 
feature of the judicial system remained, including within the application of Islamic 
law. The government, through its various institutions, monopolises the interpretation 
of religious texts within the legal system, monitors the implementation and conducts 
punishment for those who breach the law. Islamic law which was fluid in practice and 
pluralist in interpretation, in the case of Aceh was transformed into a codified law 
particularly since 2002 when Qanun No.11 (2002) was passed. Like the Dutch policy 
of transforming adat law from the oral tradition into a written form, which obliterated 
its fluidity, the Aceh government policy to standardise Islamic law into qanun has 
eliminated the pluralism of religious text interpretation. This demonstrates how 
religion is politicised to serve certain interests in order to gain and maintain power. 
The codification of Islamic law in Aceh has also brought about the practice of 
corporal punishment, particularly caning which will be elaborated further in the next 
section. 
5.3 Corporal Punishment in Aceh’s Islamic Law (Punishing the Sinners) 
Public caning is the only form of corporal punishment in Aceh under shari’a law. 
Some other countries implement different forms of corporal punishment, from caning, 
mutilation, to stoning to death. Public caning as a punishment in Aceh first appeared 
in Qanun no.11/2002 about religious affairs, worship and religious symbols, and 
applies to those found guilty of promoting deviant religious sects (Article 20); missing 
Friday prayers three times in a row (Article 21); providing places and opportunities 
for Muslim followers who have no justified reason to neglect fasting during the month 
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of Ramadhan; and eating or drinking in public during day time during Ramadhan 
(Article 22). In 2003, the government passed another law on violations that would be 
punished by public caning, Qanun no. 14/2003 on khalwat. This law regulates khalwat 
and any other activities, which could lead to zina. The law mentioned the activities as 
haram (forbidden), and those who breach it could get three to nine lashes in public. In 
2014, the government passed Qanun no. 6/2014 that expanded activities that would be 
punished by public caning (see chapter 4). Unlike the previous qanun, this one 
explicitly states that it applies to non-Muslims as well. Hence, this law also extended 
its power by forcing the implementation of shari’a across the board. 
Even though caning had already been mentioned within the law since 2002, it 
was only implemented in 2005 after guidance was passed in conducting this 
ceremony, GR no. 10 (2005) on technical guidelines for implementation of Uqubat 
(punishment) by caning. This regulation stated the cane must be made of rattan, with a 
diameter between 0.75 to one centimetre, one-metre in length and not double ended. 
When doing the caning, the distance between the WH officer, given the task to do the 
punishment, and the offenders has to be 0.70 to one metre. The officer can only lash 
the offender’s back between the shoulder and hip. During the ceremony, medical staff 
are required to check the offenders before and after the punishment and if s/he is not 
fit enough the punishment can be postponed until s/he is declared fit. If the offender is 
pregnant, according to Qanun Jinayat no. 6/2014, her punishment will be postponed 
until she has given birth. GR no. 10 (2005) states that caning must be held in an open 
area, so people can see it. The distance between the stage and the audience must be at 
least 10 metres.  
The public caning ceremony is designed to educate those punished so they 
would realise and regret their mistakes, which will help them towards taubat nasuha 
or sincere repentance; and also deter others. However, the primary goal is public 
shaming as the convicted would be “malu” or shamed and this punishment claimed 
by the government (as mentioned in Qanun 11/2002) will not bring any potential peril 
for their family.  
According to Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia, an Indonesian dictionary, malu is 
an emotion which makes a person feels really bad (despicable, low, and so on) for 
doing something that is not good (not quite right, different from customs, having a 
defect or inadequacy, etc.) . Any acts that do not fit with the prescribed norms can be 
judged as not quite right or good, or seen as uncommon or not acceptable in one 
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society. In Indonesia, malu or the Balinese term lek is also used to describe when 
someone is worried or nervous that they cannot do a thing perfectly (Geertz, 1973, 
p.402). Therefore, it has different meanings depending on the context or situation. 
However, in general it is used to explain a situation when someone has low self-
esteem that they cannot do things perfectly or behaviour that is inappropriate and 
wrong according to norms. 
According to Collins and Bahar (2000) malu can be translated as shy, shame, 
bashful, and embarrassed. They conducted a research study about how this term is 
used in Malay societies (Javanese, Balinese, Acehnese, Minangkabau, and Buginese 
in Indonesia) and Malaysia, and concluded that it is culturally constructed and could 
be re-shaped following the socio-economic changes in the society.  
The implementation of shari’a in Aceh for example, has reshaped the concept of 
malu, as local qanun introduced some new standards of moral behaviour which had 
never been regulated before. A woman who does not veil could feel malu as they look 
different regarding their public appearance, for instance, or their acts could be seen as 
shameful due to ignoring the shari’a regulations. So, malu is an emotion which has 
been exploited by the law as a form of punishment by publicly exposing and 
penalising offenders. In this case, the government has brought the idea of 
psychological punishment into its legal judicial system. 
Collins and Bahar (2000, p.48) also found that men and women responded 
differently to malu; women tend to become withdrawn and cry out of other people’s 
sight, while men tend to act violently. This could explain some cases in which women 
who been punished move from the area where they used to live, according to local 
people, while men tend to respond aggressively during punishment by confronting the 
officer (Tribun News, 28.2.15).14 
According to Nussbaum (2004) some scholars such as Dan M. Kahan argued 
that shaming as a punishment has powerful expressive effects on the individual and 
others, as stated above. However, Nussbaum warned that this kind of punishment will 
not only humiliate the offenders but also degrade their very dignity. By exposing them 
during public caning, for example, they are not only made to feel ashamed but also 
left marked in the society in which they will forever be remembered for committing a 
                                                14	http://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2015/02/28/tak-tahah-dihukum-cambuk-penjudi-asal-sigli-amuk-algojo	
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moral crime. It humiliates them as a person and also humiliates people around them, 
particularly their family. 
Shaming punishment particularly in public could lead to stigmatisation towards 
the offenders and at the same time encourage the society to jointly see it as shameful. 
Those breaching moral values could be branded as immoral or sinners. In addition, 
shaming punishment could also mobilise the society to jointly punish the offenders 
(Nussbaum (2004, p.2). 
Conducting caning ceremonies using many religious symbols, attracts people’s 
attention and connects to people’s identities. People see the offenders breaching the 
norms and values of the society, hence they are seen as deserving the punishment. 
People then participate in shaming the offenders, as discussed in the following section 
in this chapter. When people engage in jointly punishing the offenders by shaming 
them verbally, for instance, they set a new norm in which people who breach the 
shari’a are seen as deserving the abuse. Any different response could be seen as 
supporting the ‘moral’ crime and categorised as deviant or abnormal. In this case, the 
state plays significant roles to alienate its own citizens, perpetuate stigmatisation over 
them, and at the same time divide the society. People who support the regulations 
become the normal society, while those who breach the law or give support to 
offenders are categorised as deviant or abnormal. It leads to a homogenised society 
and potentially propagates vigilante groups to ‘normalise’ the society (as discussed in 
chapter 4). On the other hand, by punishing the offenders in public, authorities send a 
powerful message of the consequences if people decide to ignore the regulations. 
Authorities also arouse what Foucault (1991, p.58) refers to as a “feeling of terror” by 
the spectacle of their power to legally the use of violence to punish offenders. 
Public caning ceremonies in Aceh have received much criticism from national 
and international organisations. Human Rights Watch mentioned recommendations 
from the UN Committee against Torture, which requires the Indonesian government 
to review Aceh’s law regarding the use of corporal punishment.15 The Commission for 
the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS) called the caning ceremony a 
systematic human rights violation and asked the Aceh government to put an end to 
this practice,16 of which 59 were held between June 2017 and May 2018, increasing 
                                                15	https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/30/policing-morality/abuses-application-shari’ashari’a-aceh-indonesia	16	http://www.kontras.org/home/index.php?module=pers&id=1005	
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from the previous period which had about 24 cases.17 I would argue this increase 
could be interpreted in two ways. First, it could be seen as the punishment failing to 
give a deterrent effect in the society. The second could be due to growing control in 
the form of patrols by government official or participation by local people/vigilante 
groups that report and bring the cases to the shari’a police. Amnesty International, the 
Institute for Criminal Justice Reform and some other organisations highlight that apart 
from breaching human rights values, other more fundamental crimes such as 
corruption are ignored.  
In March 2018, Aceh’s Governor passed a new rule, GR no. 5 (2018). This 
regulation moved the location of caning ceremonies to penitentiary areas known as 
Lembaga Permasyarakatan. However, this research was conducted during the period 
of August 2016-February 2017, under the previous regulations. The governor argued 
this change was made to prevent children from watching the punishment ceremony 
and members of the public and journalists recording the event and publishing it on the 
internet. 
The new GR raised some controversy by local members of parliament, religious 
scholars and Islamic hard-line organisations who argued that the governor should have 
first discussed it with religious scholars. 18  In June 2018, the DPRA officially 
registered a lawsuit against GR no. 5 (2018) about the implementation of jinayat law 
to the Supreme Court. The governor has also been criticised for showing empathy 
toward immoral offenders who do not even feel ashamed of their acts. Some caning 
penalties have been moved to penitentiaries following the regulation,19 however, some 
others are still conducted in the mosque yard.20 The authorities claimed that the new 
GRs have no detail of how the caning ceremony in the penitentiaries area can be 
conducted. They also claimed that the regulations lack details including the 
employment of a female officer for female offenders, if no female officer exists in the 
region.21 This further indicates male hegemony not only regarding the production of 
the law but also its practice. 
                                                17	https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/06/27/10463711/kontras-sebut-penyiksaan-hukum-cambuk-di-aceh-meningkat	18	http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2018/04/16/batalkan-pergub-cambuk-di-lp	19	https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-44125317	20	https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4113629/mengapa-pasangan-gay-di-aceh-dihukum-cambuk-di-halaman-masjid		21	https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/hukuman-cambuk-di-banda-aceh-masih-berlangsung-di-luar-penjara-27431110790545256	
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According to GR no. 10 (2005) on technical guidelines for implementation of 
uqubat (punishment) by caning, during the ceremony a male offender is required to 
stand on the stage while females are asked to kneel. This different treatment towards 
men and women signals the different perceptions towards their bodies. The position 
for females also makes her body looks smaller than usual. Bending on their knees 
makes a person look weak and this position is often associated with an attitude of 
subjugation. The requirement to ask women to kneel down during the punishment 
may be aimed to appear to protect them, to make the caning seem less severe, 
however at the same time these rules perpetuate the idea that women are physically 
weaker than men. Women are considered unable to face their punishment like men 
who can stand bravely when confronting their penalty. Hence, it reproduces the 
concept of masculinity and gendered hierarchy. In many traditions in Indonesia 
bending on one’s knees also symbolises servitude, devotion and respect towards 
someone who is seen as higher. In slave culture, for example, kneeling showed that a 
slave was powerless in front of their master and this body language also symbolised 
their servitude. Meanwhile in many religious traditions, kneeling is one way to show 
the worshipper is weak in front of God and it could also be a way to express a 
devotion. 
The implementation of the public caning ceremony underline the state’s (in this 
case the Aceh government) power to not only interpret religious text to construct 
legitimate law, but also punish those who do not obey the interpretation. I would 
argue the character and practice of Islamic law (shari’a) in Aceh today is influenced 
by the legacy of Dutch colonialism. As discussed above, the indigenous judicial 
system in Indonesia was reshaped, which eliminated its flexibility and fluidity in 
practice. Local law (customary law and Islamic law) was reconstructed into a fixed 
legal form following European law. The homogenising of local customary law with 
the involvement of state coercion in practice, continues to exist in the post-colonial 
context including within the implementation of Islamic law today. 
Through the public caning ceremony, the authorities also disseminate pain and 
humiliation, which promotes institutionalised violence, violence that is endorsed by 
the government. Therefore, shari’a is not just about regulations that are made in the 
name of Islam, but it is also about power and domination of whoever has the authority 
to define, construct and enforce it. Through the public caning ceremony, the 
government makes its power visible as the one who has the authority to punish people 
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who do not follow the orders given. Offenders are punished physically and 
psychologically in three different ways, through: physical torture, public shaming, and 
incarceration.  
The sermon during the caning ceremony uses a religious text to explain and 
justify the punishment and is also a way to re-assure the reproduction of the shari’a 
knowledge continues. As Foucault (1980, p.52) said “it is not possible for power to be 
exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power”. 
Here, the authorities exercise power by inserting a sermon as part of the ritual during 
the public caning ceremony. During the sermon I observed, the preacher explained 
that the ceremony was part of the government’s effort to enforce God’s law and at the 
same time he also invited the public to not only witness shari’a reinforcement but also 
to participate in it. As a preacher, he is considered as someone with knowledge about 
religion, hence his words are valued as valid and the truth. Other religious symbols, 
such as the mosque which is a sacred space for Muslims, the recitation of verses from 
the holy Quran, emphasises the connection between the ceremony and religion. It also 
enhances the society’s identity as Muslims, which strengthens their sense of belonging 
and enthusiasm to participate. 
The sense of belonging through religious values and identity make people 
internalise the shari’a values as part of their life. The power is circulated between the 
authorities and the society. The society has a strong belief in their religion, 
particularly as they are proud of their region as the gateway of Islam in Indonesia. 
This drives the authorities to embed the religious identity into local law or qanun 
which increases people’s sense of belonging. The authorities, through their legal 
bodies and institutions, make sure the qanun is imposed and followed by the people 
and at the same time encourage the society to participate in upholding it. As qanun, 
which represents shari’a in Aceh, is claimed as God’s law, people are keen to uphold 
it and support it as a form of their devotion to God, by monitoring their 
neighbourhood (see chapter 4) or participating in shaming offenders in public caning 
ceremonies. The public caning ceremony also invites people to reinforce shari’a by 
witnessing what is perceived by many as a sacred event. 
During the ceremony, authorities read all personal details of offenders to the 
public, which means their identities are not only recorded officially, but people in the 
audience will also remember them, particularly as many journalists and members of 
the public take pictures and video recording of the event. Their faces appear in 
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popular mass media as well as social media, so the humiliation continues after the 
punishment ceremony finished. Members of the audience also engage with the caning 
ceremony by verbally humiliating and shaming the offenders. The authorities’ goals to 
make the offender ashamed, as mentioned in the explanation of Qanun no. 11/2002, 
are achieved. 
5.4 Punishment Ceremony: A Public Humiliation 
According to Foucault: “The public execution is to be understood not only as judicial, 
but also as a political ritual. It belongs, even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by 
which power is manifested” (Foucault, 1995, p.47). Breaking the law means violating 
the rules that were made by the authorities in the name of defending shari’a as a form 
of fidelity to God. Hence the authorities want to make sure no violations against the 
law will be tolerated, and punishment is made not only to give a lesson to the 
offenders but also as a warning for the people to obey the rules. While the officer’s 
face is covered to protect their identity, the face of the offenders is open for people to 
see. Additionally, as mentioned above, the offender’s personal details are publicised. 
As a public shaming punishment, people’s engagement in humiliating the 
offenders is encouraged by subjecting them centre stage to receive their caning. In 
addition, the authorities make the offenders distinct as they are required to wear a 
white outfit, which could also symbolise ‘atonement’. In Indonesia, white is 
associated with purity, hence the white outfit emphasises the idea that this is a 
purification ceremony, a way of repentance for the offenders who have committed 
‘sins’ by violating the law. 
The public punishment, as Foucault said, is also where the power is 
manifested. Through the caning ceremony, the authorities show their power to punish 
those who do not obey their rules, humiliate them in public and bring up religious 
discourse as justification. By beating them in public, the authorities demonstrate their 
power to legally injure the bodies of those who do not obey the law. They are 
punished, beaten by caning in a violent ceremony celebrated and exhibited to the 
public. 
Through this ceremony, the authorities also exercise their power as the single 
authoritative power of religious text interpretation which must be followed by the 
people. This ceremony runs some rituals, in which a stage is established to exhibit and 
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punish the offenders, some seats are prepared for official representatives to witness 
the public punishment, a sermon is delivered before the caning, and some government 
officials are assigned for the ceremonies to read the punishment, monitor the process 
and execute the caning penalty. 
 
Field notes, 28 November 2016 
A van came to bring all the people convicted, the condemned bodies that 
will be punished in front of the public today, three men and two women. 
Today they face not only the punishment charged towards their bodies, but 
they also have to face the public who will see them being punished in the 
middle of a temporarily built stage. Like a theatrical arena, they will stand 
in the middle of the stage watched by many people who have been waiting 
since morning and also by those who later on will see them being punished 
via social media or news as many journalists and people are documenting 
the event. They experience not only physical punishment, but also mental 
due to public shaming. The pain from the punishment might only stay for 
several days, weeks or months, but the shame will last forever. It might not 
only be them who will remember the punishment, but also people who 
watch it could possibly remember their face and ‘brand’ them with a 
negative stereotype. They were punished for failing to obey the appropriate 
behaviour according to local shari’a law. By punishing them in public, the 
government sends message of its power to punish those who breach the 
rules and also give the public a chance to jointly punish them through 
humiliation. 
Before the ceremony began, through a loudspeaker megaphone the 
officer asked male and females in the audience to segregate, while children 
under 18 years were asked to leave the area. However, no one bothered 
about the announcement, people were still mixed and children were still 
around and there were no further actions conducted by the officer to 
enforce the rules. The ceremony opened with recitation of a verse from the 
holy Quran: 
The [unmarried] woman or [unmarried] man found guilty of sexual 
intercourse - lash each one of them with a hundred lashes, and do not be 
taken by pity for them in the religion of Allah, if you should believe in 
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Allah and the Last Day. And let a group of the believers witness their 
punishment. (An Nur: 2) 
 
The Quran verses highlighted how it is used as justification for the caning 
ceremony against those who have committed adultery. There was no explanation 
brought about regarding the text and the context of the religious verses read, it was 
used literally without any further study. It was then followed by a sermon and prayers 
by a male preacher. He began his speech by saying: “The attendees, all the 
worshippers I glorify. We are now in this happy moment in front of or in the courtyard 
of the house of God”. 
 Here the sermon described the ceremony as a happy moment, probably due to 
its objective to enforce God’s law and as a form of punishing the sinners with 
expectations that they will repent and be forgiven for their mistake and sins. As a 
repentance ceremony, it is a happy moment, as it will purify the offenders from their 
sins.  
The sermon then quoted another religious text saying, “One who repents from 
sin is like one who has not sinned”. He also said if people stay away from and hate 
sinful activities, God will help them and it will compensate towards their sins. He 
wishes those being punished that day by public caning would repent because God 
loves those who repent. He said: “May our brothers who will be beaten, (with) uqubat 
or whip, are already being repentant. Insha’Allah. Because Allah loves the repentant 
most”. This sermon reminds people to be obedient to shari’a and encourages them to 
hate any immoral behaviour. He said: 
If you stay away from all sinful deeds, for example, if we see any behaviour… 
crimes either drinking alcohol, gambling… we hate all those behaviours, we 
are disgusted seeing all that, then Allah will grant us, because our attitude will 
repent for our other sins, if we hate all misbehaviour that could lead to great 
sins. 
 
People are told not only to avoid committing moral crimes but they are also 
encouraged to hate them. This narrative could lead to alienation or violence towards 
those committing the moral crimes as people were told if they hate the crimes it can 
repent for their other sins. This is what Peters (2005, p.30) referred to as the vertical 
dimension of the law, in which it claims to affect the reward and punishment in the 
afterlife. The concept of repentance itself is strongly associated with the hereafter, as 
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in the caning ceremony people were told those who repent during their life would be 
forgiven and will be sinless.  
During preaching, one woman in the audience standing nearby me was 
whispering “that person who is speaking (the sermon), is he pure (clean) himself?”. 
Meanwhile another said to me, those who got this punishment are mostly poor people, 
high up people who are cheating (committing adultery) would not got any 
punishment. The unjust treatment within the implementation of shari’a in Aceh has 
been mentioned in other cases as well. During dress raids for example, the shari’a 
police have been criticised for only targeting people who ride motorbikes, while those 
who drive cars have never been touched.22 This unjust treatment was also mentioned 
by Insana, a local woman I interviewed. She admitted having certain privilege, which 
make her untouched by the law. She gave an example of a veil raid, in 1999. 
 
“When did the Islamic Shari’a start to occur? It was near the end of the conflict. 
It began with cutting women’s hair. So, back then women who did not veil were 
subject to social norms. Her hair would be cut and else[other punishment]. And 
who were affected? Those who do not have a car to travel. I am safe, Des [my 
name]. Why? Because I have driven since I was in high school. So, I am safe, no 
one can touch me inside the car. But those who use public transport, they would 
not dare. Why? Because in the public transport their hair would be cut”.  
 
This highlights the unjust application of shari’a which make some people in the 
society relatively untouched, while others are prone to any form of disciplinary event 
or punishment.  
Back to the caning ceremony, the sermon ended his speech by reading a pray 
before beginning the caning penalty. The officer read the verdict, “The Shari’a Court 
verdict, In the name of God the most gracious, the most merciful. In the name of 
justice based on belief to one almighty God…”. The officer read the crime committed 
by the offenders and followed by reading all their personal details from complete 
name, their parents’ name, place and date of birth, age, sex, nationality, address, 
religion, occupation and education. The reading of all the offenders’ identities through 
loudspeakers not only shames them but also their families, and all other identities 
associated with them such as their place of birth. For example, during the reading of 
the verdict, when the officer mentioned the place of birth of the punished, I heard a 
person in the audience say, “this person embarrassed Sigli” (a town in Aceh). Hence 
                                                22	https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/pemotor-di-aceh-kena-razia-baju-ketat-pengendara-mobil-aman.html	
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the government claim in Qanun no. 11/2002 that this kind of punishment is risk free is 
not necessarily true, for the aforementioned reasons. 
On the caning ceremony that day, there were three kind of moral crimes 
committed by the offenders. The first couple were punished by eight lashes each for 
committing khalwat. The second couple were sentenced to 25 lashes each for 
committing ikhtilath, however only the man was punished because many of the 
audience said his partner was currently pregnant which make the punishment 
temporarily postponed. The last couple got 100 lashes each for committing zina. 
People were surprised when they heard there were 25 to 100 lashes punishment, as 
they did not expect to see that many. The final number received would be the number 
mentioned according to the law minus the time they had spent in jail during detention 
time. 
After reading all the verdicts, the officer once again warned people that the 
event was only for those aged 18 and over, so those coming with children were 
advised to leave the area. Still, many parents and their children stayed around, and 
some under aged children were not accompanied by their parents. One audience 
member even argued that it was fine for children to watch the event so they could 
learn how not to make the same mistake. 
The officer with the megaphone asked all the officers in charge of the caning 
ceremony to get ready for the caning as well as the offenders. The first man stepped 
on to the stage guarded by two male shari’a police officers who brought him to stand 
in the middle, watched by everyone who had been there since morning to witness this 
public event. The officer who was to perform the caning had been waiting to do his 
job on the stage. Wearing a brown outfit and full-face mask to hide his identity the 
officer stood on the left side behind the offender holding the regulation cane as per 













The officer started doing his job by giving the condemned bodies seven public lashes. 
After that, the second person who was a woman came on and knelt down in the 
middle of the stage. At this time, people were shouting ‘wooo’ at her. This highlighted 
the differences in how people treat men and women when they have committed moral 
crimes. 
The punishment ceremony continued with the man who committed ikhtilath 
and got 22 lashes. No one shouted ‘woo’ at him as they did towards the woman. After 
him, the officer called a man who had committed adultery to step on to the stage. It 
was, again, followed by shouts of ‘wooo’ shout by the audience. In many societies in 
Indonesia, Aceh in particular, adultery is considered as the worst violation, thus 
anyone found committing this act would receive harsh social punishment. 
When the man stood in the middle of the stage, I heard someone in the 
audience say, ‘he is small’, but no further comments were made which is different 
from the same comment I heard later on towards the women offender. The punisher 
started to flog him, and one woman (A1) in the audience said: 
A1: It is not painful 
Me: How come it is not painful? 
A1: You see that he is just like this (showing that the punished man was 
just being quiet), it means he is not in pain. Tomorrow he will do it again 
a hundred times 
Me: Ya Allah (Oh God…) 
A1: Do not worry, it is to give a deterrent effect, he will commit (the 
(the same crimes) again if … (does not continue her sentence) 
Figure 5.1. Male Offenders 
punished in public caning 
ceremony 
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Other A2: He needs to buy strength medication (energy booster 
medication) 
A3: Be strong a bit more (gives support-whispering) 
A4: When it is finished, do it again (the crimes), do it again on Saturday night 
 
The last person punished that day was a woman who had committed adultery 
and got 100 lashes. During this caning, there were two officers prepared to swap 
responsibilities after every 20 lashes. One officer read her verdict, she stepped onto 
the stage guarded by two female shari’a police officers who took her to kneel down in 
the middle. 
 
One member of the audience said, “I should have brought a tongsis (a selfie 
stick for a mobile phone), so I would not be tired [recording the event]”. When the 
officer started the caning, I heard someone in the audience say, “a bit harder, so (she) 
will not repeat it again next time”; another said, “that’s her fault committing this, 
embarrassing her mother”; “the clothes [they wore] must be double”. Some others also 
talked about the size of her body that was small and some others replied “there is no 
way she is small, if she can do this [adultery, it] means she is already grown up. If she 
is already grown up but not knowing how to do it, she must be no longer attractive”. 
This comment highlights how being an adult single woman could be interpreted as not 
being attractive, a label that would not be given to a man. The public response during 
the ceremony showed how women were being subjected to more abuse and 
humiliation than the men. Some members of the audience specifically targeted women 
offenders who were punished. 
Figure 5.2: Female 
offender punished in 
public caning ceremony 
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Here, we can see gender assumptions and expectations toward women which 
seems conflicting and contradictory. At one point, women are seen as passive subjects 
particularly regarding their appearance and whether they are attractive for the opposite 
sex. Here, women are expected to be attractive to be able to attract men, while men 
are active subjects, the ones who have power to choose women they like and they find 
attractive. However, when it comes to moral crimes, women become the active 
subjects, the seducers that provoke men to sin. They are also often ‘branded’ as 
naughty and flirtatious and causing men to commit moral crimes. Here, the discourse 
of woman, as a seducer is produced and re-produced not only in everyday life as 
discussed in chapter four, but also during a public punishment ceremony. 
The caning ceremony implemented is also gendered, particularly regarding 
men and women’s position during the punishment. GR no. 10 (2005) gives no 
explanation regarding this. Three of the four Sunni schools of law rule that men must 
stand and women must kneel during punishment (see Al-Mawsu'a al-fiqhiyyah, 1989, 
p.248). This rule is sometimes attributed to Ali bin Abi Thalib (companion and son-in- 
law of the Prophet) who is reported to have said that a woman must kneel while being 
flogged (Musannaf Abd al-Razzaq al-San'ani [d. circa 827 CE]; number 13530). The 
requirement for women may be concerned with protecting their modesty, to minimize 
the impact on them or to protect them, however at the same time it also perpetuates 
the idea that women are weaker than men and reproduces the concept of masculinity 
and gender hierarchy. 
Through this public caning ceremony, control over women’s bodies is being 
disseminated and sustained. Women are expected to be attractive and weaker than 
men, and their appearance also needs to be regulated so they have to kneel during 
punishment, women need to be covered so they do not distract or seduce men and they 
need to be protected by imposing partial curfew (as discussed in chapter 4). 
 On the other hand, the caning ceremony, which is intended to be a lesson, is 
seen more as a public spectacle. Instead of learning and taking that moment to 
consider the ‘moral crimes’, it becomes entertainment which people record and 
publish on their social media, some even make jokes or laugh over it. At the same 
time, it is a place where people see how the state endorses the use of violence to 
punish people. By showcasing the caning ceremony to the public, the authorities also 
transfer the fear to the people, exposing what will happen if they breach the 
regulations. The government exhibits violence as the ‘appropriate and lawful way’ to 
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punish people. The justification of violence could be used by some people or vigilante 
groups to conduct their own raids and punish those who are considered to be 
breaching local values as mandated in qanun, especially as people are also encouraged 
to hate the crimes in the sermons given during the public caning ceremony. 
Additionally, even though authorities forbid children and those under 18 years old 
from watching the ceremony, many did so and one person in the audience responded 
by saying, “Let them watch it so they know they should not do that (breaching moral 
values) in the future”. 
 The ceremony also involved lots of religious symbolism, from the place 
chosen, sequence of events which includes Quran recitation, a sermon and prayers. 
The use of religious discourse is to justify that the judgment of the government is the 
judgment of God. Humans have the power to punish offenders in the name of God. 
Here, the power is exercised in a chain from the lawmaker, the judicial court, to the 
officer during the caning ceremony. It is then transferred to the people who think that 
the offenders deserve the punishment and being humiliated as they have breached the 
shari’a law which is not just a law for them but also part of their identities as 
Muslims. 
During the ceremony, even though many were shouting at the offenders and 
trying to embarrass them, by making fun and jokes about them, there were a few who 
showed empathy; some women tried to give support to them and wish them to be 
strong. However, they chose to whisper their empathy to the person next to them, 
which meant their voices were less heard. This might be because they did not want to 
look different amidst the crowd and be seen as supporting the moral crimes. People 
avoid looking different in a society that is getting more homogenised through 
religious discourse (see chapter 4). Being different could be seen as against the norm 
that potentially leads to exclusion. Additionally, some people who disagree with the 
punishment may have chosen not to watch the ceremony as they found it only 
humiliates the offenders and they do not want to perpetuate the idea. One local 
woman, Insana gave her view: 
 
And in my opinion, regardless whether caning is allowed or not in Islam, so 
here I discuss about it outside the religious context, I think I might have 
commented about it on Desy’s (social media). In my opinion regarding the 
public caning, those who watch it, they do not get any good spiritual message. 
Because we comment about other people’s sins, while at the same time we 
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watch others being punished for their sins. We, ourselves are full of sins, so I 
am not sure if it’s a good spiritual experience for the audience. Again, this is 
outside the religious context.  
 
This illustrates that some try to challenge the dominant hegemony through different 
ways. Discussion about how women negotiate and challenge dominant hegemony will 
be elaborated in detail in chapter six. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights how the practice of corporal punishment remains in the 
post-colonial state, either as a product inherited directly from the coloniser’s law or as 
a result of transformation of the judicial system during the colonial era. The case of 
Indonesia emphasises how the death penalty which still exists in the KUHP today was 
inherited from Dutch law, the WvSNI, which was introduced in 1918. Meanwhile, 
Dutch policy during the occupation in Indonesia also changed the character and 
practice of the dual judicial system in Indonesia in the pre-colonial era, in which 
Islamic law and Adat law worked together supporting each other. This thesis argues 
the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh today inherited some legacy from the 
Dutch judicial system in at least two aspects: 1) codification of law into one fixed 
standard, neglecting diversities in religious text interpretation; and 2) the 
state/colonial/local government roles with all their supportive institutions to construct 
the legal standard, monitor and reinforce the implementation in the society. This 
system created an elite, a hierarchy and bureaucracy that aimed to maintain power, 
control and domination in the colony. Thus, the application of modern day shari’a, 
which is often claimed to be against Western values, has indeed retained the legacy of 
European colonialism. 
Earlier in this chapter I mentioned Foucault’s four major transitions of 
punishment from the pre-modern to modern era in the European context: the 
termination of punishment as a spectacle; the focus of punishment on the criminal not 
the crime; the judicial sentences no longer determined by the judges who impose 
punishments in conformity with the law but rather by ‘experts’ such as psychiatrists or 
social workers; and punishment as reform and rehabilitation instead of retribution 
(Gutting, 2005). This chapter demonstrates that punishment as public display remains 
in Aceh, following the implementation of the public caning ceremony, first mentioned 
in Qanun no. 11 (2002). In a public caning ceremony, what is punished is the crime 
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and not just the criminal, but only for certain crimes, particularly those regarding 
morality. The penalty applied to the criminal is determined by the judge in conformity 
with the qanun that stipulates the type and amount of punishment for every crime. The 
public caning ceremony is also considered as retribution in the name of enforcing 
justice as stated in the verdict read during the ceremony. It is also claimed as a way 
for the criminals to repent from their crimes which are considered as sins. 
To conclude, this chapter demonstrates that what Foucault considered as the 
character of punishment in the pre-modern era, is still applied in today’s post-colonial 
state, Indonesia. The public caning ceremony punishes people in two ways by: 1) 
tormenting the body physically and 2) torturing the offenders psychologically by 
shaming them in public as well as causing possible distress during detention prior to 
punishment. The shame experienced does not end after the ceremony, as people can 
remember their face and identities as they are announced to the public. In addition to 
that, the effects might go beyond local territory as people take photos and videos and 
send them to others or even post them on social media without censoring the 
offender’s face. 
The modernisation of the judicial system during the colonial period as 
discussed in this chapter brought some changes to the character and practice of 
Islamic law which was plural and fluid during the pre-modern era. Islamic law in the 
modern era tends to eliminate the pluralism of opinion on religious text interpretation 
and promotes homogenisation through its codification into fixed standards or laws. 
Unlike the pre-modern era in which Islamic law was in the hand of jurists, in the 
modern application of Islamic law, the state or government and its institutions 
monopolise the codification, implementation and reinforcement of Islamic law.  
Overall, this chapter highlights that the public caning ceremony within the 
application of Islamic law in Aceh incorporates Foucault’s character of pre-modern 
(physical) and modern (psychological) punishment. Additionally, the application of 
Islamic law in Aceh has also inherited the character of ‘modern law’ brought by the 
colonial system, as described above. 
This chapter also sheds further light on how gender is constructed,  how men 
and women should behave,  and how punishment is conducted under Aceh’s shari’a, 
particularly in relation to the public caning ceremony where men and women are 
treated differently. This highlights different gender constructions and expectations, 
which perpetuate gender hierarchy. 
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People also treat women offenders differently, as they were humiliated more 
verbally during the ceremony. Women are often seen as the guardians of morality 
(Collins and Bahar, 2000), hence being punished for breaching moral values is not 
only an embarrassment for themselves, but also their parents who will be judged that 
they cannot taking care and teaching good morals to their daughters. Women are 
expected to be self-effacing because they represent the society’s honour and are 
considered the face of shari’a in Aceh (see discussion in chapter 4).  
The most fundamental value of Islamic law is to protect the common good of 
humankind (Black et al., 2013), Islam is viewed as a mercy to all creation (rahmatan 
lil-‘ alamin). In 2005, the Islamic scholar, Tariq Ramadan asked the Islamic world to 
suspend corporal punishment, stoning and the death penalty. 23  He argued the 
conditions required in order to implement corporal punishment as mentioned in the 
sacred texts are difficult to re-establish, which make the application of hudud (divine 
punishment) “almost never applicable” in modern society (Ramadan, 2005). He was 
also concerned about the repressive and unjust application of Islamic law in many 
societies all over the world, which often targeted poor and powerless people.  
Here, I would like to emphasise, this research is neither based on an aversion 
towards Islamic law, nor on sentiment towards Western. I would argue the 
formalisation of shari’a has brought religion into the political domain, which makes it 
prone to any particular interest. As a Muslim, I believe Islam is a mercy to all 
creation. Hence, Islamic law should prioritise public interest rather than only focus on 
people’s private lives and morality that does no harm to others. Like Tariq 
Ramadhan’s statement regarding corporal punishment in Islam, I also refuse to be 
silent amidst “the unjust application of my religious references”.24 The construction 
and application of Islamic law in many societies is subject to Islamic scholars’ thought 
in the region. The sacred texts might need to be revisited and reinterpreted amidst the 
dynamic in contemporary society (Black et al., 2013, p.237). However, monopoly 
over the interpretation of sacred text by the state removes any discussion and debates 
amongst religious scholars, which was the common practice in the pre-modern time. 
  
                                                23	https://tariqramadan.com/an-international-call-for-moratorium-on-corporal-punishment-stoning-and-the-death-penalty-in-the-islamic-world/#leg3	24	https://tariqramadan.com/an-international-call-for-moratorium-on-corporal-punishment-stoning-and-the-death-penalty-in-the-islamic-world/	
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Chapter 6. Shari’a and Women 
 In chapter 4, I explained how shari’a regulates men and women and showed that 
the local practice regulates women more than men. In this chapter, I will explore how 
women respond to shari’a regulations about their bodies. My aim is to investigate 
how women negotiate with all the regulations applied to their bodies, as well as 
gender role expectation in the society, and how they perform their agency, 
particularly, to gain position in public space.  
In looking at how women in Aceh negotiate these regulations I will be 
emphasising women’s agency, in contrast to the way that women in the Global South 
are often portrayed in the West as passive victims who need to be ‘saved’ by 
Westerners. I would therefore like to begin this chapter by looking critically at these 
portrayals.  
America did not go to war in Afghanistan so that women there could once 
again feel the sun on their faces, but the reclaimed freedom of Afghan 
women is a collateral benefit that Americans can celebrate. After five 
years of Taliban rule, women in Afghanistan are uncovering their faces, 
looking for jobs, walking happily with female friends on the street and 
even hosting a news show on Afghan television. (The New York Times, 
24.11.2001)  
 
I remember reading this article titled “Liberating the Women of Afghanistan” 
which highlighted the US war on terror in Afghanistan and how it brought ‘freedom’ 
for women by unveiling them. The US media and some feminist movements 
celebrated this liberation of women from the Taliban, who claimed its aim was to 
impose (their interpretation) of Islamic law.  
Unveiling women has always been perceived as an effort to liberate them, as if 
their dress has curbed them from anything they could possibly do. As Rich (2014) 
said, since the dawn of European colonialism veiled women have been used to 
symbolise oppression towards women in Islam, discourse which was used to justify 
the colonialist enterprises (see also chapter 3). During French colonialism in Algeria 
for example, unveiling women was one of the main political doctrines promoted by 
the coloniser in the name of civilising and liberating Algerian women from the Arab 
patriarchal culture. As Fanon (1965, p.37-38) wrote:  
If we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for 
resistance, we must first of all conquer the women; we must go and find them 
behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where the men 
keep them out of sight. 
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Fanon highlights how French colonialists described Algerians as barbaric and 
uncivilised, so they needed to liberate the women and bring them to civilisation. 
Throughout history, women’s bodies, the veil and Islam have been a contestation 
space. The veil is often seen as a symbol of women’s subordination to men or 
associated with Islamic fundamentalism (Butler, 2009, p.123, Brenner, 2018). It is 
also often associated with backwardness and the unveiling often indicates that one has 
adopted the ‘advanced’ values of Western modernisation (see Ahmed, 2011). In 1899 
for instance, Qassim Amin, an Egyptian lawyer who was also known as a women’s 
rights advocate, published a book Tahrir al-marah (The Liberation of Women) in 
which he emphasised the need for cultural and social transformation in Egypt, 
particularly by abolishing women’s veil (Ahmed, 1992). Women’s bodies are trapped 
between those who want to “protect” and “liberate” them by veiling or unveiling 
them. This was also the discourse during the US war on terror in Afghanistan. 
The twin figures of the Islamic fundamentalist and his female victim 
consolidate and popularize the view that such hardship and sacrifice [is] 
for Afghanistan's own good. Following the September 11th attacks, the 
clad body of the Afghan woman became the visible sign of an invisible 
[one] that threatens not only “us” citizens of the West, but our entire 
civilisation. (Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p.341)  
 
 Restrictions put by the Taliban towards women such as prohibiting them from 
employment, forcing them to wear the veil, particularly the burqa which covers their 
body head to toe, has given the West a way of, once again borrowing Spivak’s term, 
“saving brown women from brown men”. The Taliban’s harsh treatment towards 
women brought justification for the Western military allies to rescue and liberate 
them, which was symbolised by the unveiling from their dress. As First Lady of the 
US, Laura Bush claimed “Because of our recent military gains in much of 
Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. They can listen to 
music and teach their daughters without fear of punishment”.25 The US military 
invasion in Afghanistan claimed to have freed Afghan women and brought them to 
civilisation where they can listen to music, as if this is what Afghan women wanted. 
Within history, the West often portrays itself as the saviour and the one who 
brings civilisation to women in the Global South. In 1820, it was the British East India 
                                                25	https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/articles/2013/02/radio-address-by-mrs-laura-w-bush-crawford-tx-november-17-2001.html	
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Company that was the ‘saviour’ of India’s woman from the practice of sati or self-
immolation of a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre (Zakaria, 2015). Almost two 
centuries later, it was the US military and its allies who were the saviour of women in 
Afghanistan, in other words, the West once again saved women in the Global South 
from their gruesome religious/local culture as well as male patriarchy. Even though 
the Taliban and Western attitudes seem in contrast, both attitudes represent forms of 
control over women which serve political power and interest and at the same time 
undermine women’s agency.  
Islam is often portrayed as a religion with a strong patriarchal culture and the 
application of Islamic law is often described as restricting and marginalising women. 
In one of the most provocative articles published in Time, Lisa Beyer (2001) wrote 
about ‘Women in Islam’ in which she said “it is clear that the religion has been used 
in most Muslim countries not to liberate but to entrench inequality”. Her article goes 
on to describe women’s marginal roles in Islam, from inheritance law, polygamous 
culture and easy male access to divorce, a husband’s right to beat his wife, female 
genital mutilation, to the “most common debate” about Muslim women, that is, 
veiling. As mentioned earlier, the veil is often seen as a symbol of oppression and 
women’s subordination in Arab/Muslim culture. In her article, Beyer further claimed 
that women achieved the greatest degree of equality only when they left Islamic law 
in favour of secular rule. This narrative is rooted in Eurocentric/Orientalist 
epistemological assumptions of the eternal male patriarchy of Arab/Muslim cultures 
that determined women’s subordination (Said et al., 2015). This assumption led to the 
belief that women in Arab/Muslim societies needed to be saved from their men and 
their ‘oppressive’ culture. This is how the “white man’s burden” (borrowing Rudyard 
Kipling’s term) is being preserved and this time upon the veiled women of 
Afghanistan. The West once again has set a standard of liberation for women of all 
cultures and backgrounds. 
The stories above are one of the reasons that attracted my interest toward 
women and the implementation of shari’a in Aceh, Indonesia. Indonesian Islam is 
often described as “the Smiling Face of Islam” (Moazzam, 2012), however, since the 
collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 much has changed, including the birth and 
rise of Regional Islamic Regulations (Perda Syariah) in many provinces in the 
country as well as the autonomous implementation of shari’a in Aceh. According to 
Buehler (2016) between 1998 to 2013 alone there were 443 shari’a regulations 
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adopted in Indonesia, which clustered in six provinces: Aceh, West Java (including 
new province of Banten), East Java, West Sumatera, South Kalimantan, and South 
Sulawesi. Buehler and Muhtada (2016) analysed the content of 422 local shari’a 
regulations in Indonesia following Bush’s (2008) categorisation. According to Bush 
(2008) the first category is directly linked to Islamic teaching which includes rules 
related to religious skills and obligations such as Quran recitation and paying zakat, 
praying requirement, as well as rules regarding religious symbolism like Islamic attire. 
The second category is about moral teaching which includes regulations regarding 
“public order and social problems” such as gambling, alcohol drinking and 
prostitution. Buehler and Muhtada found that 60 percent or 252 regulations are about 
Islamic teaching and 40 percent or 170 rules are about regulating morality. Their 
research further detailed the contents of Islamic teaching are 25 percent regulating 
zakat, 23 percent is about Islamic knowledge and skills, 15 percent regarding micro-
finance, 11 percent regulations to foster “proper faith” and prohibit “islamic sects” 
particularly mentioning Ahmadiyah, 10 percent regulates Muslim attire, and 16 
percent regarding other issues relating to Islamic teachings (Buehler and Muhtada, 
2016, p.268). Meanwhile, regarding morality issues, the majority of the regulations or 
51 percent (85 regulations out of 168) were about banning alcohol consumption, 29 
percent prohibiting prostitution, two percent banning gambling, and the remaining 18 
percent are about promoting “social order” and “prohibiting sins” (Buehler and 
Muhtada, 2016, p.269). Thus, there are about 90 regulations, which arguably 
specifically pertain to women, that is regulations regarding Muslim attire and 
prostitution. Even though the former usually do not mention in detail how women’s 
outfits should be, in practice it is often interpreted as wearing a veil and sometimes 
including prohibiting them from wearing trousers (for example, in Aceh, see chapter 
4). Meanwhile regarding prostitution, it is also often associated with women, because 
they are the ones who are often portrayed as the seducer (as discussed in chapter 4). 
 Pisani and Buehler (2016) categorised shari’a regulations into three different 
types depending on their potential appeal to constituencies. The first category consists 
of regulations that mainly appeal to local governments and are most likely supply 
driven, such as zakat which will bring cash to be regulated by the government, as tax 
would be undeniably a more unpopular policy. The second category relates to 
regulations that increase patronage and lets the authorities expand their networks or 
gain support from respected people, which could be their vote-getters, such as by 
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promoting Islamic knowledge teaching through Islamic education which could 
potentially boost the government’s popularity amongst Islamic scholars. The last 
category involves regulations that aim to appeal to the constituent, such as dress code, 
which could potentially increase the local government’s Islamic credentials and boost 
their political popularity. 
 The research above showed that legislation of shari’a regulations has gained 
popularity in recent years. In Indonesia, although many provinces have legalised 
some, it is only Aceh which has the autonomous right to implement shari’a fully, 
particularly since 2002. Aceh’s formulation of shari’a has raised controversy since the 
first shari’a regulation came into effect, Qanun no.11/2002, which required people to 
wear Islamic attire. Even though the law regulates men and women, in practice 
women are affected the most, as they are required to cover their aurat by covering the 
whole body with a loose-fitting dress except the hands and face, and to wear a jilbab 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010c), while men are only required to cover between the 
navel and knee. Human Rights Watch said the law has denied many people especially 
poor people, women and youths their rights to express their faith, identity and morals. 
Therefore, to raise the same question asked by Lila Abu-Lughod (2002), “Do Muslim 
women really need saving?” (2002). The next section will critically analyse a range of 
definitions and concepts of agency applied to the context of Aceh. 
6.1 Agency and the Subaltern 
Religious traditions are often described as denying women’s agency, marginalising 
their roles and privileging men. In the context of Islam, for example, as mentioned 
early in this chapter, Muslim women are often seen as victims of Arab/Islamic 
patriarchy (Pratt, 2013, Said et al., 2015, Mahmood, 2005), and often portrayed as 
subordinate, helpless and in need of being liberated from their native patriarchal 
culture and religion. 
In chapter 4, I discuss how Aceh’s shari’a regulates men and women in the 
society. The chapter highlights that women encountered more regulations and 
restrictions under local shari’a compared to men, which raises some questions for me 
about whether they need to be saved from their own culture and religious tradition. 
Are they subordinate, dependent, secondary, and unproductive as de Beauvoir (1953) 
would suggest? In this chapter I want to discuss how women perform their agency? 
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How do they challenge the narrative in their society that tries to limit their access to 
leadership in public space? (see chapter 4). How do they negotiate with the traditional 
gender roles expecting women to be responsible for nurturing their children? In order 
to answer these questions, I would like to elaborate what is meant by women’s 
agency. In this section, I will discuss different notions of agency, beginning with the 
concept from the World Bank and de Beauvoir that I found unhelpful, then moving on 
to some others that I found more helpful, such as those from Nancy McNay and Saba 
Mahmood.  
I would like to begin with the definition of agency from the World Bank 
because as an international donor organisation the institution does not only have 
programmes and policies to promote women’s agency but also raises funding for 
those programme in many countries, particularly the Global South. For instance, In 
Aceh and some other areas in Indonesia that were hit by natural disasters, like Nias 
and Yogyakarta, the World Bank serves as trustee for the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) 
for Aceh and Nias, which pools USD 655 million from 15 donors, and the Java 
Reconstruction Fund (JRF) which pools USD 94.1 million from seven donors (MDF-
JRF Secretariat, 2012). The MDF and JRF funded projects brought some programmes 
to those areas to promote gender equality and empowering women as well as 
strengthening their voice and agency in the post-disaster reconstruction. It can also 
dictate the policy reforms of donor-recipient countries (Jahan, 1997). Thus, I believe it 
is important to see how the organisation defines women’s agency as this represents the 
policy they bring to the countries of the Global South. 
According to The World Bank (2012), agency is “an individual’s (or group’s) 
ability to make effective choices and to transform those choices into desired 
outcomes”. Another report by the World Bank described agency as “the capacity to 
make decisions about one’s own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, 
free of violence, retribution, or fear (Klugman et al., 2014, p.1). From these 
definitions, agency is associated with freedom and choice, then how are these defined 
when it comes to women’s agency? According to the World Bank, agency is 
associated with five elements: “control over resources” (ability to earn money and 
own materials), “ability to move freely” (freedom to go anywhere outside the house), 
“decision making over family formation” (freedom of regarding relationships and 
married life), “freedom from the risk of violence” such as domestic abuse, and “ability 
to have a voice in society and influence policy” by engagement in decision making 
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institutions (The World Bank, 2012, p.150). Arguably, this definition is based on 
assumptions about gendered public and private space. 
In discussing agency and the subaltern in this chapter, debates about domestic 
and public space take a central position. The public domain is often associated with 
men and masculinity, while the private one with women and femininity (Hearn, 1992, 
p.2). However, I found such a classification problematic as it needs to be located and 
situated within various times, cultures and traditions. Narratives of domestic and 
public space often justify political moves to ‘liberate’ women of some cultures, as in 
the case of Afghanistan and Algeria mentioned earlier. 
In discussing gendered space, I would like to discuss further the work of 
Simone de Beauvoir through her book The Second Sex in which she argued that 
domestic responsibilities have strangled women from their liberation. In this kind of 
situation, she argued that for a man, it is his wife’s responsibilities to do all the 
housework as well as looking after the children. De Beauvoir claimed the jobs carried 
out by women are mostly repetitive and unproductive, “woman’s work within the 
home gives her no autonomy; it is not directly useful to the society; it does not open 
out on the future; it produces nothing” (De Beauvoir, 1953, p.442-443). For de 
Beauvoir, women with all their domestic responsibilities are subordinate, dependent, 
secondary and unproductive hence not autonomous. While women are occupied with 
household duties, according to de Beauvoir, men benefit from their responsibility to 
bring income to the household because they can perform self-realisation in work and 
action. Here, I found de Beauvoir’s account strongly based on economic benefit in 
which men’s engagement in paid labour is seen as enabling them to perform self-
realisation, while women’s work at home is considered repetitive and unproductive as 
it counts as unpaid labour, making them secondary and not autonomous. 
First, I would argue against de Beauvoir’s claims regarding domestic job as 
repetitive as many paid jobs are also repetitive, for example, assembly line work, but 
de Beauvoir does not criticise that, probably as it is a paid labour. Secondly, when de 
Beauvoir claims that the domestic space makes women subordinate, dependant, 
secondary and lacking in autonomy, this was based on her experience of living in the 
European/Western society. As Evans (1998) highlighted, de Beauvoir’s works did not 
discuss society outside Western Europe, as they mainly focus on the French bourgeois 
culture which was misogynist and denied women public agency. However, as a 
leading feminist thinker, her work has been read and has inspired many feminists’ 
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works. The Second Sex, was a best seller in the Global North (Evans, 1998) and her 
words “One is not born but rather becomes, a woman” have been quoted either in 
academic works or popular articles all over the world, from the Global North to the 
Global South, and even chosen as an inspirational remark to celebrate International 
Women’s Day.26 Thus, even though de Beauvoir was discussing French society at that 
time, her work has been read and used widely until today and inspired many feminist 
thinkers as well as the feminist movement even though it might not have been de 
Beauvoir’s aim for her work to be used to describe women’s experiences from many 
different backgrounds. I also do not say that de Beauvoir is entirely wrong about her 
argument, however, when she referred to women’s domestic tasks and responsibility 
making them secondary, lacking in autonomy and dependant, in some other cultures 
those responsibilities could be seen as positive for women. For example, the 
traditional matrifocal culture in Aceh positioned women as the house owner with 
many powers including the right to ask her husband to leave if she wanted to (see 
chapter 3). Thus, what de Beauvoir called domestic space, in the case of the matrifocal 
culture women had many powers to act as autonomous beings. Western feminists 
often use women’s experiences in the Global North as a standard for the experience of 
all women, which is often used to judge the freedom of women from the Global 
South. I would argue the definitions of freedom or agency need to be situated, and 
associating agency with paid work further marginalises any unpaid work associated 
with domestic space. 
Debates about domestic and public space also needs to be re-contextualised. A 
house now could also be a workplace, while for others it is a space to gather with 
friends or to hold a public meeting. Hence, I would argue a house can no longer be 
seen merely as domestic space. This discussion will be elaborated further in the next 
section. 
De Beauvoir also claimed women’s domestic role made her secondary. She 
claimed a woman’s “occupation makes her dependent upon husband and children; she 
is justified through them; but in their lives she is only an inessential intermediary” (De 
Beauvoir, 1953, p.443). She even believes that a woman’s decision to marry and 
                                                26	See;	https://www.theguardian.com/books/1999/jun/06/classics.simonedebeauvoir;	https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-quite-clearly-the-second-sex-2727363;	https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/life-style/relationships/love-sex/womens-day-quotes-images-wishes-messages-status-greeting-15-powerful-quotes-by-famous-authors-to-celebrate-international-womens-day/articleshow/68302831.cms	
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become a mother is like selling herself into slavery (Patterson, 1986, p.87). Here I 
would like to highlight that the position of women and mothers in the context of 
Indonesia is distinct, in three main respects.  
First, unlike in the majority Western countries, most ethnicities in Indonesia do 
not take the family name from the father or husband; there are only a few ethnicities, 
such as the Batak, with a family name, for example. Hence, one is not known because 
of their ‘paternal name’ or husband’s name, but rather as the child of their parents, 
both mother and father. Therefore, a woman does not change her last name following 
marriage. 27  In general, there is no last name in Indonesian society, so most 
Indonesians have only one name. 
Secondly, de Beauvoir’s account does not apply to cultures with a matrifocal 
tradition, such as Aceh, as previously discussed (see chapter 3). Even though this 
tradition has changed in the present day, it is important to acknowledge the cultural 
relativity to avoid homogenising all women’s experiences as the same. 
Third, in Indonesia particularly in Muslim communities a mother is highly 
respected by their children even more than their father. There is a saying ‘surga di 
telapak kaki ibu’ which literally means that ‘heaven is underneath a mother’s feet’. 
This saying is well known in Indonesia and even made into songs citing the words and 
asking people to be obedient to their mother. Some argue this saying comes from the 
Prophet Muhammad - ‘al-jannatu tahta aqdam al-ummahat’ meaning ‘heaven is 
underneath a mother’s feet’, while some others question the validity (Republika, 
2019). Nevertheless, people believe that children must be respectful and devoted to 
their mother. They are expected to obey their mother and not be rebellious against her. 
Within Muslim society in Indonesia, we are often told a story about when someone 
asked the Prophet Muhammad who should be respected the most in this world, and the 
prophet says, “your mother” three times, and only after that he said, “your father”. 
                                                27	My	mother	for	instance,	did	not	change	her	name	following	marriage	with	my	father,	so	her	name	is	still	the	same	as	when	she	was	born.	Meanwhile,	for	me	Desy	Ayu	Pirmasari	is	a	full	name	in	which	Pirmasari	is	not	my	last	name,	neither	name	I	inherit	from	my	father	whose	name	was	only	one	word,	Firmansyah.	As	I	lived	in	my	mother’s	town	when	I	was	born,	people	know	me	more	as	the	daughter	of	my	mother	instead	of	my	father,	but	when	I	moved	to	my	father’s	town	then	people	knew	me	more	as	the	daughter	of	my	father.	So,	one	is	known	as	the	daughter	or	son	of	someone	based	on	familiarity	either	with	the	father	or	the	mother.	A	woman	is	often	referred	to	as	the	mother	of	her	oldest	child	for	example,	if	the	oldest	child	in	the	family	is	named	Adriana,	the	mother	would	be	called	‘Mama	Adriana’	or	‘Adriana’s	Mother’,	and	the	same	applies	to	the	father.	
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Additionally, there is much local folklore about karma or bad luck for not respecting 
one’s mother. The most famous one is the story about Malin Kundang, a man who 
was condemned to be a stone after insulting his mother. Another famous is ‘Batu 
Menangis’ or ‘the Crying Stone’, a story about a young woman who turned into stone 
after disrespecting her mother. Respect towards the mother can also be seen from 
‘sungkem’ culture in Javanese society and some other societies in Indonesia. The 
Indonesian dictionary defines ‘sungkem’ as ‘sujud (tanda bakti dan hormat)’ meaning 
prostration (a sign of devotion and respect),28 to do this one is expected to bend one’s 
knees and kiss the hand or knees of the elderly. The sungkem tradition is often held in 
some traditional ceremonies such as weddings and during the celebration of Eid 
Mubarak. People usually do sungkem to those they respect the most, particularly the 
elderly women in the family such as mother and grandmother (Cahyono, 2018).29  
As in many other societies including the Western hemisphere, In Indonesian 
society a woman is expected to be the main carer, ‘the first school’ for their children, 
their position is highly respected and they have their own autonomy to perform 
agency. As the main educator for the children, a mother is their first source of 
knowledge which they often refer to. During my fieldwork, I often hear people saying 
to me, ‘my mother said…’. This was also mentioned by Snouck Hurgronje as well in 
his classical work on the Acehnese where he called women the “hereditary guardians 
of old-fashioned words and expressions”. Many people he met would say they must 
refer to their wives or mothers to get answers for many questions he asked (Hurgronje, 
1906a). In everyday life, people refer to their mother’s advice, and arguing against a 
parent, particularly a mother, is very taboo or even seen as something that could lead 
to bad karma (see also:Kloos, 2018 ). This highlights women’s position in a more 
positive light within Indonesian culture. 
These above concepts of agency from the World Bank and de Beauvoir were 
unhelpful for my context. So now, I will move on to some more helpful notions of 
agency. McNay (2000, p.10) defined it as “the capacity for autonomous action in the 
face of often overwhelming cultural sanctions and cultural inequalities”. Here, McNay 
                                                28	https://kbbi.web.id/sungkem	29	Cahyono	highlights	five	meaning	of	sungkem:	1)	it	symbolised	respect;2)	devotion;3)	a	way	 of	 saying	 thank	 you;4)	 asking	 for	 pardon	 and;5)	 pleading.	 He	 emphasised	 in	wedding	ceremony	sungkem	represent	devotion	of	the	children	towards	their	parents,	a	way	of	saying	thank	you	for	raising	them	as	well	as	a	moment	to	ask	for	the	parents	bless	for	their	marriage	life,	so	their	married	also	blessed	by	God.	
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does not talk about resistance but places more emphasis on one’s autonomous acts, 
whereas Isaacs (2002, p.129), for example, describes agency as women’s ability to be 
effective agents to resist sexist oppression. For Isaacs, the moral agent should be 
independent, in-control, rational and have many different options as well as the right 
to choose from all alternatives. Isaacs (2002) claimed women’s agency is sometimes 
burdened by feminine socialisation which encourages women to be passive, maternal 
and nurturing, which makes women dependant and lack control over their own life. 
Another account that describes agency as a form of resistance is one by Linda Arthur 
(1998) who conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Holdeman Mennonite 
community. Arthur investigated how women resisted the social control of their bodies. 
Her works highlight how Mennonite women perform their agency by resisting control 
regarding their appearance, such as by secretly wearing ‘worldly’ outfits at school and 
make-up which were strictly controlled in the society. According to Arthur (1998) the 
united actions of Mennonite women have brought some changes in women’s dress 
code. 
Some scholars criticise defining agency merely as acts of resistance. 
According to Mahmood (2005, p.5) this view is typically based on “normative liberal 
assumptions” which believe that human beings naturally demand freedom and seek 
autonomy. Accordin to Bracke (2008, p.63) Mahmood’s concept of agency does not 
only see it as an act of resistance against the traditions, but she consider a multivariety 
of ways where the norm is resided and consummated. Mahmood (2005), analysed 
different modalities of agency performed by women mosque participants in Egypt. 
She highlights some practices in which women’s attachment to the patriarchal 
traditions do not only make them into subordinate subjects but also enable them to 
perform their agency. Here, I would like to follow Mahmood to challenge the 
normative liberal assumptions of women’s agency. I agree that agency sometimes 
takes the form of resistance against the norms, however, by defining agency only from 
this perspective we might have ignored any other forms of agency performed by 
women, which shaped and re-shaped the norms in the society. Additionally, seeing 
agency solely as form of resistance within religious communities would only 
perpetuate the idea that religion is oppressive, particularly Islam in this research, with 
women as its main victims; and at the same time would further demonise Muslim 
men. As Mahmood (2009) said, such a view only perpetuates prejudices, stereotypes 
of Islam and legitimises Islamophobia in Europe today, or other mostly non-Muslim 
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countries. Here, I would like to propose that agency should not merely be seen as an 
act against oppression. Like Mahmood, I want to highlight multiple forms of agency, 
including any effort to negotiate identities in order to gain desired outcomes. Thus, 
this chapter could be a contribution to the debates about the concept of agency in 
subaltern studies. 
6.2 Women and the Veil 
Banda Aceh, 10 October 2016 (field notes) 
I arrived at Laila’s house in the afternoon, she wore a veil and a long loose-
fitted dress like an abaya. She lives with her mother and her sisters. Her 
mother and one of her sisters was wearing a veil and the same kind of dress 
as her, and her other sister was wearing a niqab. Even though I was just 
wearing a scarf that I put on my head which sometimes fell to my shoulder, 
I did not feel judged by them regarding my appearance.  
When I was at her house, one of her cousins Ainah came, she was wearing 
trousers, a shirt and a veil. Ainah said to me she had just started wearing a 
veil, not because she was scared of the shari’a police, even though she had 
been caught in a dress raid twice, but because she got hidayah or had been 
‘enlightened’. She told me about her experiences of being caught in a raid 
twice for not wearing a veil. She is now veiled, she says she has ‘sudah 
mendapat hidayah’ or ‘already got enlightenment’, but she disagrees with 
the government’s way of forcing people to veil. She described her 
experiences of being caught during a dress raid for the second time. One of 
the male officers warned her and other people caught that time if they were 
found not wearing a veil once again in the future, he would send them to 
jail. Not long after that the officer realised, she had been caught before and 
this was her second time and he ran at her shouting “if I got you once 
again, I will put you in jail”. Ainah replied “up to you, please put me in 
jail” and then she just left. 
Like her cousin Ainah, Laila also disagrees with the veil obligation 
imposed by the government. She said ‘hidayah will come by itself to 
people, not by force from the government’. She regretted the application of 
shari’a in Aceh today which she thinks only regulates people’s morality. 
Laila said “the government is supposed to be focused on providing support 
which will attract people to be pious, like providing good praying facilities. 
It includes providing enough water for people to do ablutions, clean toilet 
facilities in mosques many of which are really dirty now as well as make 
people feel safe (so) people feel safe to pray”. 
 
Ainah’s case demonstrates various forms of agency, one is when she resisted 
the authorities who conducted the dress raids, while the other one is regarding her 
decision to veil after she considered she had already got hidayah. For many people, 
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Ainah’s decision to veil might be seen as an act of giving up and acceptance towards 
obligations imposed on her body through the local shari’a. However, as she 
emphasises that her decision was made because she had already got hidayah, God’s 
guidance that many people do not get. Hidayah means a guide or guidance from 
God.30 God only gives hidayah to some people so they become more pious. However, 
this term is often overused, as it sometimes only refers to when one starts doing things 
that are considered better, such as veiling. In Aceh, as well as Indonesian society in 
general, veiling is often seen as better, an expression of piety, and a positive change 
when a woman decides to wear one. On the other hand, a decision to unveil would be 
seen as a sin and could lead to bullying and harassment, as was the case of some 
Indonesian celebrities who were praised when they said they had received hidayah 
when they veiled and bullied when they removed the veil (Surya, 28.04.2017). Here, 
the concept of hidayah is similar to what Brenner (1996) called awareness 
(kesadaran) which is the central motives within the narratives of veiled women and 
Islam. In her works which focus on veiling and women in Java, Indonesia, Brenner 
highlighted how this awareness about veiling comes to women through various ways, 
from attending Islamic classes, reading religious books, and discussion with friends 
and others who try to convince them to veil. These processes build their awareness as 
Muslims to be a better person and closer to God, and veiling is believed as one way to 
do so. 
In Ainah’s case, her choices to veil were driven by her will to submit to God as 
she claimed she had already received hidayah. She said she did not wear a veil 
because of the pressure from the government’s regulations nor the dress raids in which 
she had been caught twice. She said her choice to veil was made freely, thus she acted 
autonomously regarding her public appearance. Even though her decision to veil 
might have been influenced by the norms in the society, Ainah said she had made her 
choice as she wanted to be more devoted to God. 
I imagine Ainah’s decision is like someone’s who decided to wear sneakers as 
part of their identity. In such a situation, we often think that style is a way to perform 
agency, a decision made autonomously without any pressure from society or the 
environment. We rarely see them as victims of some specific sneaker brand, fashion 
trend or social pressure they belong to. For many of us, such a view is more familiar 
                                                30	See:	https://kbbi.web.id/hidayah	
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and part of our everyday life, while those wearing other kinds of outfit either veil, 
burqa, or niqab may look foreign or strange. Thus, situating and locating the context 
of agency become important, so we can understand and appreciate one’s choice or 
decision. 
 For many people in Indonesia, the veil represents piety and public 
participation (Smith-Hefner, 2007). Like Ainah, many people I met in Aceh 
associated their decision to veil with piety, a decision made as they had already got 
hidayah or because they wanted to be a better more pious person. Like her cousin, 
Ainah, Laila also believed in the concept of hidayah but had particular views as can 
be seen from the field notes above. She believed that awareness should come from 
within one’s heart not by force, religious education was not only to educate people’s 
religiosity but also force a change in their behaviour.  
 Like Laila and Ainah, many women I met when I was in Aceh stated they 
actually agreed with shari’a which they believed as God’s law to live in this world; 
indeed, for a devoted Muslim, opposing shari’a could be seen as an act of disbelief. 
However, many people I met disagreed with the codification of shari’a as law, 
enforced by the government and often only focusing on regulating people’s public 
appearance as well as their morality. Some do not hesitate to argue against the 
apparatus when being caught in dress raids. I met Tina who later on introduced me to 
her close friends, Masyitah and Fatimah. All of them have experienced being caught 
in dress raids. Tina and Masyitah did not wear veils during my fieldwork time, while 
Fatimah has decided to wear one, a decision she said because she wanted to be a better 
person and at the same time because the veil has become a fashion trend. 
Fatimah told me her experiences of being caught by the WH in the past, for not 
wearing veil and wearing a tight outfit. She was with her other friend in a street food 
store when a few cars and vans with many officers arrived. Like Ainah’s story earlier, 
when she was caught she did not just stay silent, instead she argued against the shari’a 
police and even lied to them about her name. “I was ‘in war’ with the WH, I hate them 
and I was once caught [before] for not veiling and [for] wearing tight clothes” 
Fatimah explained. She then managed to escape when the officers were busy with 
other people. She described how the WH officers were arrogant and rude which gave 
her no respect towards them. She said their attitude back then made her reluctant to 
veil. Her decision now was driven by self-awareness to be better, which she also 
referred to as getting hidayah, although she admitted that the growth of modest 
	 176	
fashion has also affected her decision, reason that was also admitted by some other 
women I met during my time in Aceh. In the last decade, the veil in Indonesia has 
been transformed not only to symbolise religious or social activism but also as fashion 
trend. According to the State of the Global Islamic Economy report 2017/2018, 
Muslim clothing consumption in Indonesia reached US$13.5 billion, which makes it 
the fifth largest in the world (Thomson Reuters, 2017). In 2018/2019, it rose to US$20 
billion, making it the third largest in the world behind Turkey and the United Arab 
Emirates (Thomson Reuters, 2018). The Indonesian government also targets Indonesia 
to be the global Muslim fashion capital by 2020 (ANTARA, 06.05.2019). Thus, like 
other industries Muslim fashion has also been influenced by the capitalist market and 
global trends. 
Even though Fatimah had decided to veil, Tina and Masyitah continued to be 
unveiled until the time I left Aceh in 2017, even though recently I saw Tina wearing a 
kerudung (a type of veil worn like a scarf) in some recent pictures she had posted on 
her social media. Both Tina and Masyitah said they always argue against the WH 
officers when being caught. Masyitah even told one who grabbed her hands, saying, 
“You said you reinforce shari’a law, but look what you do to me, it is forbidden for 
you to touch me in Islam as you are not my muhrim”. She did not stop there, she also 
rebuked another officer who told a fat woman not to wear tight clothes. She told the 
officer, “It’s not her fault though, most clothes will be tight for her because she is big, 
so how can you expect her to wear loose-fitting clothes, what kind of clothes [do] you 
mean?”. The officers finally let Masytah off without saying anything else about her 
outfit. 
Both Tina and Masyitah have shown the acts of resistance against control and 
reinforcement conducted by WH officers regarding their public appearance. They also 
refuse to obey the curfew regulations, enforced by the city mayor of Banda Aceh 
which forbids women to be outside the house after 11 p.m., as they often took me to a 
coffee shop beyond this time. Tina and Masyitah are examples of those who perform 
their agency by ignoring the regulations and resisting the government officers when 
caught for not following the order. This kind of agency which is associated with acts 
of resistance, is probably more common among liberal feminists, as was the case of 
women in the Mennonite community mentioned early in this chapter (see Arthur, 
1998). However here, I would like to emphasise, the resistance act is only one out of 
many different varieties of agency by women in Aceh. Their resistance acts posed 
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different image of Muslim women who are often portrayed as submissive and 
controlled by their male patriarchy and religion. Their resistance here could be borne 
out of their knowledge of some religious narrative or lack of faith in the shari’a 
police’s credibility as legitimate enforcers. The WH are often criticised for being 
arrogant, rude, and discriminative as many of those being caught or told off are 
women from lower socio-economic groups (see Human Rights Watch, 2010a). In 
2009 a female detainee, accused of being together with her boyfriend, was gang-raped 
by WH officers at the Shari’a Police stations (Human Rights Watch, 2010b). Two of 
the three officers received eight year jail-sentences. 
In the case of Aceh, even though women are required by law to wear the veil 
many people wear this attire for different reasons: piety, as a fashion accessory or as 
part of their identity. Alia, for instance, a mother of one who works in the educational 
field told me that the veil is part of her identity. 
I was studying at a pesantren (Islamic boarding school), so the veil has 
been my identity since I was a child. So, it cannot be separated from me. I 
agree that in Islam there are many different interpretations about the veil, 
one said it’s to cover the aurat while others do not consider it is the aurat 
that need to be covered. However, for me it is part of my identity, if I do 
not wear it, it does not feel like me. 
A pesantren, known as a dayah in Aceh, is a traditional sex segregated Islamic 
boarding school in which the main curriculum is Islamic studies, from reciting the 
Quran and  as well as reading religious textbooks, known as kitab kuning which are 
written by Islamic scholars, often in Malay Arabic. As described by Smith-Hefner 
(2007, p.14) the veil is part of the uniform at pesantren, and it has become their 
“comfortable identity”. After finishing her study at the dayah, Alia could have taken 
off her veil if she had wanted to, however, she feels it has become part of her. For 
Alia, there was no restriction and specific rules regarding the veil they used when she 
was at the pesantren. She even said, “my female religious teacher who was the leader 
at the pesantren, just wore some sort of headscarf as her veil where you could see her 
ears and hair”. For Alia, in the past, people acknowledged fluidity in interpreting 
religious texts instead of forcing them to take a homogenous viewpoint. 
“People should be left to make their own choice. Even if they want to wear 
a veil or not, because individual piety is a personal relationship between 
one with God, it is not supposed to be forced by the state. So, when the 
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state gets involved in increasing someone’s piety, in my opinion they have 
taken God’s role to discipline the religious believer”. (Alia) 
Here, Alia linked the veil and piety as well, however, like Ainah and Laila, she 
considers it as a personal relationship between God and a human being. Again, it 
could be linked to the concept of hidayah, guidance from God to those God chooses 
so no one can force it, including the state. Alia even emphasised that the forced 
veiling regulations were only a symbolic action to make the government look Islamic. 
Alia and the three other women Ainah, Laila, Fatimah are only a few of probably 
many more women in Aceh who wore the veil but disagree with government 
regulations to force women to do so. 
Veiling regulations are part of government policy at the national and regional 
level. As the relationship between the two were not always harmonious, veiling could 
also symbolise a political move or solidarity. During President Soeharto’s time, or the 
New Order regime for example, the government imposed anti-Islam policies, such as 
banning the veil until 1991 (Smith-Hefner, 2007). This caused women who wore the 
veil to face many threats and discrimination, from getting their veil pulled to being 
threatened with not being given their high school certificate (Adriany et al., 2017). For 
some others, veiling could also hinder them from getting a job or promotion at work 
(see. Brenner, 1996). As a result, the veil was later used as a symbol of anti-
government solidarity (Smith-Hefner, 2007). Thus, veiling cannot be seen merely as 
an act of submission or being oppressed, even in a region where shari’a requires 
women to wear one.  
All the women I mentioned above shared the same value, that is they believe in 
God, and being a pious person is one of their duties in this world. They also believe it 
is their responsibility as Muslims to uphold shari’a, however they disagree with the 
formalisation or codification of shari’a by the state, which they claim ends up only 
focusing on people’s morality and eliminating the diversity in religious interpretation. 
They believe piety should come from within one’s heart, not from an outside force 
such as the state rules. In a case like Ainah, for example, we need to understand how 
she values her faith or religion and her aim in this world. Some people aim for 
material wealth but others believe in the afterlife and that their life in this world is 
only temporary. Hence, obeying religious belief is a self-fulfilment and being pious is 
one of their main goals in life to prepare themselves for the afterlife. 
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Age is also a factor in people’s religiosity. In traditional Islamic teaching in 
Indonesia, after the age of 63, the age when the Prophet Muhammad died, life is a 
bonus so we need to be more pious and get closer to God to prepare for the afterlife. 
In some parts of the world, religion is seen as way of life and something fundamental 
for people’s existence while in other parts of the world it is seen as something 
irrational that should be left behind. These differences should be respected. Even 
though people’s faith is often manipulated by others to maintain power and 
domination over them, neglecting people’s freedom to perform their religious belief, 
we not only homogenise and standardise the view about women’s freedom but we also 
deny their agency to choose what they believe in. 
In this section, I elaborated women’s different reasons for their choice to veil. 
They should not be subjugated by government obligations to wear a particular style of 
Islamic dress. Women perform their agency in many different ways that should not be 
homogenised as one form of resistance only. 
6.3 Between Domestic and Public Space: Adopting and Challenging the Norms  
Field notes, 17 December 2016 
 
It was Mid December 2016, Alia asked me to meet up in a coffee shop 
nearby from where I live. The coffee shop is always busy at most times of 
the day, but this is one of our most favourite places to meet up as the 
location is easy to reach for me as I do not have motor bike or car to travel 
around. When I arrived at the café, Alia was already there with her son and 
husband whom I have met a couple of times before. Her husband is 
normally busy doing some other things so is her son, which make me and 
Alia often busy talking about anything as well. This time I showed Alia 
some photos of a banner I took when I visited Lhokseumawe, including 
one with a picture of Aceh’s national heroine Cut Nyak Meuthia, who did 
not wear a veil. Suddenly her son responded by telling us when he and his 
school friends visited the Museum of Cut Nyak Dhien, they were told her 
picture that is often shown in public not wearing a veil, like picture I was 
showing, is not correct as she was actually veiled. He said the museum 
officer told them that the picture was the Dutch way to degrade Cut Nyak 
Dhien. Alia was shocked with her son’s story and she told me this is the 
first time she heard about this from him. She then told her son, “OK, next 
time we go to the museum again and look for the truth and [we’ll] also 
read more books about it”. 
 
Alia then told me that in the past she decided to withdraw her son from 
public school and chose to teach him by herself. She said one day, her son 
come back home from school crying and said to her that God is cruel. She 
asked him why? He told her about his day at school, the teacher told them 
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about the story of Noah and his ship and how God drowned people who do 
not believe in Noah and his God. He said to her “it’s really cruel, God 
drowned them and let them die, they could not breathe”. Alia then decided 
to teach him at home because she thinks she needs to give him religious 
lesson by herself. 
 
Alia’s story above reminds me of de Beauvoir’s views that women’s decision 
to marry and have children is like putting themselves into slavery (see Patterson, 
1986). De Beauvoir always emphasises women’s roles and responsibilities in the 
domestic space, which she argued, makes them not autonomous beings. In chapter 3, I 
discussed the transformation of matrifocal culture in Aceh due to dynamics in the 
national government policies. It was under the New Order regime (1967-1998) the 
government implemented what Suryakusuma (2011) called as state ibuism in which a 
woman was expected to be a good and obedient companion for her husband, a mother 
and educator for their children as well as a housekeeper. In addition to this, women’s 
roles in Muslim societies are often associated with domestic space while men’s with 
public space (BBC, n.d). Women in the Global South or Muslim societies are often 
portrayed as helpless, subjugated and victims of their eternal male and religious 
patriarchy and in need of being liberated from the domestic space where they were 
kept by their men. The aforementioned speech delivered by Laura Bush and the 
narrative of veil during the colonial era mentioned early in this chapter, represent this 
view. Thus, in this section I would like to highlight the experiences of some women I 
met during my fieldwork of how they empower their roles as mothers who are often 
considered as the one responsible to look after, nurture and educate their children. 
During my fieldwork, I often spend time with Alia, as mentioned above, a 
mother of one who is also a full time educator in Banda Aceh. After meeting her a  
few times I found out that she and some other women often organise training and 
activities for their children. For example, with the help of Laila, they organise training 
to teach the children about writing which encourages them to write fictional or real 
life stories. They also asked me to join teach their children especially as I had 
experience as a journalist. They often invited me when they gathered to meet up either 
in a coffee shop or park. In every gathering they discussed activities or additional 
lessons they could give to their children. 
My relationship with Alia and her friends brought me to an understanding of 
how they empower gender expectation regarding women’s roles as mothers. On one 
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occasion, Alia said, “for me religious education is really important and it should not 
be coercive as well”. She recalled an event with her son: 
 
“Once we went to Peunayong, it is an area where there are many Chinese 
(descendants), suddenly he told me ‘Mother, there are many people open 
their aurat here’. That’s when he was at Kindergarten. ‘many women 
exposed their aurat, they must be go to hell’. My goodness! I thought this 
is a ‘disaster’. Finally, I explained to him that it is God’s rights to decide 
who will go to heaven or hell, we should not get involved, instead we 
should respect their choice”. 
 
Alia thought the region seems to have become more homogenised, hence she 
was worried that her son would not be able to accept diversities. After hearing her 
son’s comments about the veil, Alia then chose to educate him at home. She talked 
more to him and even took him to meet some friends who are transgender. “He talked 
to my transgender friends and when I have some friends from abroad coming I 
introduced him to them, including to those who do not veil”. Alia did not only 
introduce values that often contradict the local norms, but she also brings fluidity to 
the concept of public and domestic space as she then teaches her child either at home 
or in a public area such as when meeting friends. One day, Alia and her husband took 
their child to the museum of Cut Nyak Dhien, to find out the story of her veil as 
mentioned earlier. The public domain is a place for her to nurture and educate her 
child, responsibilities which are often described as ‘domestic’ tasks. 
After a few years, Alia decided to send her child back to school, but she said 
this time she picked a school where he could meet people from many different 
backgrounds, Muslim and Non-Muslim, where women wear the veil, burqa or none, 
which she considers as the best way to introduce diversity. She always emphasised 
that God is kind, God is merciful and not cruel or a punisher. This way, Alia also 
defies the dominant narrative in the region, in which Islam is often associated with 
punishment, and the only way people get mercy is by being punished. 
Alia’s decision showed her autonomous being as a mother in her choices to 
educate her son. Her decision was determined by her desire to internalise diverse 
values in a society that she considers is getting more homogenised. In a society like 
Indonesia where the mother’s word is sacred to their children, teaching her son gave 
Alia more opportunity to counter the homogenising narrative. Alia carried out gender 
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roles expectations as a mother by educating her child, but at the same time she also 
challenged the dominant narrative in the society. 
Alia has empowered different modalities of agency, she inhabited local norms 
and moral principles as a mother, however her action also gave an opportunity for 
change particularly through education. Her decision might be seen as acceptance of 
the dominant narrative of women as the one responsible to nurture and educate the 
children, but in performing this expectation Alia has shown that through embodiment 
of certain values, one can internalise other values that could destabilise the norms. By 
introducing her child to the transgender community, she challenged the norms that do 
not recognise them and even consider them as a deviance that needs to be normalised 
(see chapter 4). “I told my child that we live in diversity so we have to respect the 
heterogeneity”. As she spent more time with her child she was also able to give him 
more knowledge which will affect the way he views the world. Thus, I would argue 
nurturing and educating children is not a repetitive job where women have no 
autonomy. The concept of domestic and public space also becomes fluid when 
educating children as Alia and her friends often do it both in a house or the public 
arena such as a park. 
The fluidity of space can also be seen from Sila’s story, a woman who 
challenges the masculine domination in a customary institution known as a Tuha Peut. 
Tuha Peut or village council is a customary law or adat institution, one of its main 
responsibilities is resolving disputes.31 A report by UNDP Indonesia (2011, p.34) 
about the community based justice system in Aceh describes Tua Peut as: 
a complementary body within a gampong or mukim whose members 
represent government officials, religious figures, adat leaders, and scholars 
of the gampong or mukim who act as advisers to the Geuchik and Imeum 
Mukim on governance, adat law, community customs and tradition; they 
also settle disputes in the gampong and mukim. 
 
According to Qanun No.9/2008 Tuha Peut, the Keuchik (village head); imeum 
meunasah (village mosque leader); gampong secretary; clerics, adat leaders and 
scholars from the relevant gampong, and others when necessary, are adat justice 
practitioners who have rights to resolve 18 forms of common local level disputes at 
the gampong level, such as petty theft, domestic disputes between families, physical 
conflicts, and some other disputes breaching local traditional culture. 
                                                31	Qanun	Aceh	Nomor	10	Thaun	2008	tentang	Lembaga	Adat	
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In the past, Tuha Peut was very male dominated and had no women members, 
hence, women encountered much resistance from various bodies and people in the 
society when they tried to join in (BRR NAD–NIAS, 2009). It happened to Sila, a 
woman I met during my fieldwork in Aceh who challenged the masculine hegemony 
by getting into the structure. When she first proposed the idea to join in the structure 
of Tuha Peut, she got much criticism and many rejections. Her husband was also 
worried that it might get her in trouble, however she insisted on challenging the 
institution as well as the society to give her an opportunity to get involved. She said 
when confronted with all local traditional leaders she just smiled and responded to 
them: 
“I want to join in the structure, not because I want women to be imam 
(leader), men are the leaders for us women, who stand in front of us. When 
women are involved in the structure, it does not mean to replace men, 
women become imam, No. But when we are placed in the structure, please 
let us women learn together with the men (…) Why do we want to learn? 
Because we never have space, no place for us to learn, so women are not 
clever. What is the result when women are not clever? A woman is the first 
mother (parent), when a baby boy or girl is born, the first one they see is 
the mother. So, if a mother is not clever, what can we expect from the 
(next) generation?” (Sila, Tuha Peut member) 
  
Many might argue that her decision to join might be seen as an acceptance of the 
patriarchal hegemony and social injustice. However, at the same time it gives her a 
chance to be heard and negotiate women’s position. Her move to get into the structure 
provides her with many opportunities to challenge male domination and at the same 
time engage men in gender equality practice. By working together with men, Sila is 
promoting equality in her own way. She is negotiating her position as women within 
the patriarchal structure. By learning together with the men, she is challenging the 
dominant hegemony to get women into the same position as men. Without 
acknowledging men as her imam, Sila might never have been accepted into the 
customary institution. By doing this it not only allows her to be part of the institution 
that was only dominated by men, she is now also able to ask for more women’s 
involvement.  
Sila’s position in Tuha Peut, gives her authority to help people in her society to 
deal with some problems. At the beginning, she said she had to be proactive in 
approaching people in the neighbourhood she is responsible for so they would be 
willing to tell her if they have a problem at home such as domestic violence. In the 
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past, she said many women were reluctant to share such a story outside the home. 
Hence, many ended up only telling their mother who would justify the abuse and tell 
them to be patient. 
“I told them it is an old habit, probably during our mothers’ time… the 
problem is that it is not a good habit, I said. For example, a husband hits 
us, hurts us, and we accept it. Why? Because our parents are still together 
until today and they experienced it as well in the past. They got their back 
rubbed and were told to be patient, ‘that’s why I never tell the story’ they 
said. Because when I tell my mother, she said she experienced that as well 
in the past, but she is still together with her father until today without a 
problem. So why nowadays you cry and make it a problem?... (I told them) 
we should never experience it anymore, at least if it happens to our parents, 
it should not happen to us, and our children have better experiences. (Sila, 
Tuha Peut member) 
 
 At the beginning of her involvement in Tuha Peut, she approached people, 
particularly women, to share their problem or disputes they faced in order to find a 
solution in a peaceful way. Now she said, it is not only women who come to her to 
discuss their problem but also men and give the woman’s perspective. One man came 
and told her “Bu (Ma’am), can you believe that yesterday when I came home, my wife 
had not cooked rice yet?”. She responded by saying, 
 
“probably your children were crying, having fever after immunisation 
which is common, so the mother fell asleep as she had not slept all night, 
so [that is why] when you came home she has not cooked rice yet’. You 
need to be patient”. (Sila, Tuha Peut member) 
 
Sila emphasises that the household belongs to the husband and wife, hence they need 
to share all the responsibilities. “Usually I talk to them while joking, not that seriously 
so they feel comfortable and do not feel like I am teaching them. Hence, they 
normally respond by laughing but also agreeing at the same time”. Sila said she 
always reminds people when their marriage was solemnised, they agreed to build the 
family together. By doing this, she tries to engage men in gender equality and 
eliminate the gendered division of domestic and public space. She invites men to get 
involved in domestic responsibilities which are usually only held by women and also 
invites more women to get involved in public and social activities for their own and 
others’ benefit.  
Sila both confirms the patriarchal domination and destabilises the patriarchal 
tradition when accepting men as leaders but also joining the traditionally male 
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organisation. She invites men to participate in the domestic space and women to get 
involved in some public activities. In performing her roles, Sila has also made the 
gendered public/domestic space more fluid by using her home as a meeting place for 
advising people. 
6.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter tried to challenge narratives about women living in the Global 
South and under Islam, which often portray them as one single category that is 
subordinated, domesticated and victims of male and religious patriarchy. Within this 
category women are perceived of having no autonomy to perform agency, thus need 
to be rescued. 
 In this chapter, I highlighted that the effects of the application of shari’a law 
are different for women than for men. There are mixed opinions about the way the 
government is upholding shari’a law in Aceh, and also about the Western narrative, in 
which women are perceived as having no autonomy and unable to perform their 
agency.  
 However, I found Mahmood’s concept of agency the most helpful to analyse a 
society which has a strong Islamic background, like Aceh, and to elaborate how 
women negotiate their position to perform agency in a strong patriarchal context, as 
observed during my fieldwork. Her works also acknowledged multiple forms of 
women’s agency not only in the form of resistance, hence her conception is helpful to 
explain the range of ways women in Aceh perform agency. Agency is performed in 
many other ways: from the adoption of local culture which provides women a space to 
follow the traditions but at the same time this space for change also destabilises the 
norms. Women’s acts, as discussed in this chapter, have contributed to destabilising, 
constructing and reconstructing the norms. In this chapter I highlighted three different 
cases, the first one regarding women’s decision to veil or not, the second was about 
women’s responsibility to educate their children about heterogeneity and the third was 
about women’s negotiated entry into a male dominated customary institution. 
Some women perform their agency by resisting the shari’a police during the 
veil raid. By doing this, they create a different image of Muslim women under shari’a, 
not only that they reject the obligation imposed on them but they also manage to get 
themselves out of the sanction. On the other hand, this chapter has also shown that 
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women wear the veil for many different reasons. Some consider it as part of their 
identity while for others, veiling is seen as the act of piety, a spiritual gain to be a 
better person, thus wearing it often makes a woman feel that she has made progress to 
becoming more pious. This kind of decision is driven by faith and spiritual belief that 
the life in this world is only temporary and the afterlife is permanent, thus one needs 
piety to get a better place in the afterlife. Unveiling, for them is not a symbol of 
liberation or freedom from oppression. I would argue feminism should also mean 
giving any woman their right to wear anything they like even if it means covering 
themselves which is often seen as a symbol of oppression in the Western societies. 
Adopting women’s responsibilities as a mother to educate her children, Alia 
decided to withdraw her child from state school and teach him amidst the current 
dominant narrative in the society which is getting more homogenised. By doing this 
she wanted to internalise religious values regarding diversity to her child. With some 
other friends who are also mothers, Alia organised training and activities for their 
children. Her role as a mother who is expected to nurture and teach her children, 
provides her with an opportunity to choose what kind of education and values she 
could give to them. Alia’s case also demonstrated the concept of domestic and public 
space becoming fluid. Nurturing children is often associated with the domestic space 
yet sometimes it took place in the public space. 
The chapter has also demonstrated that acceptance and confirmation of the 
patriarchal culture can provide space for women to perform agency which 
subsequently shapes and constructs the norms. Sila’s acceptance of men as imam for 
women affirms men’s role as leaders, however her negotiation allowed her and many 
other women to get into a strategic structure in the customary institution which used to 
be only dominated by men. Her negotiation made her voice heard, not only to provide 
more positions for women within the structure and many other public activities but 
also to negotiate husbands and wives’ roles regarding domestic tasks. Sila has 
engaged men to support her goals of promoting women to be more active and 
involved in public institutions. Through her role, she also shaped and re-shaped the 
concept of domestic and public space to be more fluid in which the domestic and 
public space is not exclusively for women or men. 
In this chapter, I have highlighted how agency should be understood in many 
different forms and situated as well as located in a specific time, place and context. I 
also would argue it is important to engage men to promote gender equality so gender 
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programmes would not be seen as only for women. This kind of narrative would 
eliminate resistance to gender programmes which are often seen as a ‘Western 
product’ and only for the benefit of women (see chapter 3). In addition, following 
Mahmood, localising, contextualising and situating the concept of agency would 
allow us to understand how women challenge dominant narratives in their society and 
how they contribute to the shaping/re-shaping of norms.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
This thesis provides an ethnography based research study regarding the 
application of shari’a in Aceh, Indonesia. I analysed local shari’a regulations as well 
as the discursive practices in everyday life. The practice of shari’a in Aceh has 
changed through time. This research found the codification of shari’a has 
homogenised religious text interpretation which created a discourse of a homogenous 
society. Limiting religious text interpretation into only a single exegesis does not only 
eliminate diversity of opinions, which has been the very nature of religious 
knowledge, but could also lead to discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion of 
some people or groups. The government, through the law, exercises power which has 
recreated the society’s identity as well as impacted on people’s bodies through all the 
regulations and punishment. To conclude, at least there are four main characteristics 
of the contemporary practice of shari’a: 1) the government or the state is the single 
authority to interpret religious text and transform it into law; 2) the codification of 
religious text into written law has homogenised religious text interpretation and 
eliminated the diversity which was the very nature of shari’a; 3) the modern day 
practice involves the institutionalisation of shari’a in which government apparatus, 
such as the WH, has been established to ensure the implementation and monitoring of 
shari’a practice in everyday life and; 4) hudud (punishment) is the character of 
contemporary shari’a. This is not only in the form of corporal punishment but also 
public punishment, which has brought physical and psychological pain to the accused 
(see chapter 5). 
This thesis is informed by post-colonial theory. Women in the Global South 
and the Muslim community are often portrayed as victims of the patriarchal culture 
within the society or the religion in particular Islam (see chapters 1 and 6). According 
to Mohanty (2003) Western discursive representation of women in the Global South 
often universalises women’s experiences, and portrays them as an oppressed group, 
victimised and backward. By saying this, I wanted to highlight my position as an 
Indonesian Muslim woman who had studied in a Western Institution, examining the 
application of Islamic Law in Aceh. This positions me as an authentic insider 
(Narayan, 1997) (see chapter 1). Thus, this research aims to be an authentic insider 
piece of work by a Muslim woman from Indonesia, studying gender and Islamic law, 
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that engaged with local values and at the same time critical about the discursive 
practice and application of shari’a.  
 Having said that, this research is informed by feminist postcolonial theory 
which allowed me to see the colonial legacy within the practice of shari’a in Aceh. 
Dutch colonialism and Islam in Indonesia never had a harmonious relationship, as 
Islam was used as one of the main narratives in fighting against the colonial empire. 
Colonialism transformed many aspects of people’s lives: the culture, governmental 
system as well as local judicial system including Islamic law. 
This thesis demonstrated that some regulations within the implementation of 
Islamic law in Aceh echo the colonial policy during Dutch occupation. Even though 
stronger Islamic identity often claims to counter western values, this thesis highlights 
how the law is actually mirroring Western values brought during colonial times (see 
chapter 4 about night labour and chapter 5 about modernisation of the legal system). 
Thus, this thesis is also a contribution to postcolonial studies, the Dutch colonial 
legacy in the Indonesian judicial system, particularly Islamic law. 
This research also highlighted various experiences of women under strict 
regulations that try to control their body and limit their mobility. It explored how the 
discursive practice of the application of shari’a has preserved and maintained control 
over women’s bodies, particularly regarding public appearance. It is also 
demonstrated how women negotiate their position within this discourse and find space 
to perform their agency. 
This chapter provides the summary of the research findings and conclusion. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section revisits the research 
questions and the research findings. The second section highlights the use of CDA and 
CGT in this study and its potential for future study, the significance of the study and 
its contribution to existing studies about Islamic Law, gender and Islam, as well as 
Southeast Asian studies. The last section discusses about limitations of the Research 
and recommendations for future research. 
7.1 Revisiting Research Questions 
In this section, I will revisit the three research questions addressed in this thesis: 
1. How is gender ideology constructed within local Shari’a law in Aceh? a) 
How should men and women behave under local Shari’a; b) How is shari’a 
	 190	
practiced within the society? 
 
Women’s gender roles and expectation have been transformed through time 
due to various factors including government policy, the prolonged conflict and 
tsunami disaster as well as the implementation of shari’a itself. Before elaborating the 
construction of gender ideology within Aceh’s shari’a, it is important to understand 
that the state or other political interventions have constructed and reconstructed 
gender ideology in Aceh over time. 
Regulations either from the central government under the New Order regime 
or the local government in the name of upholding shari’a, have been strong forces in 
shaping gender discourse in everyday life. Here I will elaborate the transformation of 
gender expectations towards women in Aceh. 
Within traditional Aceh culture, women had a greater rights and roles through 
the indigenous practice of matrifocality (chapter 3).  Under the New Order regime in 
Indonesia (1966-1998), the government gender ideology policy transformed the 
practice of matrifocality and also brought the dominant hegemony of Javanese culture 
to the whole society in Indonesia. At the same time, it highlights the state’s policy to 
manifest the nation’s identity through women’s body and its attempt to impose 
cultural uniformity onto them through the declaration of the kebaya as national dress  
After the New Order regime ended, the state/political intervention which 
affected the construction of gender ideology continued in Aceh, following the official 
implementation and the beginning of the codification of shari’a in 2002. The 
government established some institutions to ensure people uphold the shari’a in 
everyday life, and also actively promotes shari’a values through public 
advertisements and banners requiring people’s engagement in upholding what is 
claimed as God’s law. Thus, the government has extended its power through the 
discursive practice of the application of shari’a in everyday life. 
This research found that local codified shari’a regulates people in various 
ways (chapter 4). The state (in this case Aceh’s government) has set a unified standard 
of how people, men and women should behave in public space or even in private 
space. The standard which is represented in local codified shari’a regulates women 
more than men, especially on their public appearance and mobility. This thesis 
suggests that women’s dress has become a signifier of power relations. Aceh’s 
government imposes its identity as a region that has implemented Islamic law. 
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Women’s bodies and public appearance is marked to express the society’s collective 
identity, an important landmark that distinguishes it from another. Women are marked 
as a symbol of collective identity which represents the society’s honour (Yuval-Davis, 
1997), thus controlling and regulating women’s body means protecting the society’s 
values and integrity (see chapter 1). At the same time within the discursive practice of 
shari’a, women’s dress and veil are claimed as religious obligations. Hence, women’s 
bodies are marked as the burden of the society, the nation as well as the religion. 
Women’s public appearance that does not conform with the standard could be seen as 
an anomaly, a deviance from the norms and standard. 
 Within the discursive practice of the application of shari’a in everyday life, 
women’s dress also determines spaces they can and cannot go as well as people’s 
attitude towards them. The narrative about shari’a as God’s law that needs to be 
enacted and supported by every Muslim is always being reinforced in everyday life, 
either through various banners and posters in public space or religious sermons. It has 
attracted people’s engagement with the implementation of shari’a as well as 
supporting it in various ways, including by conducting vigilante acts, such as run a 
dress raids on public roads, ‘policing’ people’s behaviour including raiding people’s 
house, and placing banners that restrict women’s access to mosques due to their public 
appearance. Using shari’a law as the justification, many groups have used mosques 
and other places to extend their power over others, particularly women. Many of these 
acts highlight aggressive behaviour associated with masculine hegemony and this 
perpetuates social domination of men over women and other men who are considered 
as breaching the laws, such as khalwath, ikhtilath, zina,  or homosexuality 
(musahaqah and liwath) (chapter 4). This discursive practice marginalises women as 
well as men who do not conform to the expectations. Thus, hegemonic masculinity 
within this context is not only about domination and control by men over women, but 
also by men over men. 
The Aceh government’s gender ideology also restricts women’s mobility in 
public space as well as extends gender stereotype regarding women’s modesty. 
Women are expected to cover up according to the standard regulated by the 
government under shari’a regulations by wearing a veil and loose-fitting dress. Those 
who do not meet the standard are targeted during official ‘dress raids’ by the 
government authority the WH, as well as those by the aforementioned vigilante 
groups. The government also tries to limit women’s mobility through GI no. 
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02/INSTR/2014 about policing cafe and internet services in Aceh, CMI no.1/2015 and 
its revision version CMI no.2/2015 about supervision and policing tourist 
services/recreations/entertainment and internet services, cafes/other similar services 
and sports facilities in Banda Aceh city. All the three regulations restrict women’s 
mobility in several ways as discussed in chapter 4. Thus, within this discourse, the 
government uses its legal power to regulate, restrict and exclude women within time 
and space. 
This research argues the codification of shari’a in Aceh has contributed to the 
perpetuation of hegemonic masculinity which disseminates social inequalities within 
the society. Through all these stages, the state has a played fundamental role in 
constructing and reconstructing gender ideology. This thesis also argues that the 
codification of shari’a has homogenised the interpretation of religious text as the law 
is claimed to be based on the Quran and hadith. The government monopolises 
religious text interpretation and disregards divergent interpretation which used to be 
common amongst jurists in the past. Finally, the establishment of some institutions to 
ensure the enactment of shari’a regulations aims to preserve the state control and 
power over its people.  
2. How is punishment conducted on those who do not follow the local 
codification of shari’a? 
There are two main forms of punishment mentioned within Aceh’s codification of 
shari’a, which are hudud in form of public caning ceremony and ta’zir. Ta’zir is a 
form of punishment that is not mentioned in the religious texts, so this form of penalty 
is at the discretion of the judge (Mir-Hosseini and Hamzić, 2010). According to 
Qanun Jinayat no. 6/2014 there are four primary forms of ta’zir: caning, fine, 
imprison and restitution (money or other form of property). Additionally, the law also 
mentions seven other additional forms of ta’zir including: 1) re-education by the state; 
2) restitution by parents; 3) returned to the parents; 4) marriage termination; 5) 
revocation of permits and rights; 6) confiscation of certain items and; 7) social work. 
Amongst all type of punishment, hudud is the most renowned one and often described 
as one form of shari’a in Aceh. Thus, this thesis focuses on hudud punishment or the 
public caning ceremony. 
In chapter 5, I discussed the practice of the caning ceremony. This thesis 
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argued that the form and enactment of the punishment is gendered. Men are expected 
to stand and women kneel. This different treatment perpetuates the idea that women 
are weaker and subservient to men. It also reproduces the concept of masculinity and 
gender hierarchy within the society. 
The public caning ceremony punishes people in two ways: physically by 
torturing the body and psychologically by shaming them in public space. During the 
public caning ceremony people are brought to a public stage to accept their 
punishment. The person in authority reads all their personal information into a loud 
speaker, the criminal/moral offence conducted, as well as the punishment received. 
The government claims that the ceremony is designed to help those convicted towards 
taubat nasuha or sincere repentance, shame them and therefore, prevent them from 
making the same mistake in future, and the same time it could be a reminder for others 
not to breach the rules. This way, the government also exhibits its power and 
domination over people. 
Through the public caning ceremony, the person convicted experiences 
physical punishment as regulated in the qanun as well as social punishment from the 
society, being shamed in public during the ceremony and in the official media as well 
as on social media by those who have watched and recorded the event, could have a 
permanent impact. 
During the ceremony, people treated women differently, they were subject to 
more verbal abuse and humiliation than men. Some people in the audience shouted at 
women that they had embarrassed their mother or the village they belong to. Women 
often seen as the guardian of morality (Collins and Bahar, 2000), thus breaching moral 
values and their parents will also be seen as failing to teach good moral values to their 
daughters. 
The public caning ceremony also highlighted the use of violence by the 
government as a legitimate method to punish those who breach the law. Through this, 
government transfers fear to people, to remind and warn them of what will happen if 
they do not follow the order. Additionally, this could also be used as justification by 
some vigilante groups to use force and violence in the name of upholding shari’a. 
3. How do women respond to the shari’a regulations and how do they perform 
their agency within the society? 
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Throughout this whole thesis, I have argued that the shari’a application in Aceh 
regulates women more than men. However, this thesis also aimed to investigate how 
women responded to shari’a and how they perform their agency. This thesis 
contributes to the theoretical debates regarding women’s agency. Adopting Mahmood 
(2005) concept that acknowledges diverse forms of agency, this thesis also challenged 
the normative liberal assumptions of women’s agency which often defines it solely as 
a form of resistance. This thesis highlights how women negotiated their identity to 
perform agency, to shape and reshape the norms (chapter 6). 
This thesis demonstrated various forms of agency performed by women in 
Aceh, such as donning the veil, resisting government apparatus during dress raids, 
teaching progressive values to children, or even challenging male dominated 
institutions to gain some space for women. In chapter 6, I discuss various reasons why 
women choose to wear or not to wear the veil, and show that it is not necessarily a 
form of subjugation or homogenising tendency due to government shari’a regulation. 
Some consider the veil as part of their identity and some claim they have received 
hidayah, guidance from God, to make them pious and become a better person. There 
are also women who refuse to wear the veil and resist arrest, sometimes using 
religious discourse to negotiate their position. 
This thesis also showed how women use agency to negotiate with patriarchal 
values, such as the role of men as imam or leaders. This negotiation provided them 
with some opportunity to challenge the dominant hegemony by opening space for 
women entering strategic positions in a customary institution. This negotiation meant 
their voice could be heard and at the same time they also contributed to the 
destabilising, constructing and reconstructing the norms, through a non-
confrontational way. 
This thesis concludes that despite many restrictions under local shari’a 
regulations, women in Aceh showed ways to negotiate their identities to perform 
agency, challenge the dominant hegemony and contribute to the construction and re 
construction of norms. 
7.2 Significance of the Study and Research Contribution 
This research is based on six months’ ethnography fieldwork and involved looking at 
the local codification of Islamic law (qanun, GI, GR and CMI) in Aceh as well as the 
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practice of shari’a in everyday life. In analysing the data, this research was informed 
by CGT and CDA. In using CGT, analysis and development of theories were 
conducted after data collection, thus resulted in a grounded findings developed 
inductively from the data gathered. 
CDA aims to understand the unequal power relations and how domination and 
inequality is performed, produced and maintained in society (Van Dijk, 2001). In 
CDA it is important for the researcher to see a connection across text, context and the 
sociocultural practice. In this research, CDA helped me to analyse how the discursive 
practice within the application of shari’a is preserved and maintained through text and 
various forms of communication in everyday life, verbal or non-verbal. This study 
showed how language, which sometimes seems neutral does indeed contain gender 
bias (see chapter 4 about Qanun no. 11/2002). 
CDA and CGT requires a close reading and revisiting of the data, as well as 
memo writing which helped me thoroughly understand it, see emerging themes and 
identify the dynamic within the application of shari’a. Thus, this approach could also 
be useful and beneficial for future research in other topics or fields. 
This research is a contribution towards discussion regarding Islamic law, 
particularly outside the Middle Eastern context. The popularity of Islamic law has 
been growing in the last few years, not only in other provinces in Indonesia, but also 
in the neighbouring country in Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia and Brunei 
Darussalam. The two countries have also conducted visits to Aceh to learn the 
implementation of shari’a in this province.  This study was necessary, considering 
Indonesia is the biggest Muslim country in the world, and was once known as ‘the 
Smiling Face of Islam’. However, the adoption of shari’a regulations in Aceh and 
some other provinces in Indonesia through local regulations or Perda, has transformed 
the face of Islam in this country. Perda shari’a has become a popular narrative for 
many political parties to gain people’s support in the Muslim majority nation. The 
“Islamization of Politics” (Buehler, 2016) in Indonesia has not only brought religious 
narrative to the legislation system, but also perpetuates restrictions on people’s bodies, 
particularly women, as well as intolerance towards some groups/people such as 
Ahmadiyah followers and the LGBTQ community. I would argue the adoption of 
shari’a regulations will lead to the increasing of vigilante groups as has been the case 
in Aceh. Thus, government and policy makers, especially in a democratic country like 
Indonesia, need to study further the codification of religious text into a legal system. 
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As the largest Muslim country, Indonesia could also play a massive role to play in 
discouraging the homogenisation that is going on in Aceh and other neighbouring 
countries. 
 Future research could also study how policy makers can accommodate 
diversity within religious text exegesis, to give people options and at the same time 
revive interest and debate regarding Islamic knowledge, to achieve the fundamental 
goal of Islam, that is rahmatan lil-’alamin, (mercy to all creation). 
The codification of shari’a in to law in the modern day has neglected diverse 
interpretations of Islamic texts and acknowledges only one single interpretation. As a 
result, shari’a is seen as set of rules that control people in various aspects of everyday 
life, practices uncivilised punishment, and subjugates women. This only perpetuates 
western hegemony narratives which often portray Islam as male-dominated and 
oppressive towards women. Therefore, Islamic scholars and jurists need to bring about 
discussions about shari’a and diversity within Islamic text interpretation. 
As mentioned earlier, this research is informed, among other things, by 
feminist postcolonial theory. Thus, this thesis does not aim to universalise all 
women’s experiences in Aceh, instead I emphasise various experiences and ways 
women deal with challenges they face that open up opportunities for change. Women 
respond to shari’a regulations in various ways, thus their experiences cannot be 
generalised as one single category. This research provides an alternative to the 
definition of women’s agency, and recognises its multiple forms. Agency is not only a 
form of resistance, but also various ways where women negotiate their identities or 
even accept some patriarchal values, in order to give them space to destabilise, 
construct and reconstruct the norms. It is also important to engage men in women’s 
empowerment projects. In a society with strong patriarchal values where men’s voices 
are significant, to get them participating and supporting the idea of gender equality is 
essential. 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This research only studies six local regulations (two qanun, one GR, One GI, and two 
CMI), further research could investigate more regulations such as Qanun No. 8 (2014) 
about the main points of Islamic Law, or some more local regulations in other 
town/cities in Aceh. 
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This study has investigated and presented data and findings regarding shari’a 
and women as a group that are regulated the most within the society. Further studies 
could also examine other groups in the society that might not even be acknowledged 
or accepted, such as LGBTQ people. Future research might also want to focus on 
male actors, particularly as one of the participants in this research described men 
being “like dogs and women are bones”. Within this narrative, women are seen as 
passive objects, the one without good morality or the seductress and men as active 
agents (chapter 4), however it could be interesting to see men’s perspective as being 
explicitly portrayed as incapable of controlling themselves. 
Finally, This thesis has shown within the contemporary practice of shari’a the 
codification of religious text has homogenised its interpretation. Future research could 
expand beyond Aceh, particularly following the increase of shari’a regulation 
elsewhere, as mentioned above32 as well as the effects of increased homogenisation of 
religious text interpretation which transformed into law. 
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